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ESSAY
PATHS TO BELONGING: THE CONSTITUTION
AND CULTURAL IDENTITY
KENET L. KARs'rt
American history is the history of many peoples. In our multicul-
tural society immigrants have followed two paths- to satisfy their need to
belong: they have turned inward to group solidarity and outward toward
assimilation. Professor Karst explores these two paths to belonging and
illustrates how our Constitution can aid outsiders in their search for a
cultural identity.
If there is any figure in our national history who lives in modem memory as
a model of optimism, moderation, and common sense, it is Benjamin Franklin.
It was Franklin who urged his countrymen to "hang together" at the outset of
the Revolution.1 But a quarter century earlier, he had sounded a divisive note
concerning a growing foreign-born population in his home state:
Why should the Palatine boors be suffered to swarm into our settle-
ments, and, by herding together, establish their language and manners,
to the exclusion of ours? Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the
English, become a colony of aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as
to Germanize us, instead of our Anglifying them... ?2
Cultural differences are often seen as threatening deeply held values. Franlin's
exasperation typifies the fear and resentment frequently expressed by "native"
Americans3 toward strangers at the gate. Throughout the nation's history, dif-
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. A.B. 1950, UCLA; L.L.B. 1953,
Harvard University. This Essay is an expanded version of the William T. Joyner Lecture in Consti-
tutional Law, given at the University of North Carolina School of Law on April 12, 1985.
I have benefitted from suggestions for source materials and comments on a draft of this Essay
by a number of friends and colleagues. My thanks to Alison Anderson, Richard Delgado, Janet
Dolgin, Robert Goldstein, Joel Handler, Gerald L6pez, Susan McCoin, Audrey Schwartz, Gary
Schwartz, Steven Shiffrin, Margaret Stevenson, Jonathan Varat, and Stephen Yeazell. In particular
I am grateful to Catherine Hancock, whose wise suggestions for reorganization made it possible for
my main point to come out from under layers of wool in the earlier draft; this is her Essay, too.
1. Or, at any rate, so the story goes. For a caution about the story's authenticity, see BENJA-
MIN FRANKLIN'S AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRrINGS 418-19 (C. Van Doren ed. 1945).
2. Quoted in S. STEINBERG, THE ETHNIc MYTH: RACE, ETHNICrrY, AND CLASS IN
AMERICA 11 (1981). In the same year (1751), Franklin also expressed a preference for excluding
blacks from the country. 4 PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 227, 234 (L. Labaree ed. 1959).
3. Throughout this Essay, references to America and Americans are short ways of designating
the United States and its people. This usage reflects not chauvinism but economy; regrettably, we
have no other short expression to distinguish ourselves from the other peoples of the Americas.
(Even in Latin America "Americano," by itself, typically refers to someone from the United States.)
By "native," of course, I do not refer specifically to the members of American Indian tribes, but
to all people born in the United States. For a discussion of the experience of Indian tribes in this
country, see infra note 146.
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ferences in race, language, religion, and ethnicity have produced waves of nativ-
ist hostility to the members of cultural minorities.
In the two decades since Congress repealed the national origins quota sys-
tem,4 most immigrants to the United States have come from Latin America and
Asia,5 settling in some cities in large numbers. 6 Like their predecessors, these
4. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 911 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525
(1982)).
5. Senator Moynihan has said:
In fiscal year 1973, the top ten visa-issuing ports were Manila, Monterrey, Seoul, Tijuana,
Santo Domingo, Mexico City, Naples, Guadalajara, Toronto, Kingston. I would expect
Bombay to make this top ten list before long. . . . In short, by the end of the century, the
United States will be a multi-ethnic nation the like of which even we have never imagined.
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, quoted in Fairlie, Why I.Love America, NEW REPUBLIC, July 4,
1983, at 12, 17.
Between 1951 and 1960 lawful immigration to the United States from Europe, Asia, and Latin
America averaged around 133,000, 15,000, and 100,000 per year, respectively. For 1979 lawful
immigrants from the same three areas numbered around 64,000, 183,000, and 197,000, respectively.
INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 780 (1983). These numbers do not include persons who entered
the country without lawful permission. According to the U.S. Census, persons of Mexican origin,
who constituted 2.2% of the national population in 1970, constituted 3.9% in 1980. Bean, Stephen
& Optiz, The Mexican Origins Population in the United States: A Demographic Overview, in THE
MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY, 57, 59 (R. de Ia Gar-
cia, F. Bean, C. Bonjean, R. Romo & R. Alvarez eds. 1985) [hereinafter cited as THE MEXICAN
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE].
From 1968 to 1977 some 35% of lawful immigrants to the United States were Spanish-speaking.
Keeley, Immigration and the American Future, in ETHNIC RELATIONS IN AMERICA 28, 51 (L. Lieb-
man ed. 1982); Midgley, Comings and Goings in Immigration Policy, in THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE:
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE 1980s, at 41, 52 (D. Papademetriou & M. Miller eds. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE]. This figure is, of course, augmented by large num-
bers of immigrants from Mexico and Central America who have entered the country without per-
mission. The number of expulsions of such entrants has recently been running close to one million
per year. Weintraub, Treating the Cause Illegal Immigration and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, in
THE UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE, supra, at 185, 188. The total number of entrants who are settled in the
United States without permission is a matter of speculation. One authoritative conjecture places the
figure between 7,970,000 and 9,990,000, of whom roughly 80% are from Latin America and the
Caribbean, with about two-thirds of the total from Mexico. Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates
of Illegal Aliens in the United States, 1970-1981, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 223, 248-50 (R.
Hofstetter ed. 1984). A recent study concludes that the number ranges between two and four mil-
lion; this conclusion, too, has been challenged. Shaw, Number of lllegalAliens in the U.S. May Be as
Low as 2 Million, New Study Contends, L.A Times, June 25, 1985, § I, at 4, col. 1.
6. By the year 2000 a majority of California's population may be members of racial and ethnic
minorities. A fairly conservative estimate by the Center for Continuing Study of the California
Economy places the "nonHispanic white" population at about 55% of California's projected popula-
tion in 2000. CENTER FOR CONTINUING STUDY OF THE CALIFORNIA ECONOMY, PROJECTIONS OF
HISPANIC POPULATION FOR CALIFORNIA, 1985-2000, wrrH PROJECTIONS OF NON HISPANIC
WHITE, BLACK AND ASIAN & OTHER POPULATION GROUPS 23 (1982) (available from the UCLA
School of Architecture and Urban Planning Library). Although the Center's estimates of minority
populations are labeled "higher," in contrast to another "lower" projection, its assumptions about
unlawful immigration seem quite conservative. See id. at 38-39, 50.
At Hollywood High School in Los Angeles the students speak some 35 different native lan-
guages. Braun, Hollywood Higk Many are Strangers in a Strange Land, L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1984,
§ IX, at 18, col. 3. Minority students constituted 44.7% of the freshman class that entered UCLA in
the fall of 1983; the comparable figure at the University of California at Berkeley was 36.7%. Roark,
Minorities Soon Could Be Majority at UC and UCLA, L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 1985, § I, at 1, col. 1.
The 1980 census reported 14,079,906 foreign-born people in the United States....
The latest available reckoning indicates there are 121 self-proclaimed "ancestry groups"
living in the United States and speaking 385 languages and dialects. Last year, 204 foreign-
language newspapers were published in America. God (or gods) is (or are) worshiped in
the United States in approximately 250 different (denominational) ways.
The Golden Door, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1984, at 47.
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immigrants have encountered new expressions of nativism. Their reception also
raises new versions of some old questions about the constitutional order of our
multicultural society. When can government properly treat membership in a
racial or ethnic group as legally relevant? Do the members of a cultural minor-
ity have a constitutional stake in the preservation of their language and culture?
When does governmental support for religion amount to impermissible official
sponsorship? Should questions like these be left to cultural politics, or resolved
as questions of constitutional law?
Beneath these issues lie larger questions. Is an individual's self-identifica-
tion with a racial, religious, or ethnic group wholly consistent with that individ-
ual's identity as an American? If our constitutional law fosters the sense of
belonging to particular cultural groups, will it undermine the unity of the Na-
tion? What does it mean to belong to America? Who belongs?
In all times and places, cultural differences have bred suspicion and fear. In
times of trouble, those fears tend to focus on particular groups of cultural outsid-
ers as a source of danger. It becomes convenient to make scapegoats of
"them"-the people who look different from "us" or whose language or behav-
ior is foreign to our own. Cultural majorities have sought to force outsiders to
conform to the prevailing cultural norms; alternatively, they have sought to
dominate and suppress the outsiders, separating them from the public life of the
community. These responses to fear of the outsider have served as spawning
grounds for much of our present-day constitutional law. The United States
Constitution, in the first amendment's religion clauses and in the guarantees of
racial equality in the Civil War amendments, explicitly addresses issues arising
out of our cultural differences. Other constitutional doctrines also reflect the
influence of decisions arising out of attacks by cultural majorities on dissenting
cultural groups. Imagine, for example, what the freedoms of speech and of the
press might look like if all decisions involving foreign-born radicals, religious
minorities, and civil rights demonstrators were erased from the United States
Reports. 7
From the calling of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 to the present
day, the ideal of "one nation, indivisible" has occupied a central place in the
theory and the practice of the American political order. When cultural divisions
appear to threaten this ideal, one response is to bar people who seem different
from entering the country. Every period of heavy immigration produces polit-
ical agitation to close the gates.8 Despite this recurrent impulse toward exclu-
7. In his 1965 Ohio State Law Forum lectures, Harry Kalven, Jr., remarked that much of the
modem doctrinal history of the first amendment could be written around cases involving commu-
nists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and black people. This comment is modified in the printed version, H.
KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1965). Like the first amendment, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment received its modern baptism of fire as a guarantee of
procedural fairness in a series of state criminal cases involving members of racial and ethnic minori-
ties, eg., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (white mob's threats of violence forced jurors to
render guilty verdict against blacks on trial for murder); cf. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)
(a famous episode of anti-Semitism; Supreme Court denied a remedy in federal habeas corpus for an
alleged due process violation closely similar to that in the Moore case).
8. On nativism and immigration, see M. JONES, AMERcAN IMMIGRATION 147-76, 247-77
(1960); J. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925
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sion, however, the persistent reality is that we remain a multicultural society,
continually faced with the problem of building a nation.
The sense of belonging is a basic human need, vital to every individual's
sense of self. This Essay begins by examining the role of group identity in the
process of self-definition and finds in that process one of the main sources of
intercultural conflict. After discussing the various types of nativist responses to
cultural differences in America, the Essay explores two paths that cultural out-
siders have followed to satisfy their need to belong: turning inward to group
solidarity and cultural politics and turning outward toward assimilation into the
larger society.
Next, the Essay considers the ways in which our constitutional law has
recognized the importance of the values of connection-both connection to par-
ticular cultural groups and connection to the nation. Today's constitutional
doctrine proclaims the values of tolerance and individual choice of cultural iden-
tity. The same doctrine makes two promises to members of racial, religious, and
ethnic minorities. First, it promises them the opportunity to participate in our
public life as equal citizens while maintaining such ties to the minority cultures
as they may choose. Second, because those paths to participation are to be
opened, members of minority groups are to have the opportunity to choose to
identify with the cultural norms of the larger society.
Finally, the Essay discusses the unifying role of a civic culture universal to
all Americans and central to the idea of American identity. Early in our history,
the Constitution itself became a major symbol of our nationhood; it remains so
today because it continues to be seen as a repository for the central substantive
values of our civic culture: individualism, egalitarianism, and tolerance of diver-
sity. Whatever cultural path an individual may choose, our constitutional law
supports that person's right to belong to America by embracing the American
civic culture.
I. GROUP IDENTITY AND SELF-DEFINITION
In America, at least from its colonial beginnings, race, religion, and ethnic-
ity have been major sources of self-identification and identification by others.
Predictably, religious differences appeared early in colonial history, and in some
colonies these differences were the source of conflicts that were not limited to
religious doctrine.9 The roots of these conflicts can be found in the fear of out-
siders that is part of the process of personality formation in every human tribe.
(2d ed. 1981); Seller, Historical Perspectives on American Immigration Policy: Case Studies and Cur-
rent Implications, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 5, at 137, 140-55.
9. See generally S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 200-16
(1972) (discussing the historical significance of religious movements in the middle colonies of the
United States). On the founding of Rhode Island following the expulsion from Massachussetts Bay
of Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson. See id. at 217-36. Some conflicts concerned land claims,
which were, in turn, the foundation for political power. See, eg., id. at 217-21.
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A. The Importance of Being Connected
Members of cultural groups often regard themselves as the "true" people
and regard outsiders as inferior.10 The very names many peoples give to their
own groups reflect this assumption: "Many tribes call themselves... 'we-are-
men,' implying that all others are not."' "I Erik Erikson has called this phenome-
non "pseudo-speciation," a false sense of being a member of a separate species.
He traces the origins of this attitude to the process in which children are "famil-
iarized by ritualization with a particular version of human existence,"' 12 and
thus instructed in what it takes to be a respected member of the community.
The child, by this process of socialization, comes to "grasp the symbolic mean-
ing of behavior"; 13 the child comes to belong, to be a full participant in a partic-
ular culture. The assignment of meaning to behavior is one definition of
culture.
14
The individual's identification with cultural groups--ethnic, racial, reli-
gious, or language groups-plays a major part in the process of self-definition.
In defining ourselves, we rely heavily on others' views of us, real or imagined,
and on our connections with others. 15 Imagine right now that someone has
asked you the question: "Who are you?" Perhaps the reader is a Walt Whit-
man, who would answer, "I am myself, unique in the universe, and I exult in my
uniqueness."' 16 Most of us, however, would likely respond in words premised on
the ways in which we are related to others: "I am a mother"; "I am a law
student"; "I am black"; "I am an old man"; "I am a Jew"; or "I am the child of
Korean immigrants."
Although the list of identifying labels is potentially long, every feature you
choose to describe yourself also will embrace a group of people. In the raw facts
of existence, we are all Whitmans-unique, every single one of us. But as soon
as we use generalized language to identify ourselves, the uniqueness of each indi-
vidual comes down to this: no one of us bears precisely the same list of identify-
ing characteristics as anyone else. Because the naming of each separate char-
acteristic also identifies a group, it also is correct to speak of the uniqueness of
10. Eg., E. ERIKSON, LIFE HISTORY AND THE HISTORIcAL MOMENT 176 (1975). "There was
no word in old India to include both Aryans and non-Aryans together." H. ISAACS, IDOLS OF THE
TRIBE: GROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE 75 (1975).
11. A. MONTAGU, MAN: HIS FIRsT MILLION YEARS 170 (1957).
12. E. ERIKSON, ToYs AND REASONS 79 (1977) (italics in original omitted). On the use of
ritual in integrating the Amish community, see J. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 207-30 (3d ed.
1980).
13. E. ERIKSON, supra note 12, at 81.
14. See E. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE 20 (1973). Yet culture is more than a collection of
mental states. "Behavior must be attended to... because it is through the flow of behavior--or,
more precisely, social action-that cultural forms find articulation." C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF CULTURES 17 (1973).
15. See generally H. LYND, ON SHAME AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTIT (1958) (discussing
the relationship of guilt and shame to the development of a sense of identity). On "culture and
identification," see E. HALL, supra note 14, at 23-40. The dependence of both personal identity and
early learning on one's connections and emotional attachments to others is discussed in P. BERGER
& T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALrrY 100-01, 131-35 (1967).
16. See his poem, Song of Myself, in W. WHrIMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS 24 (E. Holloway ed.
1926).
1986]
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the individual in another way: you are unique in that no one else bears the same
labels; no one else belongs to exactly the same combination of groups that you
do.
The foregoing may make the reader want to cry out, "God is not a sociolo-
gist"-a proposition that seems self-evident. No label makes a person more or
less of a person. Each of us, however, does go through a process of self-defini-
tion, and in this process our primary bonds to family, religion, and ethnic group
play a crucial role.' 7 These "primordial affinities"' 8 not only provide a tie to
other people, but also offer us our very selves. No wonder that we develop a
bond "to the very tie itself."' 9 Helen Lynd captured the idea in one simple but
elegant sentence: "Some kind of answer to the question Where do I belong? is
necessary for an answer to the question Who am I?
''2°
We do not find our identities solely through acculturation; we also create an
important part of our identities out of a patchwork of labels. Primarily we adopt
labels that are offered to us-or imposed on us-by other people, not only when
we are children but throughout our lives. Most of us do not resist being labeled;
indeed, from childhood we insist on our labels and could not do without them.
There are those exceptional moments we all experience, when the wonder of our
own sheer existence shines through, and each of us can be a Whitman for a few
17. These are not the only bonds that are used to define the self. Additional features that we
share with others also play a part in self-definition. Examples are gender, sexual preference, occupa-
tion, and even political association.
18. J. GUSmELD, COMMUNITY: A CRTCAL RESPONSE 27-29 (1975); Geertz, The Integrative
Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States, in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW
STATES 105, 109-19 (C. Geertz ed. 1963); Shils, Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties, 8 BRIT-
ISH J. OF SoC. 139 (1957).
19. Geertz, supra note 18, at 109.
20. H. LYND, supra note 15, at 210. Although ethnicity is a term that is widely used and
seldom defined with precision, see H. ISAACS, supra note 10, at 26-37, it implies a sense of attach-
ment to a group, what Milton Gordon called the sense of "peoplehood." M. GORDON, ASSIMILA-
TION IN AMERICAN LIFE 23 (1964); see also Novak, Cultural Pluralism for Individuals: A Social
Vision, in PLURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC SoCIETY 25, 29-34 (M. Tumin & W. Plotah eds. 1977) (on
definitions of ethnicity). Thus, I use the terms "ethnicity" and "ethnic identity" interchangeably to
refer to one's connection with a group defined by the sharing of one or more of a number of overlap-
ping traits such as ancestral origins, race, religion, language, and culture. Social scientists disagree
about the degree to which ethnicity is a matter of individual choice. Some see ethnicity as a "strate-
gic" choice and others see it as acquired at birth. See generally Eisinger, Ethnicity as a Strategic
Option: An Emerging View (Book Review), 38 PUB. AD. REv. 89 (1978) (analysis of these two
viewpoints in review of four books on ethnicity in America). It takes no training in social science to
see that there must be at least some validity to both of these perspectives. Like other manifestations
of the "nature versus nurture" question, see, eg., E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SEX DIFFERENCES (1974), the issue of the sources of ethnicity must end with the recognition of wide
variation among individuals. The intensity of ethnic attachment and its effects on behavior also vary
greatly from one person to another. Micaela di Leonardo makes this point with great sensitivity in
her aptly named study, THE VARIETIES OF ETHNIC EXPERIENCE: KINSHIP, CLASS, AND GENDER
AMONG CALIFORNIA ITALIAN-AMERICANS (1984). See also McCready, The Persistence of Ethnic
Variation in American Families, in ETnmcrry IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRELIMINARY RECON-
NAISSANCE 157 (A. Greely ed. 1974) (discussing the influence of ethnic heritage on contemporary
American familial relationships).
An ethnic group, of course, is always in flux. Its changing membership results not merely from
births and deaths, but also from the infusion of immigrants and the erosion of ethnic attachment as
the generations pass. See infra text accompanying notes 176-80. Indeed, there is some exaggeration
in speaking of membership in an ethnic group, for the boundaries of any such group are necessarily
indistinct.
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seconds. But imagine what it would be like to have that feeling all the time. It
might be beautiful, but without question it would be terrifying. We need group
identities in order to go on living our lives. 21 Not only do the labels protect us
from being paralyzed by awe; they also designate our places in society and thus
reinforce our sense of self-definition.
B. Difference and Distrust
If my group identity tells me where I belong-and that I belong-it also
tells me that you, who do not wear the same identifying labels, do not belong.
We can trust the members of our own cultural group because we know the
meanings of their behavior and know what to expect of them.22 Conversely,
distrust of the members of a different cultural group flows from fear, not just of
the unknown but the fear that outsiders threaten our own acculturated views of
the natural order of society.
To grow up in a culture is to learn that some ways of acting or talking or
thinking are right and other ways are wrong. The very sense of one's identity is
connected intimately with this learning; a young girl, in order to appreciate the
idea of correct behavior, must understand the possibility of behaving incorrectly
and recognize that possibility in herself. Thus, each of us carries around inside
the image of what Erikson calls a "negative identity,"'23 which must be repressed
if we are to live up to the expectations of our cultural groups. Outsiders-those
who belong to other groups with other ways of behaving-make us uncomforta-
ble partly because our own acculturation has not prepared us to understand
their behavior 24 and partly because they serve so handily as screens on which we
can project our own negative identities.25 Our psychic response is predictable:
we want to repress the outsiders' incorrect, foreign ways.
Much of American history can be seen as a series of re-enactments on the
pattern of this "dramatic template." 26 Behind the bland term "intercultural re-
21. An existentialist might retort that it is only label-shredding, the pursuit of "being in itself,"
that enables a person truly to live. See, eg., J. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHNGNESS 3-30 (H. Barnes
trans. 1966). I conclude from my limited reading, however, that existentialists appear not to mind
the label "existentialist."
22. See E. HALL, supra note 14, at 35; R. WIEBE, THE SEGMENTED SOCIETY: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE MEANING OF AMERICA 172, 174-75 (1975).
23. E. ERIKSON, supra note 12, at 20.
24. E. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE 57-69 (1977).
25. E. ERiJSON, supra note 12, at 83; see also P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 15, at
170-71 (discussing how socialization can cause individuals to become "traitors to themselves" by
adopting the normal values of a given social group). Erikson applies this notion specifically to
"images of... the ethnic outgroup, and the exploited minority," in E. ERiSON, IDENTITY AND
THE LIFE CYCLE 29-30 (2d ed. 1980). These images, of course, do not arise spontaneously. Parents
and others teach them to children by precept and example; adults in a particular culture reinforce
the images for each other. See Pettigrew, Prejudice, in T. PETTIGREW, G. FREDRICKSON, D.
KNOBEL, N. GLAZER & R. UEDA, PREJUDICE, at 1, 14-20 (1982). See generally G. ALLPORT, THE
NATURE OF PREiUDICE (1954) (discussing the roots of ethnic prejudice in an individual's physical,
cultural, ideological, and religious background). Furthermore, discriminatory behavior reinforces
prejudice in the minds of the people who are practicing discrimination. Pettigrew, supra, at 29.
26. The term is R.D. Laing's. See R. LAING, THE POLITICS OF THE FAMILY 16 (1976). Such a
template is not innate, but is itself a cultural artifact. Cultural patterns provide "a blueprint for the
organizations of social and psychological process ... ." C. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 216.
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lations" lies the menace of violence. 27 When two cultural groups with conflict-
ing values contend in the political arena, each seeking to use the power of the
state to impose its values on the other, distrust can ripen into hostility and even
cause the rupture of the social fabric. No doubt it was this perception that led
vice-presidential candidate Edmund Muskie, speaking specifically about "people
of different races and national origins," to say in 1968, "the great issue in
America is whether or not . . . Americans can trust each other . ,,.-
Distrust and fear of persons with different cultural backgrounds usually
find expression in language emphasizing a conflict of values. In American his-
tory, however, an expressed concern for values has often provided the excuse
and the emotional fuel for hostile action aimed at preserving interests that are
mainly economic. 29 Typically, people who are themselves on the margin of the
society and economy feel most threatened by cultural outsiders and are the most
likely to resort to intercultural violence. When a Massachusetts mob burned an
Ursuline convent in 1834, the act expressed not only anti-Catholic feeling but
also resentment against Irish workers who were taking over jobs as bricklay-
ers.30 When Irish mobs committed their own violence against blacks in the New
York draft riots of 1863, two of the root causes were fear of the competition of
black labor and resentment over the use of blacks as strikebreakers. 31 Chinese
workers in nineteenth century California received their harshest treatment at the
hands of white labor union members. 32 And poor southern whites enthusiasti-
cally embraced the subordination of blacks when the racial caste system called
Jim Crow had its sinister flowering around the turn of the century. 33 When a
27. R. BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND
VIGILANTISM (1975); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE: RACIAL
AND RELIGIOUS BIGOTRY IN AMERICA (Clearinghouse Publication No. 77, 1983). A long series of
episodes of violence motivated by racial, ethnic, and religious differences is summarized in AMERI-
CAN VIOLENCE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 87-338 (R. Hofstadter & M. Wallace eds. 1971).
28. T. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF 430 (1982).
29. This is one of the main themes of S. STEINBERG, supra note 2. Assertions of conflict over
values are also frequently masks for racism. See D. WELLMAN, PORTRAITS OF WHITE RACISM
(1977) (case studies of how the cultural backgrounds of five whites affect their feelings toward minor-
ity groups).
30. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 149.
31. Id. at 173, 174.
32. Id. at 264; A. SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE
MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1971) (describing the white majority's attempts to rationalize its treat-
ment of Chinese immigrants on the West Coast). The attacks on Slavic workers in the Pennsylvania
coal fields in the late nineteenth century were similarly motivated. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 256-
57. Important political support for the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast during
the Second World War came from associations of growers and farmers and from certain labor un-
ions. F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORrY 217 (1962); M. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED 19-91
(1949). California's 1913 law forbidding ownership of land by aliens ineligible for citizenship (le.,
Asians) also was economically inspired. See M. JONES, supra note 8, at 253-54, 264. During the
Civil War, General U.S. Grant expelled Jews from the Department of Tennessee, making them the
scapegoats for all illicit cotton trading through the Union lines. Id. at 174.
33. See THE ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION (J. Williamson ed. 1968); see also C. WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974) (tracing the development of Jim Crow laws and
other segregation statutes from before the Civil War through the 1960s). Woodward makes clear
how the Southern patrician establishment encouraged this development by using racism as a way to
maintain its political dominance in the face of a rising populist movement among poorer whites. Id.
at 67-109. The final part of Stephen Steinberg's book, supra note 2, at 167-262, is devoted to demon-
strating "the class character of racial and ethnic conflict." For an excellent short statement of the
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cultural group is made into scapegoats, it is well to ask, "Cui bono? "; whose
interests are advanced by the scapegoating?
In its most severe forms, intercultural conflict can imperil nationhood itself.
Today's world contains a depressingly large number of illustrations. 34 In
America hostility among cultural groups is only part of the persistent problem
of achieving national unity, but it is properly seen as a threat to that unity even
when it does not reach the level of tribal warfare. Those who react to cultural
differences with fear or anger generally espouse nativist policies designed to re-
press the differences by excluding the "others" from the country, by forcing
them to conform to the norms of the dominant culture, or by relegating them to
a subordinate status in society.
II. NATIVISM IN AMERICA
American nativism has taken three main forms: religious, political, and
racial. 35 Late in the nineteenth century, racism broadened into Anglo-Saxon-
ism, which extended its hostility and its assumptions of superiority beyond race
to ethnicity.36 In 1924 Congress responded to this "tribal mood" 37 by radically
restricting immigration and imposing "national origins" quotas on immigrants,
based on the composition of the population as it had been in 1890, before the
great influx of "new immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe.38 The
1924 law had a dramatic effect on immigration, 39 but was not a sharp break with
the American past. Nativism's main techniques-exclusion, forced conformity,
and domination-were known and used in the colonial era.
4 °
A. Nativism as Forced Conformity
The "melting pot" did not become part of the national vocabulary until the
production of Israel Zangwill's play of that name in 1908, but the idea was as
political uses of scapegoating, see Kenneth Burke's 1939 review of Adolf Hitler's MEIN KAMPF, The
Rhetoric of Hitler's "Battle," in K. BURKE, TERMS FOR ORDER 95-119 (S. Hyman ed. 1964).
34. "One attempt to count the 'ethnic/cultural fatalities' in such clashes between 1945 and
1967 listed thirty-four 'major' bloodlettings and hundreds of lesser collisions and came up with an
estimated total of 7,480,000 deaths." H. ISAACS, supra note 10, at 3. Donald Horowitz's recent
study of ethnic conflict combines careful analysis with richness of example. D.'HORowrrz, ETHNIc
GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985). The study centers on Asia and Africa, with some discussion of the
Middle East and the Caribbean. See especially id. at 141-84, on "group comparison and the sources
of conflict."
35. J. IGHAM, supra note 8, at 3-11.
36. On the role of the eugenics movement id this process, see id. at 150-51; D. KEVLES, IN THE
NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HEREDITY (1985); Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt
Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1418, 1420-35 (1981). On the social sci-
ence milieu of the Progressive era and the rise of "intelligence" testing during this period, see Del-
gado, Bradley, Burkenroad, Chavez, Doering, Lardiere, Reeves, Smith & Windhausen, Can Science
Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity of Governmental Restrictions on Race-IQ Research, 31
UCLA L. REv. 128, 132-36 (1983).
37. . HIGHAM, supra note 8, at 323.
38. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, §§ 11-12, 43 Stat. 153, 159-61. Regarding the political
context of immigration quotas, see . HGHAM, supra note 8, at 300-30.
39. See M. JoNEs, supra note 8, at 278-307.
40. See id. at 6-63; R. WIEBE, supra note 22, at 14-18, 49-50; see, eg., S. A-iLSROM, supra
note 9, at 341.
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old as the Nation itself. In 1782 an immigrant from Normandy, Hector St. John
de Cr6vecoeur, published his Letters from an American Farmer, a series of com-
mentaries on life in the new nation. On the subject of assimilation he was
rhapsodic:
What then is the American, this new man? ... I could point out to
you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was
Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose present four
sons have now four wives of different nations .... Here individuals
of all nations are melted into a new race of men .... 41
How did one acquire the status of an American? Cr6vecoeur's answer makes
two points that have found repeated expression in our prevailing national
ideology:
He is an American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices
and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has em-
braced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He
becomes an American by being received in the broad lap of our great
Alma Mater.42
In other words, there are two cultural requisites for belonging: participation in
the Nation's political culture with the "new rank" of citizen and rejection of Old
World ways of thinking and behaving in favor of the culture of the "new race."
Later we shall consider the relation between American identity and the Ameri-
can civic culture.4 3 For now our focus is the assumption that a cultural outsider
can become a member of the American community only by relinquishing his or
her native culture and embracing the prevailing American cultural norms.
The metaphor of "melting," popular from the early nineteenth century up
to the 1930s, implied that both the "old stock" and more recent immigrants
would contribute to a new American character and culture. The term, however,
often served as an integrationist cloak for public and private programs aimed at
forcing new Americans and their children to conform to the attitudes and be-
havior of their British-American predecessors. 44 This "Anglo conformity"
came to dominate the idea of assimilation and thus to redefine the qualifications
for being received in our Alma Mater's lap. To call a group "unassimilable"
45
implied that its people were not sufficiently similar to the old stock to adapt
themselves to a society defined by the old stock's world view, and, therefore, that
they should be excluded from the American community. Congress implemented
this policy of exclusion by denying members of various racial or cultural groups
41. H. DE CREVECOEUR, LETrERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 69-70 (Penguin American
Library ed. 1981) (1st ed. 1782).
42. Id. at 70 (italics in original omitted).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 369-468.
44. See, eg., M. GORDON, supra note 20, at 84-114; Buenker, Mainstream America and the
Immigrant Experience, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AMERICAN CULTURE 312, 313-14 (S. Coben
& L. Ratner 2d ed. 1983); Gleason, American Identity and Americanization, in W. PETERSON, M.
NOVAK & P. GLEASON, CONCEPTS OF ETHNlcrry 57, 80-96 (1982). See generally J. HIOHAM,
supra note 8 (examining American nativism from 1825-1860).
45. Most immigrant groups have been tagged with this label or similar ones. See M. JONES,
supra note 8, at 248 (concerning the Chinese); A. SAXTON, supra note 32 (concerning the Chinese);
see also T. SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA 34-35, 57-58 (1981) (concerning the Irish and the Germans).
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entry into the country46 and by denying the benefits of citizenship both to cer-
tain classes of aliens47 and to Americans who were black or Indian.48 The irony
is that the universalism expressed by Cr6vecoeur-that all who embraced the
nation's ideals would be admitted to full membership in America-was twisted
so easily into racist nativism. It is no wonder that the members of some ethnic
groups today bristle at the very word "assimilation" and take it as an affront.
The campaign for "Americanization" of foreigners, which gained intensity
during the First World War and culminated in the mania of the Red Scare of
1919 to 1920, was the most determined national effort to coerce conformity to
the values and behavior of the dominant culture. Government officials joined
with private organizations in a zealous effort to press foreign-born Europeans to
become citizens, to abandon their native languages for English, to suppress any
expression of "anti-American" sympathies, and generally to demonstrate a
"[c]onformist loyalty intolerant of any values not functional to it."49 The
message was simple: to belong, you must conform.
Americanization mixed well-intentioned good works with nativist coercion.
Many who took an interest in bringing the foreign-born into American society's
mainstream offered vital social services, from adult education to housing assist-
46. The Supreme Court consistently has treated congressionally mandated exclusions of aliens
from the country with extreme deference, even upholding exclusions that are candidly racist. The
leading early decision was the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). To say the very least,
such decisions are in tension with the Court's modem treatment of other legislative classifications
based on race, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (racial classifications bear a "very heavy
burden ofjustification"). Yet no recent decision has suggested that the Court is about to change its
deferential position toward congressional control over admission of aliens to the country. Nonethe-
less, the modem constitutional climate seems to have contributed to the abandonment by Congress
in 1965 of the "national origins quota" system of admission of aliens for permanent residence. See
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 911-12.
Since 1965, immigration from Europe has been outpaced by immigration from Latin America and
Asia. See supra note 5. Because of the 1965 amendments, the Supreme Court has been relieved of
the necessity to reconsider the constitutionality of racially based statutory exclusions of aliens.
One permissible inference from the broad power of Congress to exclude aliens is that due pro-
cess protections of the right to remain in the country grow progressively stronger as an alien lives,
works, and establishes ties here. Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of
Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1324-34 (1983). For a short summary of congressional policy to-
ward immigration, see Bernard, A History of US. Immigration Policy, in R. EASTERLIN, D. WARD,
W. BERNARD & R. UEDA, IMMIGRATION 75 (1982) [hereinafter cited as IMMIGRATION].
47. As early as 1790 Congress limited naturalization to "free white" persons. Act of March 26,
1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795). During Reconstruction, Congress made persons of African
descent eligible for naturalization. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256. In 1922 the
Supreme Court faced the question whether aliens of Japanese ancestry were eligible for citizenship.
The Court's answer: No, Japanese are not African, and "white," in the statute, means Caucasian.
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). During andjust after the Second World War Congress
repealed these racial restrictions on naturalization. Act of December 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat.
600, 600-01 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 263 (1982)) (Chinese); Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534, § 1, 60 Stat.
416, 416 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 703 (1982)) (Indian and Filipino); Immigration and Naturalization
Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 311, 66 Stat. 163, 239 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1982)) (total repeal of the
exclusion, principally affecting Japanese). Under modern constitutional doctrine a racial restriction
on naturalization of persons otherwise qualified for citizenship almost certainly would be invalid.
The history of American policy toward citizenship is briefly summarized in Ueda, Naturalization
and Citizenship in IMMIGRATION, supra note 46, at 106.
48. Even the abolitionists did not argue for full integration. See J. HIGHAM, SEND THESE TO
ME: IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN AMERICA 179 (1984).
49. J. HIGHAM, supra note 8, at 247.
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ance to protection against fraud.50 The coercive face of Americanization had its
private aspects,5 1 but also enlisted government officials at all levels. In 1918
Congress doubled the income tax on "non-resident aliens";5 2 although it was not
clear who would be considered non-resident, thousands of aliens promptly de-
clared their intention to become citizens.5 3 Other measures were proposed and
even introduced in Congress, but failed to pass: deportation of aliens who failed
to apply for citizenship or who failed to learn English within a specified period;
and, short of deportation, "suppression of the foreign-language press, mass in-
ternments, and the denial of industrial employment to aliens."
'5 4
State and local governments joined the Americanization crusade with
gusto. Fifteen states banned teaching foreign languages in public schools; some
states required public school teachers to be citizens; and Oregon required all
elementary school children to attend public rather than private schools. A few
years later the United States Supreme Court held both the ban on teaching for-
eign languages and the ban on private elementary schools unconstitutional.55
The Governor of Iowa was not to be outdone; he issued a proclamation forbid-
ding the use of foreign languages in public and private schools, in church serv-
ices, and even in conversations in public places or over the telephone.5 6 In an
action eventually upheld by the Supreme Court, Cincinnati prohibited aliens
from operating poolrooms, to prevent foreigners from gathering in places where
they would be away from Americanizing influences.5 7 Most of these measures
and proposals plainly violate today's constitutional norms.5 8 In the frenzy of
1915 to 1920, however, if the foreign-born were to have Americanization im-
posed upon them, the courts were only rarely disposed to intervene.
Forced conformity, like other forms of cultural domination, is not just a
means of securing power or material advantage for members of the dominant
culture. The coercion of a cultural minority to conform also reassures the ma-
jority that its own group identities are secure. For example, the question of
liquor prohibition, which arose in the mid-nineteenth century, always repre-
50. Id. at 235-50.
51. Employers, for example, pressed their alien employees to become citizens and otherwise
encouraged the abandonment of Old World dress and manners. Id. at 235-48.
52. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 210, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062 (1919).
53. J. -IGHAM, supra note 8, at 248.
54. Id. at 249-50. The National Americanization Committee further recommended congres-
sional legislation requiring semiannual registration of the whole population and internment of those
who had "anti-American" sympathy. Id. at 249.
55. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (elementary schools); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (foreign language). The modern Court, however, has upheld a state law forbid-
ding aliens to teach in public schools. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
56. J. HIGH a, supra note 8, at 247 n.30.
57. Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927). The Court previously had upheld a
1915 New York law preferring citizens over aliens as laborers in projects under public works con-
tracts. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
58. The exceptions, in addition to the ban on alien school teachers, likely would be found in the
proposals for deportation of aliens and the discriminatory income tax. Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976) (unanimously upholding conditions that denied Medicare benefits to some aliens and
articulating very permissive standard ofjudicial review for congressional regulation of aliens). Given
the Supreme Court's recent decisions, it is not possible to be confident that a congressional ban on
employment of aliens in industrial plants would be held invalid.
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sented more than a dispute about the use of legal sanctions to prevent alcohol
abuse. The issue symbolized the question whether Anglo-Protestant morality
could maintain its dominance over the cultural norms that Irish and German
immigrants had brought with them.5 9 It was no accident that the prohibition
amendment to the Constitution was proposed and ratified at the height of the
Americanization furor; the temperance movement and nativism had always
gone hand in hand. The effort of evangelical Protestants to enact their norms
into law polarized the opposing forces and accentuated the symbolic import of
the movement. Now that the issues had been joined, defeat or victory was a
clear-cut statement of public dominance.6° The old saw, "The wets have their
liquor and the drys have their law," spoke not only to hypocrisy but also to
nativism.
Intercultural domination, however, always rests on shaky foundations, for
it is based on fear. The dominant group seeks to impose its norms precisely
because it sees those norms threatened by the others' very presence. On both
sides of the prohibition issue, cultural identifications were strengthened, because
both sides felt that their cultural values were under attack. Attempts at domina-
tion are not always successful. In 1932, with the strong support of the Irish
voters in northeastern cities, the Democratic Party captured the Presidency and
the Congress. The repeal of the eighteenth amendment was accomplished the
following year.
6 1
Not all forms of domination are so readily reversed through the practice of
cultural politics. Particularly when cultural hostility is aggravated by wartime
anxiety, distrust of a cultural minority is apt to ripen into suspicions of disloy-
alty and suppression of dissent.
B. Nationalism and Negative Identity
In principle, allegiance to the United States is not inherited but is chosen by
each citizen. A century-old act of Congress embodies the right of expatriation.
62
Thus, citizens who are cultural outsiders may be suspected of disloyalty, espe-
cially if they express their dissent from prevailing political norms. This sort of
suspicion is merely a special case illustrating the more general tendency to pro-
ject one's own "negative identity" onto outsiders.63 The insiders' suspicions are
59. One commentator has noted:
Advocates of prohibition [in the 1850s]... found their progress threatened by "a noisy,
drinking and brawling rabble" of Irish and Germans. "They bring the grog shops like the
frogs of Egypt upon us," one writer complained, and the temperance societies warned that
the success of their cause depended upon a check of immigration.
R. BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF AMERI-
CAN NATIVISM 323 nn.2-3 (1938).
60. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance, 15 Soc.
PROBS. 175, 184 (1967). See generally J. GUSFiELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND
THE AMERICAN TEMPERENCE MovEmENT (1963) (detailing how political conflicts over the
temperence movement symbolized the ascent and descent of status groups).
61. The twenty-first amendment, repealing the eighteenth amendment, was ratified in 1933.
62. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223.
63. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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heightened by their own awareness of the ways in which they have subordinated
the outsiders, denying them membership in the community and a sense of be-
longing: "Of course they can't be loyal; look at the way we have treated them."
Ever since the colonial era, suspicions of disloyalty have surrounded vari-
ous minorities: Catholics, who were thought loyal to a foreign Pope;
64
Germans, who were required to sign a loyalty oath in Pennsylvania in 172765
and who remained suspect during the First World War; 66 persons of Japanese
ancestry, who were interned during the Second World War;67 and Chinese, who
were called "subversive" in California late in the nineteenth century.68 In a
nation of immigrants, it could hardly be otherwise. Most of the foreign-born do
retain ties to their home countries, and their descendants often seek to influence
the Nation's policy toward foreign causes in foreign lands. This allegiance of
immigrants to their homeland often has been viewed by members of the domi-
nant culture as disloyalty to America.
The American Revolution itself required people to choose sides between
allegiances to their ancestral homelands and their new nation. Both the old
stock of English ancestry and other ethnic groups were divided in their attitudes
toward the Revolution-"a triumph of environment over heredity."' 69 Two in-
stitutional questions concerning the loyalty of the foreign-born surfaced at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 and persisted past the turn of the century.
First, how long should aliens be required to walt before they became eligible for
citizenship? Second, should the foreign-born be eligible to hold public office?
The Convention left to Congress the issue of the residence period for naturaliza-
tion,70 but did set qualifications for election to Congress and the presidency.
The President must be a "natural born" citizen, with fourteen years of residence
in the United States.7 1 Despite George Mason's reluctance "to be governed by
foreigners and adventurers,"'72 the Convention required only relatively short pe-
riods of citizenship for senators and representatives. 73 The First Congress set
the waiting period for naturalization at two years.
74
Soon, however, as a direct result of the influx of political refugees, the cli-
64. R. BILLINGTON, supra note 59 (Anti-Catholic sentiments of American colonists stemmed
from English bitterness toward Catholics and from perceived threats from various Catholic groups.);
J. HIGHAM, supra note 8, at 5-7, 28-31, 77-87, 291-94.
65. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 47-48.
66. See supra text accompanying note 49.
67. See supra note 32; infra notes 101, 122.
68. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 248-49.
69. Id. at 63; cf F. LEYBURN, THE SCOTCH-IRISH: A SOCIAL HISTORY 253-54, 305-09 (1962)
(most Scotch-Irish enthusiastically supported American independence; exception was in North Car-
olina where Presbyterian ministers led support for the Crown).
70. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
71. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. Alternatively, the President might be a United States citizen at the
time the Constitution was adopted. Id.
72. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 81.
73. The terms were seven years for the House of Representatives and nine years for the Senate.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (House of Representatives); id. § 3, cl. 3 (Senate).
74. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Naturalization Act of 1795, ch.
20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414; see M. JONES, supra note 8, at 81-82.
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mate changed. 75 By 1795 the waiting period had been extended to five years,76
and three years later, under the threat of war with revolutionary France, a Fed-
eralist Congress extended the period for naturalization to fourteen years in a
legislative package that included the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts.77 The
Federalists expressed fear that aliens were engaging in "treasonable or secret
machinations against the government." 78 The Alien Enemies Act gave the Pres-
ident discretion to seize and deport an alien summarily, without accusation or
hearing.79 The war with France failed to materialize; the Alien Friends Act
expired in 1800, and the Alien Enemies Act went unenforced.80 Yet these laws
had their intended intimidating effect; in 1798 several boatloads of French citi-
zens left the United States.81 The Sedition Act, which essentially made strong
criticism of government officials a crime, was logically connected with the Alien
Acts: "those who corrupt our opinions. . . are the most dangerous of all ene-
mies.",82 Unlike the Alien Acts, however, this law was enforced, chiefly against
foreign-born critics of the government. 83
Upon the Republicans' accession to national political power in the 1800
elections,84 Jefferson pardoned the victims of the Sedition Act. 85 In 1802 the
waiting period for naturalization was again set at five years, where it has re-
mained ever since.86 The Alien and Sedition Acts were discredited. The legisla-
tures of Kentucky and Virginia reflected more than a local opinion when they
complained that Congress had exceeded its enumerated powers, and that the
Acts, by giving legislative and judicial powers to the President, had "subverted
the general principles of free government."'87 In the twentieth century, the
United States Supreme Court has made use of this history to support its develop-
75. Federalists feared the Irish, Jacobins who had fled from France, and exiled British radicals.
Republicans feared French royalists who had been expelled from France and Santo Domingo. M.
JONES, supra note 8, at 82-83.
76. Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414, 414, repealed by Naturalization Act of
1802, ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 153. The Act also required applicants for naturalization to renounce for-
eign titles and foreign loyalties.
77. Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, § 1, 1 Stat. 566, 566-67, repealed by Naturalization Act
of 1802, ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 153, 153-54. Because the royalists had gone back to France, Republicans
decried the Acts. The French and Irish had become Republican supporters-a factor that was not
irrelevant to the Federalists' enthusiasm for these laws.
78. J. CAREY, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE 37 (1931).
79. Id. at 37-38; M. JONES, supra note 8, at 86.
80. President Woodrow Wilson, however, used the Alien Enemies Act during the First World
War. J. HIGHAM, supra note 8, at 210.
81. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 87-88.
82. W. PRESTON, ALIENS AmD DISSENTERS 22 (1963). The Federalists' anti-Jacobin rhetoric
linked atheism with sedition. L. LEvY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 288-89 (1985).
83. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 88.
84. The Republicans captured both Congress and the Presidency. Thomas Jefferson was
elected President with crucial support of French- and Irish-born citizens in New York City.
85. See Justice Brennan's discussion of this history in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 273-77 (1964).
86. Naturalization Act of 1802, ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 153, 153-54; M. JONES, supra note 8, at 9.
87. J. CAREY, supra note 78, at 38-39 (quoting Madison's speech before the Virginia Assembly,
Dec. 21, 1798). On the emergence of a libertarian theory of the freedom of the press out of the
Republican reaction to the Sedition Act, see L. LEvY, supra note 82, at 282-349.
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ment of strongly libertarian first amendment doctrine.8 8 Yet the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts left another legacy that is anything but libertarian. They set a pattern
for the institutionalization of nativist exclusion as an appropriate response to
fear of foreign people and foreign ideas. The Hartford Convention in 1814
called for a constitutional amendment to forbid a naturalized citizen from hold-
ing federal office.89 In the 1850s the Know-Nothing Party renewed this demand
and called for extending the residence requirement for naturalization to twenty-
one years.90 None of these proposals was enacted, although Massachusetts,
under the influence of the Know-Nothings, briefly amended its state constitution
to prohibit immigrants from voting until two years after their naturalization.91
More significantly, the exclusion and expulsion of aliens on political grounds has
reappeared periodically in the twentieth century, 92 along with the use of govern-
mental power to suppress both radical and moderate dissent by members of cul-
tural minorities.
93
The assumed connection between alienage and disloyalty appears to be
deeply rooted in the role that "negative identity" plays in self-definition. 94 No
one should be surprised when a legislature translates this antipathy to foreigners
into laws limiting a wide variety of state jobs to citizens; the legislature, after all,
represents voters, not one of whom is an alien.95 It is surprising, however, that
recent majorities of the Supreme Court have turned a blind eye to such bursts of
nativism as laws forbidding aliens to be public school teachers or probation of-
ficers.96 When the Court upheld these laws using language about preserving our
"'political community,"' 97 its words were more than a little reminiscent of the
88. Justice Holmes made this point in his influential dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919), which he wrote during the great postwar Red Scare. The case involved the
prosecution of alien supporters of the Russian Revolution. In fact, most recent immigrants had been
politically inactive. M. JoNEs, supra note 8, at 237. Holmes appears to have been wrong about his
history. L. LEvy, supra note 82, at 281. Justice Brennan got it right in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-77 (1964).
89. M. JoNEs, supra note 8, at 89.
90. Id. at 156-57.
91. Id. at 157-58.
92. For a discussion of the "Soviet Ark," a boatload of leftist aliens deported to Russia in 1919
during the Red Scare, see M. JONES, supra note 8, at 274. A 1903 law forbade anarchists from
entering the country. Id. at 262. During the 1950s there were some deportations of aliens for polit-
ical reasons, and the exclusion of radical aliens was common. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972), sustained a provision of the Immigration and Naturality Act of 1952, ch. 66 Stat. 477, § 212
(a)(28)(D), 163, 185 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(28)(D) (1982)), that made alien communists
ineligible to receive entry visas.
93. On the "Palmer Raids" of 1919 to 1920, a massive roundup of radicals, see W. PRESrON,
supra note 82, at 208-29. Black radicals were a particular target for both federal and state officials.
See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935); FEDERAL
SURVEILLANCE OF AFRO-AMERICANS 1917-25: THE FIRsT WORLD WVAR, THE RED SCARE, AND
THE GARVEY MOVEMENT (T. Kornweibel ed. microfilm 1985).
94. See supra text accompanying note 23.
95. Once I heard Judge James Garfield Stewart of the Ohio Supreme Court tell this story: He
was running for reelection as mayor of Cincinnati during one of the periodic crises in Cyprus pitting
Greeks against Turks. In the judge's words: "I spoke one night to a Greek-American organization.
You know, there aren't many Turks in Cincinnati,. . . [pause]. . .and I just gave the Turks hell."
96. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979) (public school teachers).




Federalist rhetoric of 1798 about "those who corrupt our opinions." 98 Who
knows what heresy may be propagated when a French citizen, teaching a French
language class, helps students to pronounce words such as libertd, dgalitd, and
fraternit6 ?99
Wartime combines anxiety with patriotic fervor, weakening the restraints
that ordinarily inhibit acts of hostility against cultural outsiders-as the French
who left New York in 1798 well understood. The wave of nativism that swept
the country in the mid-nineteenth century was similarly exaggerated by anxieties
over an internal conflict that eventually would lead to war-anxieties over the
state of a Union that seemed to be coming apart. 10 0 By the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, two world wars had produced two virulent nativist movements: the harsh
treatment of both Germans and foreign-born radicals during and after the First
World War, and the assault on Japanese Americans during the Second World
War.1°1 During the Vietnam War blacks who opposed the war risked being
charged with radicalism, or disloyalty, or both.'02 It bears emphasis that the
question of disloyalty was typically posed not for individuals but for groups.
General John L. DeWitt, who presided over the "relocation" of Japanese Amer-
icans in the Second World War, illustrated this phenomenon in his shameful
remark, "A Jap's a iap.''1
°3
Religious, racial, and ethnic ties also have caused various cultural groups to
seek to influence American public policy concerning issues in "the home coun-
try." The catalogue is as long as the list of ethnic groups in America-and that
is a long list, indeed. I° 4 Today an American Jew can support Israel and an
98. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
99. In Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982), the official job description was "Deputy
Probation Officers, Spanish-speaking." Id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
some recent cases in this area, see Note, A Dual Standard for State Discrimination Against Aliens, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1576 (1979).
100. See, eg., R. BILLINGTON, supra note 59, at 386 ("The Know-Nothing Party was really a
no-Popery party .... This fact alone accounts for its unity, for on more material matters the
Know-Nothings were as divided as other organizations in that area of sectional strife.").
101. See F. BIDDLE, supra note 32, at 212-26; M. GRODZINs, supra note 32, at 231-52; P. IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR (1983); U.S. COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIvIL-
IANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1982). State and local governments joined in the hunt. Peter
Irons reports that, before the relocation program began, the county manager of Los Angeles County
fired all Japanese Americans from county employment and that Idaho's Attorney General advocated
"concentration camps" because, as he put it, "We want to keep this a white man's country." P.
IRONS, supra, at 40-41, 72. Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston and James D. Houston have written an
affecting memoir of one family's experience in a desert camp, titled FAREwELL TO MANZANAR
(1973).
102. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was the subject of surveillance and harassment by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, in part because of his opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam
War. For a detailed account of the FBI's surveillance of Dr. King, see D. GARROW, THE FBI AND
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: FROM "SOLO" TO MEMPHIS (1981). See also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S.
116 (1966) (Georgia legislature's effort to refuse to seat a black legislator for his statement of sympa-
thy for draft resisters).
103. M. GRODZINS, supra note 32, at 297.
104. People of Irish descent generally have favored Catholic emancipation in Ireland, Irish inde-
pendence, and the unification of Ireland. Germans after 1848 opposed the German monarchy and
favored revolutionary democratic movements. Before both world wars, many Germans favored
American neutrality. Catholics generally have been more receptive than Protestants to American
diplomatic representation in the Vatican. Most Jews have been solicitous of the interests of Israel-
as President Harry Truman no doubt recognized when he quickly granted Am.erican recognition to
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American of Arab ancestry can support the Arab states, without being accused
of disloyalty. But when the home country and the United States are sorely at
odds, attitudes harden among members of the dominant culture.10,
Yet these expressions of support for the homeland10 6 serve mainly as a
source of self-respect for people who above all want to find a secure place within
American society-people who need reassurance about their identities precisely
because they see themselves as cultural outsiders.10 7 If there be irony in this
perception that the path to inclusion lies through separate identity,10 8 it is an
irony with lineage that runs back at least to the Germans in eighteenth century
Pennsylvania.10 9 Inclusion, it seems, is what nearly everyone wants, whatever
his or her sense of ethnic or religious identity. Despite the fears that have
plagued intercultural relations in America, the disloyalty of the foreign-born and
their children has turned out to be, with remarkably few exceptions, a figment of
nativist imagination.
C. Separation and Stigma
The peoples brought to this country by force from Africa were culturally
diverse. On the plantations of the American South, however, their common
bondage in slavery welded them into one people. 110 A considerable measure of
what we call cultural identity begins in the common experience of a number of
people who share a group label imposed from the outside, along with the ill
treatment associated with that label. Stephen Steinberg exaggerated only mildly
when he said, "Ethnic pluralism in America has its origins in conquest, slavery,
and exploitation of foreign labor."'1 1
Jim Crow illustrates the main technique of nativist domination: the en-
forced separation of members of the subordinate cultural group from a wide
range of public and private institutions that, in the aggregate, constitute "soci-
ety." Racial segregation in the American South was the successor to slavery and
the new state in 1948-while an increasing (and increasingly vocal) American Arab population has
taken a different view of the Nation's Middle East policies. Armenians take intense interest in
American policy toward Turkey. Blacks have always opposed white supremacy in South Africa and
other African colonies and states. Recent American policy in Central America has drawn fire from a
number of people of Mexican and Central American ancestry.
105. Consider, for example, the hostility to Iranians in America during the hostage crisis of
1979-81, a hostility that extended to Iranians of any and all political affiliations.
106. In this expression I include even the pan-African homeland constructed by American
blacks.
107. See eg., T. BROwN, IRISH-AMERICAN NATIONALISM, 1870-1890 (1966); J. DOLGIN, JEW-
ISH IDENTITY AND THE JDL (1977); Harrington, Loyalties Dual and Divided, in M. WALZER, E.
KANTowicz, J. HIHAM & M. HARRINGTON, THE POLITICS OF ETHNIcrry 93, 99-102 (1982).
108. The irony lies in the eyes of others; for the people who are asserting their identity, there is
no irony at all.
109. M. JONEs, supra note 8, at 27-30.
110. J. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979); S. ELKiNS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSITUTIONAL AND
INTELLECTUAL LIFE 81-139 (1976); L. LrWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFrER-
MATH OF SLAVERY 502-56 (1981); Berlin, Time Space and the Evolution of Afro-American Society
on British Mainland North America, 85 AM. HsT. REV. 66 (1980).
111. S. STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 5. On the exclusion and subordination of American Indians,
see infra note 146.
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the Black Codes, both of which had been decisively made unlawful by congres-
sional legislation and the Civil War amendments. In this historical context it is
easy to see Jim Crow for what it was: a thoroughgoing program designed to
maintain blacks as a group in the position of a subordinate racial caste by means
of a systematic denial of belonging. 112 Jim Crow laws extended from disen-
franchisement to prohibitions on interracial marriage and imposed racial segre-
gation everywhere: schools, courtrooms, buses, restaurants-indeed, all places
where people of both races otherwise might interact in public. Private racial
discrimination also played an important role in maintaining the caste system,
producing segregation in housing, employment, and public accommodations,
and leaving a legacy that, even today, remains only partially remedied. Lynch-
ing was the system's ultimate weapon, and it was by no means a wholly private
enterprise. 
113
Discrimination against other ethnic groups typically has not reached the
level of intensity that discrimination against blacks reached in the South. Yet
the history of intercultural relations in America provides parallels to nearly all
the features of Jim Crow. Here, too, the law played its role. Jews were forbid-
den to vote in some states until the mid-nineteenth century; New Hampshire did
not repeal this limitation on the franchise until 1877.114 School segregation af-
fected not only blacks115 but Asians,116 Mexican Americans,11 7 and, for a time,
112. I refer to caste in the sense of a rigid social stratification (which, for blacks, has meant
relegation to a lower stratum), essentially inherited, with the sort of staying power that gives it the
look of permanence. In this usage I follow Gunnar Myrdal, who treats the idea of racial caste as an
extreme form of social class division. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 675 (1944). For a purist's insistence on a different use of
words, see Dumont, Caste, Racism and "Stratification'" Reflections of a Social Anthropologist, in
SOCIAL INEQUALITY 337 (A. Beteille ed. 1969).
113. The Supreme Court has had its share of experience with cases involving lynchings and
other racially motivated murders. See; ag., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (three black
men released from prison in middle of the night were intercepted and killed by a lynch mob includ-
ing three Mississippi law enforcement officers); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (three
Georgia law enforcement officers arrested and beat to death a young black man suspected of stealing
a tire); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (group of white men attacked and fired upon black
congregation attending church). On lynching, see R. GINSBURG, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
LYNCHINGS (1969); G. MYRDAL, supra note 112, at 560-64.
It is no accident that the period of the Americanization movement was the low point for blacks
in America during the century that followed the Civil War. See generally BLACK WORKERS IN THE
ERA OF THE GREAT MIGRATION, 1916-1929 (J. Grossman ed. microfilm 1985) (discussing the mi-
gration of blacks from the rural South to Northern cities). On the Supreme Court's role in this
period, see A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-21 (1984).
114. L. DINNERSTEIN & D. REIMERS, ETHNIC AMERICANS: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND ASSIMILATION 41 (1977). In the 1850s the Know Nothing movement proposed excluding all
foreign-born people from public office. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 157.
115. School segregation extended to Northern blacks. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5
Cush.) 198 (1849). On Roberts, see L. LEvY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY 316-41 (1972).
116. The California law requiring segregation of children of "Chinese, Japanese and Mongolian"
parentage is discussed in Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 1947); see
also Gong Lur v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (Mississippi law classified children of Chinese ancestry as
"colored" and assigned them to black schools.).
117. In Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 1947), the court held
that the school board's segregation of such children was unauthorized by California law. A more
violent kind of exclusion took place in 1917 when almost 1900 striking Mexican-American miners
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Italians, who were directed to all-black schools in some southern communi-
ties. 118 Miscegenation laws forbade intermarriage of whites with persons of any
other race.119 In the West, Asians were subjected to special taxes120 and prohib-
ited from owning land; 12 1 a California law even prohibited Chinese people from
testifying in court against whites.
122
Private discrimination, too, victimized a great many cultural minorities, no-
tably Catholics, Jews, the foreign-born, and persons of Irish and Italian descent.
Violence against Chinese residents in California 23 was matched by anti-Semitic
violence, including the lynching of Leo Frank in Georgia. 124 In the same year
that New Hampshire repealed its restrictions on voting by Jews, New York's bar
association rejected an applicant because he was Jewish. 125 Although some la-
bor unions (notably the International Workers of the World) actively courted
foreign-born members, the American Federation of Labor excluded Japanese
people from membership. 12 6 Even in Hawaii Japanese workers faced wage dis-
crimination. 127 The ethnic neighborhood, sometimes seen today through a haze
were arrested in and around Bisbee, Arizona and forcibly transported to Columbus, New Mexico.
When the Columbus authorities would not take charge of them, they were taken into the desert and
left to find their way out. The young Felix Frankfurter wrote a scathing report on the incident for
the Wilson administration. See C. McWILLIAMS, NORTH FROM MEXICO 197 (1949). The Bisbee
deportation left its victims in the United States. Two other episodes resulted in mass forcible depor-
tation from the country. In the early 1930s about half a million people of Mexican descent were
rounded up and expelled, and more than two million suffered the same fate from 1953 to 1955. These
people included United States citizens as well as aliens. See J. SAMORA & P. SIMON, A HISTORY OF
THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN PEOPLE 1981 (1977); J. SAMORA, Los MOJADOS: THE WETBACK
STORY 33-57 (1971); L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of Just Immigration Law
and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REv. 615, 632-33 (1981). In 1954 "Operation Wetback" alone accounted
for expulsion of more than one million persons; during the 1950s, "perhaps as much as one-sixth of
the total Mexican-origin population living in this country was deported." Cfrdenas, United States
Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An Historical Perspective, 2 CHICANO L. REV. 66, 81 (1975);
see also Cortes, Mexicans, in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 697, 703
(S. Thernstrom ed. 1980) (3.8 million Mexicans expelled between 1950 and 1955).
118. L. DINNERSTEIN & D. REIMERS, supra note 114, at 40.
119. The statute challenged in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which focused on preserv-
ing the purity of the white race, was typical. See VA. CODE § 20-54 (1960) (repealed 1968).
120. T. SOWELL, supra note 45, at 139 (taxes on the kinds of activities engaged in only by
Chinese).
121. See, eg., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). In Oyama a California statute forbade
land ownership by aliens ineligible for citizenship. Under federal law, that category included Japa-
nese aliens. The Supreme Court set the stage for invalidating the law, and the state courts finished
the job. See Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579,
204 P.2d 569 0949); see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (invalidating
California law denying commercial fishing licenses to aliens).
122. T. SOWELL, supra note 45, at 137. Laws that were formally race-neutral were also adopted
for the purpose of disadvantaging Asians. On ordinances aimed at Chinese laundries in San Fran-
cisco, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); T. SOWELL, supra note 45, at 139. For the
history of discrimination against the Japanese in the American West, see R. DANIELS, THE POLI-
TICS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
JAPANESE EXCLUSION (1962); J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND
THE CONsTrrUON 11-67 (1954).
123. See, eg., A. SAXTON, supra note 32, at 205-13.
124. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); L. DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE
(1968).
125. See L. DiNNERsTE N & D. REIMERS, supra note 114, at 42.
126. W. PETERSEN, JAPANESE AMERICANS 33 (1971). On the role of labor unions in West
Coast anti-Asian activity, see R. DANIELS, supra note 122, at 16-30; A. SAXTON, supra note 32.
127. T. SOWELL, supra note 45, at 162.
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of romantic nostalgia, was founded on more than affinity. Ethnic discrimination
ranged over the whole housing market, and racial segregation remains the pat-
tern in today's urban neighborhoods. 128 Today's "white flight" had antecedents
in the nineteenth century, when middle-class families in eastern cities fled from
neighborhoods that were becoming populated with Irish residents 12 9 And if
overt ethnic-group exclusion by resorts, hotels, and universities is now largely
behind us, such discrimination in private schools and "businessmen's" clubs
130
is, sadly, very much a part of today's urban life.
13 1
Like Jim Crow, discrimination against the ethnic outsider is a form of ex-
clusion-not physical exclusion from the country, but exclusion from belonging
as a respected and responsible participant in "the public life of the commu-
nity."' 132 The types of material and spiritual harm thus inflicted on persons who
are denied full citizenship are innumerable, and each harm aggravates the
others. Jim Crow was not just a collection of particular prohibitions on blacks
but a system;' 33 the sign in the shop window that said "No Irish need apply"
bespoke more than job discrimination.
134
Racial segregation not only stigmatizes its victims; it also excludes them
from full participation as members of society, treating them as members of a
subordinate caste. An earlier generation of Supreme Court Justices left the mat-
ter of segregation to majoritarian politics, 135 which meant, given the disen-
franchisement of blacks, the reinforcement of a system of racial subordination in
all phases of life. After holding Jim Crow unconstitutional, 36 the Supreme
128. See B. EPSTEIN & A. FORSTER, SOME OF My BEST FRIENDS ... 79-139, 251-56 (1962)
(Jews). Racially restrictive covenants of the kind held unenforceable by the Supreme Court typically
limited residential occupancy to Caucasians. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For a chilling quotation of a "Get out of Hollywood" leaflet circulated
by one anti-Japanese group, see R. DANIELS, supra note 122, at 97. On today's patterns of residen-
tial segregation, see G. STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES, CURRENT POPULATION TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES 74-75 (1978); Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implications for School Integration, in
THE COURTS, SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 164, 167 (B. Levin & W. Hawley
eds. 1977); Sternlieb & Hughes, The Changing Demography of the Central City, 243 Sci. AM., Aug.
1980, at 48, 53.
129. J. FTRNAS, THE AMERICANS 698-99 (1969). Another commentator notes that "[t]he first
blacks in Harlem were fleeing from the tough Irish neighborhoods in mid-Manhattan, and avoided
going north of 145th Street, for fear of encountering more Irish there." T. SOWELL, supra note 45,
at 277.
130. I use the term advisedly; many of these clubs still exclude women from membership.
131. On anti-Semitism in clubs, see B. EPSTEIN & A. FORSTER, supra note 128, at 18-24.
132. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword- "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 101 (1967).
133. See supra text accompanying note 112.
134. See 0. HANDLIN, THE UPROOTED 239 (2d enlarged ed. 1973). On the Irish generally, see
N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT 219-87 (2d ed. 1970); T. SOWELL, supra
note 45, at 17-42; C. WITnKE, THE IRISH IN AMERICA (1970).
135. Private segregation was insulated from federal constitutional attack in The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court upheld official segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896).
136. The Court achieved this result sub silentio in a series of cases following Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954): Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (municipal airport
restaurant); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks);
Gayle v. Brownder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches).
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Court pronounced the demise of "caste legislation" 137 in America. The attack
on caste employed the rhetoric of individualism: 138 henceforth, an individual
was not to be treated as less than an equal citizen because of his or her member-
ship in a racial-or, by extension, ethnic or religious-group. This "anti-dis-
crimination principle' 139 is individualistic in outlook: treat each person as an
individual, not on the basis of group membership.
Yet stigma, like caste, is a group experience. A characteristic like race,
unorthodox religion, or ethnicity is identified as deserving of stigma, and the
stigma is imposed on the whole group of people who share the characteristic.
When we invent a "stigma-theory"' 14 to justify the stigma, we incorporate our
assumptions about the whole group rather than picking on the particular char-
acteristics of this or that individual.
14 1
Furthermore, when the Supreme Court declares that racial classifications
generally are "suspect,"' 142 it is implicitly recognizing that racial discrimination
has historically operated to victimize groups of people. Racism, after all, focuses
on race. Separatist movements arise among the victims of domination' 4 3 pre-
cisely because domination is a group experience for both the dominating and the
dominated. Terms like "race relations" or "intercultural relations" suggest rela-
tions among groups, even though all human interactions, including group rela-
tions, are composed of the acts and responses of individuals toward each other.
In short, if the continued existence of cultural groups is certain-and it is-then
group identifications will continue to be important to the ways in which individ-
uals treat each other. And if much remains for America to do to end racial
domination and its harmful effects in this country-and it does-then it is hard
to see how that task will be made easier if government is constitutionally re-
quired to ignore that a black person is black. 144
Just as forced conformity is the nativist path to assimilation, the nativist
prescription for pluralism is the subordination of racial, ethnic, and religious
minorities. These two forms of cultural suppression reinforce each other. The
137. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213, 215, 217 n.14 (1982).
138. At oral argument on the remedial aspects of the cases decided under the name of Brown v.
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), Thurgood Marshall, as counsel for the children in the Virginia
and South Carolina cases, encapsulated this individualistic attitude in arguing for a race-neutral
standard: "What we want is the striking down of race. . . . It is no problem to put dumb colored
children with dumb white children and smart colored children with smart white children." Argu-
ments Before the Court, 23 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1955), quoted in Kaplan, Segregation
Litigation and the Schools-Part 11k The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. PREv. 157, 173-74
(1963).
139. See Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AsF. 107, 108 (1976).
140. See E. GoFrmAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTrY 5
(1963).
141. See generally E. GoF mAN, supra note 140 (examining situation of individuals disqualified
from full social acceptance and noting difference between their "virtual and actual social identity").
Ralph Ellison's black man is not unseen by whites; he is invisible as an individual because he is seen
only as a member of a racial group. R. ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1952).
142. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
143. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
144. Cf infra text accompanying note 234.
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pressure to conform carries with it an implication that members of the unortho-
dox cultural group are inferior. Correspondingly, the subordination of a cul-
tural group, even while it intensifies the group's cohesion, undermines
confidence in the group's values and perspectives, with the long-term effect of
impairing the perceived worth of the group's ethnic identity' 45 and thus of pro-
moting conformity to the dominant cultural norms.
Virtually every cultural minority in America has had to face exclusion,
forced conformity, and subordination. All these patterns of nativism are varia-
tions on the same theme: those who are different cannot belong as full members
of the community. The victims of cultural domination, therefore, face a serious
problem: they must necessarily live their lives within the larger society, and in
order to define themselves they must satisfy their basic needs for connection.
They may choose to turn inward to the solidarity of the excluded group, banding
together to confront the larger society. Alternatively, individual members of the
cultural minority may, as to some aspects of their lives and in varying degrees,
be assimilated into the culture of the larger society. These two paths to belong-
ing start out by heading in different directions; as we shall see, however, they
lead most people to the same destination.
III. THE SEARCH FOR CONNECTION
A. Cultural Politics: From Solidarity to Integration
Although most people have their cultural identities ascribed to them at
birth and some, such as religious converts, choose theirs, a great many people
find their cultural identities thrust upon them. One principal source of cultural
identity in America has always been the perceived need to band together in de-
fense against domination or hostility. Indeed, the outside world plays an impor-
tant part in the very definition of a group's cultural identity. The immigrants
from a single European country typically came from different regions with
marked cultural distinctions, but in America the people from a given village or
region generally were few in number; naturally, they sought association with
others of the same religion or from the same country. Natural affinities, of
course, did exist: a common language, or a common religion, or both. How-
ever, much of the sense of community felt by the members of an American eth-
nic group today originated in the ways in which the members' ancestors were
labeled-for example, as "Italians" or as "Jews"-and, by those labels, set apart
as outsiders.
146
145. See I. LIGHT, ETHNIC ENTERPRISE IN AMERICA 189 (1972).
146. The case of the Indian nations is different, and it is tragic. Hundreds of native cultures were
present when the first European settlers arrived in America. Except for an early period of uneasy
dealings on a basis of equality, the history of white-Indian relations in this country is a story of
virtually unrelieved dispossession and even extermination of the Indian peoples justified by racist
assumptions. See generally W. HAGAN, AMERICAN INDIANS (rev. ed. 1979) (Indians suffered re-
peated setbacks from encounters with new American settlers in colonial times until the New Deal
era); Note, Constitutional Law: Congressional Plenary Power over Indian Affairs-A Doctrine Rooted
in Prejudice, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 117 (1982) (Congress' traditionally unrestrained rule over
Indians based on perceived need for strong control over "inferior" race). For a century-old Indian
statement, still unsurpassed for its painful dignity, see the 1879 lament of Chief Joseph, reprinted in
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"Defensive" identification with an ethnic or religious group has always been
a major source of cultural pluralism in America; the victims of domination be-
come bound together in a community, a "fraternity of battle." 147 Yet when the
members of cultural minorities have intensified their group attachments by liv-
ing in ethnic neighborhoods,1 48 or focusing their economic dealings within the
ethnic communities, 149 or founding ethnic social or political organizations,
150
the outside world has been ready to call them "clannish" and unassimilable.
15 1
Like many another process involving social subordination, this one is circular.
The exclusion of members of a cultural minority from full participation in the
larger society causes them to focus their need to belong on the cultural group
itself; and this very solidarity stimulates further outside suspicion and hostility.
L. DINNERSTEN & F. JAHER, THE ALIENS: A HISTORY OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN AMERICA 181
(1970). For capsule histories of national policy toward the Indian peoples, see V. DELORIA & C.
LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 1-24 (1983) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN IN-
DIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE] and E. SPICER, THE AMERICAN INDIANS 176-203 (1982).
In the face of this onslaught, it is remarkable that so much remains of the separate Indian
cultures. Tribal cultures may have much in common, see, eg., V. DELORIA, GOD IS RED (1973),
but they remain separate. Nothing in the Indian experience to date resembles the cultural assimila-
tion of Germans from different regions and religions into a national ethnic group. On the history of
political divisions among the various tribes, see Metcalf, Who Should Rule At Home? Native Ameri-
can Politics and Indian-White Relations, 61 J. AM. HIsT. 651 (1974). On the relation of Indian
reservations to Native American autonomy, see Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense
of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979 (1981). A
more far-reaching call for a sovereign Indian nation embracing all tribal groups is made in V. DELO-
RIA & C. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVER-
EIGNTY (1984). For a sympathetic but skeptical reception of this proposal, see Washburn, Toward
Indian Nationhood (Book Review), NAT. HIsT., Jan. 1985, at 76. On Pan-Indianism generally, see
H. HERTZBERG, THE SEARCH FOR AN AMERICAN INDIAN IDENTITY: MODERN PAN-INDIAN
MOVEMErNs (1971). On the continuation of wide cultural diversity among Indian peoples today,
see E. SPICER, supra, at 2.
147. W. MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA 542 (1974). Correspondingly,
as the need for defense declines, group attachment weakens. Church attendance among Catholics
has declined 23% since 1958. HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1985, at 19. Enrollment in Catholic parochial
schools has declined from about 5.6 million students in 1965 to about 2.9 million in 1985. Chandler,
Parochial School Enrollment Dwindling, L.A. Times, May 20, 1985, § I, at 19, col. 1. See generally
McNamara, American Catholicism in the Mid-Eighties: Pluralism and Conflict in a Changing
Church, 480 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. Sci. 63 (1985) (authority of Catholic
church leadership has declined because of its inability to accommodate diverse viewpoints on issues
such as birth control, premarital sex, and remarriage after divorce).
148. See, eg., R. BAYOR, NEIGHBORS IN CONFLICT: THE IRISH, JEWS, AND ITALIANS OF NEW
YORK CrrY, 1929-1941 (1978); M. JONES, supra note 8, at 134, 162; T. SOWELL, supra note 45. The
major ethnic concentrations in American cities developed late in the nineteenth century. Thern-
strom, Ethnic Groups in American History, in ETHNIC RELATIONS IN AMERICA 11 (L. Liebman ed.
1982).
149. Personalism and nepotism have been seen as ways of surviving in a hostile environment.
Some forms of economic activity are suited for this kind of defensive response to adversity, for they
are "located within a particular kind of social network: close quarters, daily routines, local connec-
tions, personal service, familial cooperation." M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 161 (1983); see
also I. LIGHT, supra note 145, at 7-10 (inability to find nonmenial employment due to discriminatory
opportunity structure contributed to such developments as Chinese owning laundries and restau-
rants and Japanese owning hotels and grocery stores).
150. On ethnic militia units, see M. JONES, supra note 8, at 155-56, 158-59. On ethnic polities,
see ETHNIC LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA (J. H'igham ed. 1979); N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 134; M. WALZER, E. KANTOwicz, J. HGHAM & M. HARRINGTON, THE POLITICS OF
ETHNICrrY (1982) [hereinafter cited as THE POLITICS OF ETHNiCIrrY]; and infra text accompanying
notes 269-98.
151. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 155-56.
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Racial, religious, and ethnic domination has often led to defensive separa-
tism. The most important impetus to the early growth of the Catholic school
system was the use of public schools in eastern cities to indoctrinate children in
the tenets of Protestantism, complete with the distribution to children of the
King James version of the Bible.15 2 Black separatist movements, from the ex-
plicit black nationalism of Marcus Garvey' 53 to the more ambiguous "Black
Power" and "community control" movements of recent years, 154 have had simi-
lar origins: seeking to replace the skepticism, frustration, and resentment pro-
duced by domination with a revitalized sense of pride.15 5
The hostility of the outside world is by no means the only factor that has
contributed to ethnic solidarity in America. The very openness of American
society, for all its assimilative power, 156 also can impel some people to seek the
solidarity of a group defined by cultural indicia. An ethnic or religious group
can offer shelter from the insecurity that stems from a sense of isolation in a
crowd of strangers, even when the strangers are not hostile but indifferent. Yet,
when an individual feels fenced out of the larger society or mistreated by it, the
religious or ethnic community may serve "as a solace for exclusion, a retreat
from slights and prejudice."'157 In these circumstances, the cultural group serves
152. R. BILLINGTON, supra note 59, at 142-58, 220-34 (1963); M. JONES, supra note 8, at 139,
150.
153. Garvey started The Universal Negro Improvement Association, a movement founded on
the need to instill black pride and dignity. Garvey denounced assimilation and urged blacks to
"return" to Africa. He scorned the existing black leadership and found his main support among the
blacks who were the poorest of all. After impressive early successes, the movement collapsed in the
1920s. For a capsule history, see G. MYRDAL, supra note 112, at 746-49. A thorough scholarly
record of the Garvey movement is presently being compiled and analyzed by Robert Hill. The first
four volumes of a projected ten-volume series have been published under Professor Hill's editorship;
the work is entitled MARCUS GARVEY AND UNIVERSAL NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION PA-
PERS (R. Hill ed. 1983). On Garvey's objections to interracial marriage, see J. WILLIAMSON, NEW
PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATrOES IN TE UNITED STATES 159-61 (1984).
One of Garvey's main opponents was W.E.B. DuBois. DuBois understood that a separatist
community is rarely a community of choice; rather, it is a community of despair. See W.E.B. Du-
Bois, DUSK OF DAWN 182, 185-88 (1940).
154. See S. CARMICHAEL & R. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER (1967); Kirp, Community Control,
Public Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (1970).
155. Elijah Muhammed, one of Garvey's workers in Detroit, later founded the Nation of Islam.
On this more recent black separatist movement, see J. BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 67-113
(1963); K. CLARK, KING, MALCOLM, BALDWIN: THREE INTERVIEWS 34,45 (rev. ed. 1985) (quot-
ing Malcolm X in 1963 as favoring "complete separation" and as saying, "My father was a
Garveyite"). Malcolm X saw integration as a hoax, a sophisticated form of domination. MALCOLM
X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 275-81 (1966).
Some blacks who do not opt for separatism have expressed skepticism about integration. James
Baldwin asked, "Do I really want to be integrated into a burning house?" and remarked, "Why-
especially knowing the family as I do-I should want to marry your sister is a great mystery to me."
J. BALDWIN, supra, at 108, 111 (1963). Yet in the same breath Baldwin added, "[W]e, the black and
the white, deeply need each other here if we are really to become a nation-if we are really, that is, to
achieve our identity, our maturity, as men and women." Id. at 111. Other blacks have registered
skepticism about the willingness of whites to carry out the process of integration unless they are
made to see integration as advantageous to themselves. See, eg., Bell, A Hurdle Too High: Class-
based Roadblocks to Racial Remediation, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1984); Bell, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REv. 518 (1980).
156. See infra text accompanying note 193.
157. W. McWLLAMS, supra note 147, at 102; see also id. at 492 (ethnic organizations provided
a "defensive fraternity" for immigrants).
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as a defense against a world that "measure[s] acceptability by appearances--skin
color, dress, deportment-and by customs-language, family governance, reli-
gious ritual-according to broad racial and nationality stereotypes."
158
Facing either hostility or indifference, the members of a cultural minority
may conclude that they will fare better if they act as a group, particularly when
their aims can be satisfied only by participation in the larger community. The
pursuit of political goals by people identified by race, ethnicity, or religion has
been a fixture of American politics since the colonial era and must be seen as a
permanent feature of the politics of a multicultural society. Often, when an issue
becomes prominent in cultural politics, it takes on an importance that tran-
scends any immediate effects of the issue's resolution on people's day-to-day
lives. The obvious explanation is that the issue has become a symbol of cultural
identity and ultimately of individual worth.15 9 With the stakes so high, it is no
wonder feelings are intense. •
A quarter-century ago, in a study of black leaders in Chicago, James Q.
Wilson distinguished between status goals and welfare goals. 160 By welfare
goals Wilson meant tangible improvements such as better schools, new public
housing, and better access to health services. Status goals focused on the princi-
ple of equality and on the integration of blacks into the general community:
school integration, open occupancy in housing, and equal treatment of blacks in
the allocation of public offices and honors. 16 1 With respect to many immediate
welfare goals, little distinguishes a cultural group from any other interest group.
An ethnic neighborhood has the same interest in getting the city to repair street
lights as any other neighborhood would have. 162 A cultural group's status
goals, however, differ from the goals of many other interest groups that seek to
influence government. The cultural minority seeks to replace discrimination and
domination with acceptance, recognition, and equal citizenship. 163 The concern
for status arises out of basic psychological needs; the individual not only needs
to belong, but needs to be respected for his or her own self. The cultural out-
sider wants the freedom to shape his or her own identity, to be allowed to keep a
"primordial" identity and also to be accepted as one who belongs to the larger
society.
Correspondingly, however, members of the dominant cultural group may
see themselves as having an interest in maintaining existing "pecking orders"
1 "4
158. R. WIEBE, supra note 22, at 32.
159. See supra text accompanying note 20.
160. J. WILsoN, NEGRO POLITICS: THE SEARCH FOR LEADERSHIP 185-213 (1960).
161. Id. at 185.
162. Depending on the composition of the city government, a minority racial or ethnic neighbor-
hood may have more trouble than would another neighborhood. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (court sustained challenge to racially discriminatory provision of neigh-
borhood public services upon a showing that over 90% of homes without sewers or paved streets
were in black neighborhoods), aff'g 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'g 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D.
Miss. 1969).
Some welfare goals of minority groups, such as compensation for past harms, are distinctive.
See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
163. See Higham, Leadership, in THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY, supra note 150, at 69, 83-88.
164. See H. IsAAcs, supra note 10, at 44, 208-14.
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associated with race, ethnicity, and religion. 165 In other words, dominance it-
self-preventing cultural outsiders from belonging-may be someone else's sta-
tus goal.
Just as the racial caste system of Jim Crow employed a mixture of formal
legal disabilities and informal social and economic sanctions, it will take more
than the elimination of formal legal inequalities to end the "status harm' 1 6 6 that
is the main evil of racial caste. As a status goal, equal citizenship includes both a
measure of substantive equality and formal equality before the law. Although
the distinction between status and welfare goals has its uses in analyzing day-to-
day political strategies, eventually these two types of goals converge. In the long
run, a cultural minority's status goals will be secured only when large numbers
of its members have advanced into the middle class. The best evidence of an end
to the harmful effects of racial discrimination against blacks would be evidence
that blacks and whites were distributed along the socio-economic scale in the
same proportions. 167
Even in the short term, the distinction between welfare and status goals can
be blurred. Poverty that is degrading, for example, may deprive its victims of
effective participation as equal members of society.' 68 To be unemployed is to
be deprived of more than wages. 169 Thus, a series of antidiscrimination meas-
ures focused on welfare goals may, in the aggregate, work important changes in
the status of a previously dominated group. 170 However, the distinction be-
tween status and welfare goals retains utility, at least in the short run. Some
immediate issues are centered on material well-being and others are centered on
the need for belonging and the dignity of equal citizenship.
The "emotionally charged" quality of American cultural politics, today as
in the nineteenth century,17 1 arises out of conflicts over status, with one group's
anger matched against another group's fear. The cultural issues that recently
165. See generally R. BILLINGTON, supra note 59 (enactment of temperance legislation as a reac-
tion against Irish and German immigration); R. DANIELs & H. KrrANo, AMERICAN RACISM: Ex-
PLORATION OF THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 96-105 (1970) (discussing the effectiveness of the white
majority's attempts to remain separate from minority groups); J. HIGHAM, supra note 8 (discussing
the political pressures related to nationalism and ethnic prejudice); C. WOODWARD, supra note 33
(discussing southern segregation laws from Reconstruction to mid-1960s).
166. Fiss, supra note 139, at 157.
167. See generally Thurow, A Theory of Groups and Economic Redistribution, 9 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 25, 27-29 (1979) (because individual discrimination cannot be quantified, group analysis is
required to determine the existence of equal opportunity).
168. See Matza, The Disreputable Poor, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MOBILTY IN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 310-19 (N. Smelser & S. Lipset eds. 1966); Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional
Welfare Rights One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 983-91 (1973);
Plamenatz, Diversity of Rights and Kinds of Equality, in NoMos IX: EQUALrTY 79, 91-92 (J. Pen-
nock & J. Champman eds. 1967).
169. On the destructive quality of unemployment and marginal employment, see E. LIEBOW,
TALLY'S CORNER 29-71 (1967).
170. For example, laws forbidding racial discrimination in hotels, restaurants, and other public
accommodations, which on the face of things are aimed at access to the world of commerce, have
their most important long-run effects in the area of status goals.
171. See IL WIEBE, supra note 22, at 32-33.
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have aroused the most fervor-abortion, 172 immigration, religion in the schools,
affirmative action, and bilingualism-are all status issues, touching the heart be-
cause they touch the sense of self. When members of a cultural group join in
taking a stand on an issue of United States foreign relations, typically one of
their main concerns is the recognition of their own cultural identity and even of
their status as citizens, whose voices count for something in the councils of the
Nation. 173 Ethnic politics is a historically validated avenue to recognition and
acceptance for members of minority cultures' 74 and especially for their
leaders.'
75
A constant concern of ethnic leadership is group solidarity. Indeed, ethnic
groups are, in some sense, "the creation of their leaders"; 176 no clear boundaries
define the groups, and the openness of American society is a continuing invita-
tion for marginal members to define themselves outside the group. The leaders
themselves are apt to be people whose successes in the larger society make them
acceptable in that society, and, in the same degree, marginal to the group.
1 7 7
The life of the ethnic leader is a life of tension and frustration. Each success for
the group in the politics of the wider community, each material advance, inte-
grates more and more members of the group into the institutions and processes
of the dominant culture.
178
If the story of ethnic leadership in modern America is one of "a certain
decline,"' 179 the main reason is that cultural assimilation follows modernization
and advances in a market economy.' 80 Solidarity politics, "organizing around
172. On abortion as a status issue, see K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHER-
HOOD (1984).
173. See infra text accompanying note 296.
174. See J. IIIGHAM, supra note 48, at 11-12; Kantowicz, Voting and Parties, in THE POLITICS
OF ETHcrrY, supra note 150, at 29, 44.
175. T. SOWELL, supra note 45, at 30-35; ETHNIC LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, supra note 150;
Higham, Leadership, in THE POLITICS OF ETHNICrY, supra note 150.
176. Highamn, Preface to ETHNIC LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, supra note 150, at ix. Indeed,
political leaders may even play a distinctive role in the construction of ethnicity itself. See, ag.,
Padilla, On the Nature ofLatino Ethnicity, in THE MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 5,
at 332.
177. K. LEWiN, RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICTS: SELECTED PAPERS ON GROUP DYNAMICS
195-96 (1948).
178. Consciousness of ethnicity, which is shared widely at all socio-economic levels, decreases as
a factor influencing behavior for people in the middle class. D. SCHNEIDER & R. SMITH, CLASS
DIFFERENCES AND SEX ROLES IN AMERICAN KINSHIP AND FAMILY STRucruREs 35-36 (1973).
On cultural politics and assimilation, see R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? 32-51 (1961), and infra text
accompanying note 188. A prominent Mississippi lawyer has commented that "[tihe principal
points of interaction" between persons of different races are politics and government. Shipp, The
Races in Mississippi Old Order and New, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1985, at Al, col. 2, at B7, col. 1. In
Mississippi today, some 450 of the state's 5000 elected officials are black. Id. at Al, col. 2.
179. Higham, Introduction: The Forms of Ethnic Leadership, in ETHNIC LEADERSHIP IN
AMERICA, supra note 150, at 1, 11.
180. One scholar has commented on the influence of modernization on the stability of ethnic
groups:
Intrinsically, the ethnic group is a link with the past and a bulwark of stability. It
depends on instinctive sympathies and ancestral loyalties of a wholly nonrational kind.
Modernization, on the other hand, demands rationality, calculation, progress, and material
incentives. It brings deracinating forces into the ethnic group and sets up an inner tension
between "modem" techniques and ethnic loyalty.
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in-group concerns and encouraging a bloc vote," 181 is likely to be seen as a prac-
tical necessity for a group that is just emerging from severe conditions of domi-
nation. 182 This quest for internal cohesion, however, will limit the group to
local successes. To carry its influence outside ethnic enclaves-a step necessary
for the achievement of many status goals and virtually all welfare goals--the
group must form coalitions with other interests.18 3 Irony attends this "broker
politics.' 1 8 4 The ethnic leaders become integrated into larger organizations and
thus are drawn even further toward the margins of the group.185 The achieve-
ment of the group's goals opens progressively more opportunities for members
of the group in the larger society, with the inevitable result that the group de-
clines as a separate political force.
Observers of ethnic politics have been struck by a development that is, at
first glance, curious: as ethnic bloc voting has increased, ethnic identification
has decreased.' 8 6 In the middle years of the nineteenth century, Edward
Beecher spoke in the direst terms about the antagonism between Catholicism
and American democracy: "The systems are diametrically opposed: one must
and will exterminate the other." 187 In 1960 American voters, sensing that the
Catholics' assimiliation into American life was an accomplished fact, elected
John F. Kennedy as the Nation's first Catholic President. In the century that
had intervened between those two events, the Irish had been the Nation's fore-
most practitioners of cultural politics.
A cultural group's active participation in politics is a step along the path to
assimilation.' 8 8 The personalism, even nepotism, that has characterized politics
among immigrant groups throughout the Nation's history189 may look like no
Id. at 14.
181. Kantowicz, supra note 174, at 54.
182. A cultural group's very insularity may, in fact, enable it to act as a cohesive body and thus
to carry more weight in the political process than would an equally large group that is dispersed and
largely invisible. For discussion of this point, see Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv.
L. REV. 713, 722-28 (1985).
183. On "balanced tickets" in New York City, see N. GLAZER & D. MOYNIHAN, supra note
134, at 305 (noting the strong custom of representing prominent ethnic groups on mayoral tickets).
On the ways in which economic and political interests can prevail over ethnic prejudices, see R.
BAYOR, supra note 148, at 164-67. Unfortunately, for the same reasons a divergence of class inter-
ests can drive old ethnic allies apart. For one view of New York City's ethnic politics today, see
Kramer, Blacks and Jews: How Wide the Rift?, NEW YORK, Feb. 4, 1985, at 26. On black-Asian
rivalry in Los Angeles, see McMillan, Anti-Asian Bigotry: An 'Alarming' Rise as Refugees Pour In,
L.A. Times, Feb. 4, 1985, § II, at 1, col. 5.
184. The notion of cultural "broker politics" is an old one in this country. On the nineteenth
century version of ethnic politics, see R. WIEBE, supra note 22, at 139-40.
185. Higham, supra note 175, at 88. Irish leaders were especially successful in broker politics.
See Cross, The Irish, in ETHNIC LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, supra note 150, at 179-81. Polish and
black leaders historically have tended to focus on solidarity politics. See Kantowicz, supra note 174,
at 54, 65. On "projective" leaders, individuals who win recognition outside their ethnic groups and
then serve as role models for assimilation, see Higham, supra note 175, at 88-90.
186. ETHNIC LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, supra note 150, at 11-12; S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN
PoLITcs: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 20-21 (1981).
187. Quoted in RL WIEBE, supra note 22, at 68.
188. The same participation produces changes in the dominant culture. Undeniably, various
ethnic styles have influenced both the form and the substance of American politics, from party
conventions to the pluralist concerns of any good campaign manager.
189. On immigrants and machine politics, see M. JONES, supra note 8, at 230-36.
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more than a reinforcement of intragroup solidarity, but it also constitutes a first
step in the process leading to a sense of belonging to the Nation. Political party
activity makes people feel like insiders. 190 The parties themselves both connect
different groups and serve as "carriers of certain basic values that large numbers
of citizens [can] accept as common American beliefs." 191 Local ethnic power
produces the belief that "the system works for us," further strengthening na-
tional allegiance. 192 Cultural politics thus begins in the defensive solidarity of
the cultural group, but ends in integration.
B. Participation and Assimilation
The assimilation of white immigrants' descendants into the cultural main-
stream of American life is an undeniable fact, verified by the immediate experi-
ence of all of us. Assimilation means change-specifically, a change in cultural
norms. These changes are most visible in behaviors such as the adoption of a
language or a style of dress. 193 Assimilation, however, also implies change in
self-identification, which is not so much a behavior pattern as it is a state of
mind. Some such changes can be seen in first generation Americans, but the
typical adult immigrant is not inclined to undertake the wrenching transforma-
tion involved in adopting the ways of a new culture. Indeed, the change that we
call assimilation does not take place primarily within any individual. Mostly, it
is visible as a group phenomenon, a change from one generation to another.
Like ethnicity itself, 9 4 the process of assimilation is both subtle and com-
plex. Even from generation to generation there is no linear movement from
"community" to "society,"' 195 from "primordial" association to contractual as-
sociation, from ethnic identity to occupational identity. Rather, these types of
association and identity exist side by side in the same individual; there is an
"interaction. . . of communal and noncommunal ways in the lives of us all."1
96
It would seem odd, for example, to say that fourth-generation Americans are
assimilated. Rather, they are what they are; because they have grown up under
certain circumstances, they lack the characteristics that once set their immigrant
great-grandparents apart from the American cultural mainstream. For the indi-
vidual, "assimilation," or its absence, is just a label that we attach to the product
of myriad decisions made by that individual and by others, including ancestors
and acquaintances and government officials.
The assimilation of a group, too, is a complex, ongoing process. It is said,
190. Kantowicz, supra note 174, at 45.
191. PL WIEBE, supra note 22, at 140. On local politics in the early twentieth century as a
"substitute for community," see id. at 69.
192. J. HIGHAM, supra note 48, at 185. Correspondingly, when members of a cultural minority
see little benefit from political participation, they are not apt to participate, even by voting. See infra
text accompanying note 297.
193. On the relation of America's "democracy of clothing" to the newcomer's transformation
"into one who belong[s]," see D. BOoRSmTN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 91-
100 (1973).
194. See supra note 20.
195. See F. ToNNiES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY (C. Loomis trans. 1963).
196. T. BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 43 (1978).
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for example, that the French Huguenots and the Dutch had become largely as-
similated by 1820.197 Yet any such statement is only a shorthand way to de-
scribe the statistical distribution of someone's abstract characterizations of a
variety of states of mind and types of behavior. In 1820 the descendants of the
old Dutch settlers almost all spoke English and otherwise behaved as their
neighbors did, but surely they gave little thought to the question whether they
were assimilated. In any case, the assimilation of a group can never be said to be
complete: "every one of the racial and national groupings that was created in
America has stubbornly persisted." 198
Although an exact definition of assimilation appears to be impossible, there
are some measures of assimiliation on which observers can agree: language us-
age, educational integration, occupational dispersal, residential dispersal, and in-
tercultural marriage. 199 By these tests, it is plain that a common pattern
prevails for nearly all the ethnic groups in American history: eventually they
become largely integrated into the American cultural mainstream.
20°
What causes assimilation to take place? The details of the mechanism are
not well documented, but three generalizations seem true, even in the absence of
hard evidence. First, the commonly assumed assimilating effects of occupational
mobility in an open society illustrate a larger truth: assimilation is advanced
when the members of a cultural minority take part in the institutions and activi-
ties of the larger society. It is often said that assimilation is promoted by such
behavior as speaking English, attending the public schools, listening to the na-
tional broadcast media, entering the job market, joining a union,20 1 moving
197. J. HIGHAM, supra note 48, at 178.
198. Id. In the case of the Indian tribes, "stubbornly" is the proper word. On the national
government's efforts to force Indians to be assimilated into the larger society, see AMERICAN INDi-
ANS, AMERICAN JusIcE, supra note 146, at 8-12, 15-21; W. HAGAN, supra note 146, at 121-50, 161-
66.
199. Thernstrom, supra note 148, at 9-12. Milton Gordon distinguishes between "cultural" as-
similation, involving the abandonment of the mother tongue and distinctive customs, and "struc-
tural" assimilation, involving extensive social interaction and intermarriage. As of the time he wrote
(the early 1960s), Gordon discerned a fundamental pattern for ethnic groups in the United States,
combining cultural assimilation with structural pluralism. M. GORDON, supra note 20, at 60-83.
To an immigrant, some degree of assimilation might be indicated by activities that others would
see differently.
The peasant who had become a Polish Falcon or a Son of Italy, in his own view, was acting
as an American; this was not a step he could have taken at home. To subscribe to a
newspaper was the act of a citizen of the New World, not of the Old, even if the journal
was [written in his native language].
0. HANDLiN, THE UPROOTED 250-51 (2d ed. 1973).
200. Until recently, the one obvious exception to this general trend has been found among black
people. The overwhelming majority of black Americans still live in separate communities and send
their children to predominantly black schools, a situation that is euphemistically called "racial isola-
tion." See, eg., I U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 109-
14 (1967) (concluding that all racial isolation, regardless of origin, harms black students). The inter-
marriage of blacks and whites is still uncommon. See infra note 204. Because the black community
suffers today from disastrously high rates of unemployment, most blacks have little hope for moving
out of the ghetto. In short, race has long been a great divide in American society, and there is no
reason to assume that it will lose its significance in the near future. The separation of at least some
blacks from some whites, however, has been reduced in a number of important ways since mid-
century. There also is no reason to expect this trend to be reversed.
201. On the assimilating role of unions, see M. JONES, supra note 8, at 270-73; Bukowczyk, The
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away from the ethnic neighborhood, and voting in public elections.202 But a
person who engages in a significant number of these kinds of behavior is assimi-
lated. No bright line differentiates the measures of assimilation from the mecha-
nisms that produce assimilation. The various forms of behavior that indicate
assimilation tend to reinforce each other, accelerating assimilation. The rein-
forcement takes place in people's minds. It is circular: the more a person en-
gages in "mainstream" behavior, the more that person is apt to perceive himself
or herself as part of the wider American culture and to be disposed to participate
in it still further.
Because participation and mobility are important to the process of assimila-
tion, the ability to make choices about ethnic identification is, to a marked de-
gree, dependent on the material resources available to an individual or to a
family. If assimilation tends to follow entry into the middle class, the reason is
plain. In a market, resources mean opportunities, including opportunities to in-
teract with widening circles of people in a variety of ways, provided, for exam-
ple, by neighborhoods, schools, and social activities. The point has validity even
for cultural groups defined by race. No one chooses to be black, or Asian, or
American Indian; yet, for people in all these groups, middle class status permits
a great many choices about participation in the wider society, choices that are
unavailable to poor people.
Thus, the second generalization about assimilation is that it is closely asso-
ciated with economic class. Most immigrants, whatever their class, remain
largely unassimilated. In succeeding generations, however, middle-class families
tend to live in the suburbs20 3 and to send their children to college. Higher edu-
cation not only provides access to elite occupations, but also erodes social barri-
ers to the point that ethnic intermarriage is now common among young people
of the middle class.204 Furthermore, the openness of American society tends to
Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood: Poletown vs. G.M. and the City of Detroit, 41 WAsH. &
LEE L. REv. 49, 55-57 (1984).
202. See generally M. GORDON, supra note 20 (discussing the nature of group life in a large
industrialized nation with a heterogeneous population). The conventional wisdom, which I accept,
needs a few qualifications. For example, occupational mobility in an economic market is properly
seen as an integrating mechanism, eroding ethnic attachments and promoting the language of the
market and the wider society's behavioral norms. Yet the openness of American society can seem
threatening in ways that send some individuals running for the protective cover of their "primor-
dial" associations with kin and kindred. See supra text accompanying note 22. The public schools
have, indeed, been agents of assimilation. But this statement ignores the racial segregation of public
schools, which by no means was limited to the South. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying
text. Furthermore, in a number of communities in the nineteenth century the public schools carried
on their instruction in languages other than English. J. HIGHAM, supra note 48, at 180. Corre-
spondingly, various institutions that appeared most likely to cement ethnic attachments, such as
ethnic group schools and the foreign language press, turned out to facilitate participation in the
wider society-and thus to facilitate assimilation. See Fishman & Nahirny, The Ethnic Group
School and Mother Tongue Maintenance, in LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNrrED STATES 92 (J.
Fishman ed. 1966). On the Americanization of the foreign language press, see M. JONES, supra note
8, at 228-29; Fishman, Hayden & Warshauer, The Non-English and the Ethnic Group Press, 1910-
1960, in LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 51, 73 (referring to the "de-
ethnicized ethnicity" of the ethnic press).
203. The residential dispersal of ethnic groups in America began with the Huguenots. See M.
JONES, supra note 8, at 52.
204. According to the 1980 census, 8% of persons of Italian descent born before 1920 were of
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distribute the members of a cultural group over a range of levels of income and
status, with the inevitable effect of weakening that group's internal cohesion.205
The third engine driving assimilation is the complexity of our modem soci-
ety, which presses nearly everyone into a fragmentation of roles and thus of
norms. This fragmentation makes it virtually impossible for an individual to
focus either loyalties or identity single-mindedly on an ethnic or religious
group 20 6 Our "primordial affinities," after all, are not our only attachments to
groups. We also identify with those who share our occupations, our economic
classes, the causes or institutions we support, the places where we live, and even
our leisure activities. Each of us interacts with others in relation to different sets
of expectations, one to govern each sub-part of society in which we see ourselves
as members. Because each individual finds different sets of "allies" for different
types of conflict, the society avoids the breakdown that would be threatened if its
members saw themselves as divided into only two groups.2 0 7 One of the most
pernicious features of the system of Jim Crow was that it fed on itself, polarizing
Southern society and inhibiting the diversification of identities and attachments.
Conversely, to foster that diversified sharing and those multiple loyalties is to
nourish the growth of tolerance.
Tolerance and assimilation thus go hand in hand. When the enforced sepa-
ration of a cultural minority ends and its members come to participate in the
activities and institutions of the wider society, that participation itself promotes
assimilation. At the same time, the need to seek refuge in a "defensive" cultural
identity decreases. Correspondingly, as a cultural minority becomes more as-
mixed ancestry; 70% of those born after 1920 were of ethnically mixed parentage. Some 72% of all
married persons of Asian ancestry were married to other Asians-which means that about 28% are
married to non-Asians. Herbert J. Gans, a sociologist, has commented that these and other census
data illustrate that "among economically secure middle-class whites, ethnic background is no longer
the source of conflict that it once was." Quoted in Collins, A New Look at Intermarriage in the U.S.,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1985, at C13, col. 2. On attitudes toward ethnic intermarriage, see S. STEIN-
BERG, supra note 2, at 68-71. See generally Heer, Intermarriage, in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN ETHNIC GRoUPs, supra note 117, at 513-21 (discussing the determinants and conse-
quences of intermarriage).
Black-white marriages are not common. The 1980 census showed that only 1.3% of married
couples in the United States were interracial couples. Here, however, as with other ethnic groups,
there has been a significant generational shift. Of black married men born before 1920, 0.8% were in
interracial marriages, mostly to whites; for black married men born after 1950, 6% were interracially
married-almost an eightfold increase. Collins, supra. There are, however, many children of ra-
cially mixed parentage whose parents were not married. See J. WILLIAMSON, supra note 153 (trac-
ing miscegenation between blacks and whites in the United States from the 1800s to the present).
Religious intermarriage also has increased with successive generations. Of Jews who have mar-
ried in the last ten years 40% have married non-Jews. Collins, supra. On the acceptance by Jews of
this rising tide of intermarriage, see A. GOREN, THE AMERICAN JEWS 107 (1982); C. WAXMAN,
AMERICA'S JEWS IN TRANSITION 173-78 (1983). In large urban dioceses, about one-third of mar-
riages by Catholics involve non-Catholic partners. Collins, supra.
205. This factor is related to education, which, as Bernard Bailyn remarked of education before
the Revolution, tends "to propel [the individual] away from the simple acceptance of a predeter-
mined social role." B. BAILYN, EDUCATION IN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 49 (1960).
206. The effects of modern liberal individualism in eroding traditional forms of community are
the subject of a large volume of literature. For a capsule statement and a one-foot shelf of citations,
see Karst, Equality and Community: Lessons from the Civil Rights Era, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 183,
186-89 (1980).
207. See generally L. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CoNFLIcr 121-49 (1956) (on the uni-
fying function of conflict).
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similated, its members find more tolerance among the majority for the cultural
differences that may remain.
Unquestionably such differences will remain. A great many Americans will
continue to identify themselves in significant ways as members of cultural
groups and, indeed, to reject parts of the majority culture, such as family pat-
terns that seem isolating and uncaring. The survival of these cultural groups in
some form is entirely consistent with the process of assimilation, and it is un-
likely that any ethnic group now visible in America soon will disappear. What
seems more likely is that the process of assimilation will go on as it has pro-
ceeded in the past, with each newly assimilated cultural group not only main-
taining a measure of internal cohesion but also contributing to the enrichment of
the cultural mainstream.
If many largely assimilated Americans cling to some aspects of their "pri-
mordial affinities," perhaps they understand that genuine individuality is not to
be found by participating in a vast social or political market. Rather, both indi-
viduality and community are attainable only within a particular group of people
who share cultural traditions. "Most often, when individual men and women
insist on 'being themselves,' they are in fact defending a self they share with
others."
20 8
One bulwark of the defense of self is the Constitution. Today's constitu-
tional doctrines of equal citizenship, freedom of religion, and freedom of expres-
sion mediate cultural conflict by opening our public life to the participation of
cultural minorities. By defending against cultural subordination and the coer-
cion of cultural conformity, the same doctrines also promote tolerance for cul-
tural difference. Together, these guarantees promise individuals broad freedom
to choose for themselves among "the varieties of ethnic experience."
209
IV. BELONGING: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Until late in the nineteenth century the price of national unity in a "seg-
mented society" was local autonomy of a kind that frequently permitted the
imposition of local orthodoxy as a condition on belonging.2 10 The required con-
formity might govern religious observance, political expression, or other forms
of behavior ranging from trivialities such as public sobriety to the cruelties of
slavery and Jim Crow. To all these varieties of local orthodoxy, the Constitution
was seen as having little to say. By the mid-twentieth century, however, the
Supreme Court not only had laid the doctrinal foundations for effective protec-
tion of unorthodox political and religious expression, but also had confronted
the local "custom" of racial subordination. 211 The Court had inaugurated an
208. Walzer, Pluralism in Political Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF ETHNIcrry, supra note 150,
at 14. As Micaela di Leonardo shows convincingly, a range of choices about the quality and inten-
sity of ethnic identification are available to people who think of themselves as fully assimilated to the
mainstream culture. M. DI LEONARDO, supra note 20.
209. See supra note 20.
210. R. WIEBE, supra note 22.
211. An earlier Court had upheld racial segregation as an accommodation to local custom. See
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (confirming the constitutionality of "separate but equal"
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era in which equal citizenship and tolerance for cultural difference would emerge
as major themes in constitutional law. If the new constitutional doctrine could
be made a reality, local autonomy, when it meant the exclusion of a cultural
minority, would have to give way.
The Court's decisions protecting the constitutional values of equal citizen-
ship centered on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
2 12
but were not confined to that doctrinal area. For example, the Court invoked
the establishment clause to forbid various forms of state sponsorship of religion
that effectively treated members of religious minorities as outsiders.2 13 In addi-
tion, the Court expanded the scope of the freedoms of speech and of the press in
the course of protecting the rights of protesters against racial discrimination.
214
Although the Court's interpretations of substantive constitutional guarantees
and civil rights laws have been expressed in the language of individual rights, in
the aggregate they nourish a vision of American society that emphasizes toler-
ance and the value of belonging.
A. The Constitution and the Choice of Cultural Identity
The most important constitutional development of the twentieth century,
the emergence of the principle of equal citizenship, has promoted the freedom of
individual choice about cultural identification. When the promise of equal citi-
zenship is fulfilled, the paths to belonging are opened in two directions for mem-
bers of cultural minorities. As full members of the larger society, they have the
option to participate to whatever degree they choose. They also may look in-
ward, seeking solidarity within their cultural groups, without being penalized for
that choice.
Any effective prohibition against racial discrimination, for example, weak-
ens a racial caste system, widening the range of choice for individual members of
racial minorities concerning participation in activities previously closed to them.
The right to enter an interracial marriage2 15 is a moving example of the role the
law has played in removing obstacles to individual choices leading toward assim-
ilation, but the entire body of antidiscrimination law has the same tendency. If
equal legal rights can be made into a practical reality,2 16 opportunities will be
increased for the members of racial and other cultural minorities to participate
railroad cars). Some Reconstruction civil rights laws referred to such "custom" as the effective
equivalent of law. See, eg., Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 20, 35 Stat. 1092, 1092 (current version
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982)); Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 20, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (current version
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
212. And the decisions also centered on the corresponding guarantee of equal protection that the
Court found in the fifth amendment in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
213. See infra note 348 and accompanying text.
214. See H. KALvEN, supra note 7.
215. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (miscegenation law invalid).
216. This process is far from complete. The critical legislative beginnings in the modem era
were the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1982)), and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1982)), along with the Supreme Court's broadened inter-
pretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1982)), in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in the institutions of our public life and in private markets, including the em-
ployment market. These doctrinal developments are properly seen as egalita-
rian; yet they also are grounded in the idea that a person has a right to be treated
as an individual and to not be excluded from any significant aspect of "the pub-
lic life of the community" 217 because of race, religion, or ethnicity.
The paramount constitutional value recognized in these cases is dignity, or
respect. In negative terms, the principle of equal citizenship protects against
stigma, the imposition of badges of inferiority based on a person's race or mem-
bership in an ethnic or religious group. When stigma attaches to a subordinated
cultural group, that denial of respect not only inhibits the integration of the
group's members into the larger society but also undermines the value of belong-
ing to the group. Putting an end to the various forms of domination based on
race, religion, or ethnicity is thus a constitutional imperative if we are to foster
satisfaction of the basic human need for connection. But, given a history of
subordination of racial and other cultural groups, a society that prizes the value
of belonging will solve only part of its problem by ending those practices of
domination that have been embodied in law. The social vision nourished by the
constitutional principle of equal citizenship not only tolerates but encourages a
broad range of efforts to promote the integration of American society.218
If the subordination of a group is a constitutional wrong, there is nothing
unorthodox in the suggestion that group remedies may be appropriate. On the
whole, however, the United States Supreme Court in the last decade has been
reluctant to recognize explicitly the relevance of racial groups to constitutional
claims. For example, the Court has refused to treat a governmental action as
unconstitutional racial discrimination even when the action's effect is to disfavor
blacks as a group and the officials who engage in the action know of that effect.
To establish racial discrimination, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
government deliberately adopted a program in order to achieve a racially dispa-
rate result.2 19 Typically it is difficult to prove either that the governmental ac-
tion was improperly motivated220 or that any individual black was
disadvantaged by the action because of race.221 The usual result, then, is to
leave the matter to majoritarian politics, as an earlier majority of the Court did
with the group wrong of segregation. Yet when majoritarian politics produces
an affirmative action program, the inevitable argument against the program's
constitutionality is that it abandons individual treatment in favor of group
rights. Black people can be pardoned for perceiving this argument-which the
Supreme Court has not accepted-as a variation on the theme: "Heads, we win;
217. Black, supra note 132, at 101.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 234-37.
219. Eg., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
220. Eg., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (statistical showing of racially disparate
results is insufficient).
221. Eg., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (lack of standing). For a general discussion, see
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of




Beyond the domain of antidiscrimination law, the Supreme Court's consti-
tutional decisions of the past forty years have both acknowledged and reinforced
a national commitment to a broad freedom for individuals to make their own
choices about cultural identification, particularly the choice of looking inward to
a cultural group. The constitutional right to control one's children's education
extends to questions of language and religion.223 An expanding freedom of asso-
ciation protects not only marriage and family relationships and other similar
forms of intimate association224 but also association in groups that aim to pro-
mote racial or ethnic identification. 225 The core of the free exercise of religion,
of course, is the freedom to organize and maintain a church or other religious
group.
Some constitutional recognition is also given to a cultural group's right to
exclude outsiders in order to maintain its own integrity. Thus, one's home has a
preferred constitutional status that protects it against various kinds of official
intrusion that might erode the family autonomy that is one foundation for cul-
tural identification. 226 Even intrusions to protect so important a value as racial
equality have their constitutional limits. 227 Churches, too, are protected in their
right to exclude dissenters.228 Thus far private clubs, successfully claiming asso-
ciational freedom, have secured legislative exemptions from civil rights legisla-
tion, which exemptions allow them to maintain exclusive membership policies
based on race or religion.
229
222. On the place of groups in our thinking about constitutional rights, see Piss, supra note 139;
Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983). On
affirmative action and race, see infra text accompanying note 234.
223. See supra text accompanying note 55 (language); infra text accompanying note 330
(religion).
224. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3250 (1984), the Supreme Court re-
ferred approvingly to a "freedom of intimate association." See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
225. In fact, the leading decision identifying what the Court has recently called the "freedom of
expressive association," Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3250 (1984), involved just
such a group. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (the NAACP). On
the freedom of association as a matrix for both communal life and a "normative universe," see
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4
(1983).
226. The fourth amendment is an explicit recognition of this preferred status for the home. See
also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (possession of obscenity in the home protected by the
first amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy guaranteed within
the penumbra of the Bill of Rights).
227. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 187-89 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (associational
rights as bearing on the hiring of people to work in one's home).
228. The issue typically arises in the context of a church property dispute arising out of doctrinal
schism. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (allowing state courts to apply state property law
"neutrally" to such disputes).
229. The public accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempts a "private club
. . . not in fact open to the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1982). The fair housing title of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 exempts rooms in dwellings occupied by their owners. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2)
(1982).
Outside the contexts mentioned in the text, the constitutional protections of cultural exclusive-
ness weaken. Private schools and universities, whatever their cultural orientation, have no constitu-
tional immunity from the application of civil rights legislation against their racially exclusive
policies. See, eg., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1976); see also Bob Jones Univ. v.
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Our constitutional law thus offers a considerable measure of individual free-
dom to satisfy the need for connection by looking to the solidarity of a particular
cultural group. Historically, however, most Americans have regarded this reso-
lution of the search for belonging as no better than a consolation prize, a defen-
sive identification in response to exclusion. Both the Nation's need for unity and
the individual's need for connection will be best served when our constitutional
law makes it possible for everyone, whatever his or her cultural identity, to par-
ticipate as a full member of the larger American community, knowing that he or
she belongs to America.
B. The Cultural Outsider and the Paths to Belonging:
Four Constitutional Problems
For much of the Nation's history, cultural politics and constitutional law
went their separate ways; even after the adoption of the Civil War amendments
this pattern continued largely unchanged for some eight decades. 230 The mid-
twentieth century emergence of the constitutional principle of equal citizenship
coincided with the emergence of a new political consciousness among black peo-
ple and other cultural minorities, and each of those developments gave strength
to the other. Perhaps because constitutional litigation sometimes seems to be a
continuation of cultural politics by other means, it is possible to overlook the
difference between the two. Nathan Glazer has asked, rhetorically, "[I]s it more
helpful to get a decision from a court that one is right, or an outcome to a
negotiation in which one gets something-a new housing project or school, a
nomination for an assembly seat, a promise of a job as an assistant district attor-
ney?'"23 1 Often Glazer's implicit answer is correct.232 But when the fundamen-
tal question is whether one is to be recognized as an equal citizen-whether one
belongs as a respected participant in the society-it is not only helpful but essen-
tial to get a decision from a court that one is right-on principle.233 Cultural
politics transgresses its constitutional limits when it becomes the means for cul-
tural domination.
The rhetoric of rights is vital to a cultural minority in defending the values
of belonging, whether the concern be for group solidarity or for integration into
the larger society. The rhetoric of rights, however, can also mislead, by sug-
gesting that the concerns of constitutional law are focused narrowly on guaran-
teeing individual zones of noninterference. Even in protecting individual rights
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (religious institution denied tax exempt status because of racially
discriminatory policy). Yet it is by no means clear that civil rights laws have had any appreciable
impact on the actual racial composition of private schools, as distinguished from the symbolism of
those schools' exclusive policies. Black children have not rushed to apply for admission to "segrega-
tion academies."
230. See, eg., A. BICKEL & B. ScHmnyr, supra note 113.
231. Glazer, Politics of a Multiethnic Society, in ETHNIC RELATIONS IN AMERICA 128, 142 (L.
Liebman ed. 1982).
232. His argument becomes more persuasive as more and more members of an ethnic minority
become integrated into American society. As integration progresses, the minority has less need for
symbolic reaffirmations of equal membership in the national community.
233. See Karst, supra note 206, at 205-11.
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to liberty and equality, the constitutional law of our multicultural society per-
forms an organizing, constitutive function of the sort envisioned by the Framers.
In developing a body of constitutional law that realizes the ideals of the Ameri-
can civic culture, our courts make it possible for the members of all cultural
groups to belong to America. Judges engaged in that essential endeavor can
truly say, "It is a Nation we are constituting."
1. Affirmative Action and Integration
The constitutional validation of affirmative action has been criticized as a
development that will accentuate racial and ethnic divisions, promoting the frag-
mentation of the Nation into a society of groups. The theoretical side of this
argument is that legitimizing affirmative action implies adopting a theory of
group rights, a form of ethnic corporatism.2 34 The argument's factual compo-
nent is a prediction: affirmative action in the sense of "allocation among people
by race" 235 or ethnicity will stimulate ethnic politics and intercultural con-
flict, 2 3 6 threatening the Country's solidarity.2 3 7
These concerns should trouble anyone who cares about the unity of our
multicultural Nation. Yet what we know about assimilation and cultural plural-
ism suggests an alternative view of the likely results of affirmative action. In this
perspective, affirmative action can be seen as a means to promote not separatism
but integration-and, indeed, as an instrument in the long-term service of
individualism.
We can begin by recapitulating four propositions already developed. First,
the main cause contributing to cultural separatism in America has been the sub-
ordination of minorities.23 8 Second, the most important technique of subordina-
tion has been the exclusion of cultural groups from jobs and from the public life
of the community-that is, the exclusion of individuals on the basis of their
membership in racial, ethnic, or religious groups. 239 To speak of caste is to
speak of the subordination of a group.24° Third, to identify the economic effects
of systematic racial discrimination, it is necessary to look at the incomes of ra-
cial groups, and, in particular, at the serious disparities between the incomes of
blacks and whites. 241 Fourth, assimilation means participation.2"2 In the racial
234. This appears to be Nathan Glazers view. See Glazer, supra note 231, at 128-32.
235. Van Aistyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CH.
L. REv. 775, 777 (1979).
236. Id. at 809.
237. Id. at 778 n.10. In this Essay I focus on cultural identity and the sense of belonging. The
discussion of affirmative action here is similarly focused and touches only tangentially the larger
questions of substantive justice involved in these issues. Elsewhere I have argued for affirmative
action as a means to promote the substantive values of equal citizenship. Karst, The Supreme Court
1976 Term-Foreword. Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. 1EV. 1,
48-53 (1977).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
239. See supra text accompanying note 112.
240. See Fiss, supra note 139, at 147-70; Marshall, A Comment on the Nondiscrimination Princi-
ple in a "Nation of Minorities," 93 YALE L.J. 1006 (1984).
241. See Thurow, supra note 167, at 27-29; Jencks, Discrimination and Thomas Sowell (Book
Review), N.Y. REv. oF BooKs, March 3, 1983, 33-36 (discussing nonwhite incomes as percentages
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context, generally we speak of integration rather than assimilation, but the two
concepts are not different in substance. Whichever term be used, the process is
fluid enough to permit a range of different choices about cultural identification
and about participation in the life of the wider community.
Any such wider participation, however, ultimately requires the larger soci-
ety's acceptance of the group that is being integrated. A group that has been
subordinated in the past is unlikely to find that acceptance until individual mem-
bers of the group have moved into the middle class in large numbers. At pres-
ent, the avenues into the middle class are blocked for a great many blacks,
who-given the Nation's history of racial subordination-simply do not have
any effective choices about the nature and degree of their integration into the
wider society.
Complex processes maintain the separation of the races today. Thomas
Schelling has discussed a variety of mechanisms of individual choice that might
produce racial "sorting and mixing" in residential neighborhoods, even though a
generation has passed since the end of segregation imposed by law.243 An exam-
ination of the origins of individual preferences for integration or separation
reveals that one major contributing factor is the question of economic class,
whether the issue is the integration of neighborhoods or of schools. 244 Nor is
the problem of caste solved by ending the exclusion of middle class blacks from
of white incomes). In 1983 the Current Population Survey gave these figures on median incomes for
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Other Spanish Origin 13.2%
Id. Table 658, at 394; Table 666, at 396.
In the 1980s racial disparities in income and unemployment have widened. "In a recent Gallup
poll, one-fifth of the U.S. population claimed that there were times during the preceding 12 months
when they did not have enough money to buy the food, clothing, or medical supplies their families
needed. Among blacks, close to half reported these conditions." Gallup, Religion in America, 480
ANNALS OF THE AMER. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 167, 174 (1985). These estimates are confirmed
by recent figures on poverty among children. In 1984, 21.3% of children under 18 lived in families
below the federal government's "poverty line." Among black children, the figure was 51.5%, the
highest ever recorded. Houston, L8 Million Escape Poverty as '84 Rate Drops Sharply, L.A. Times,
Aug. 28, 1985, pt. I, at 1, col 5. For an exploration of the grim human realities that lie beneath
figures like these, see K. AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS (1982). On the implications of these facts for
the condition of black Americans--all black Americans, see Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-
Foreword, The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARv L. REv. 4 (1985); Bell, An American Fairy Tale:
The Income-Related Neutralization of Race Law Precedent, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 331 (1984).
242. See supra text accompanying note 193.
243. T. SCHELLING, MCROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 137-66 (1978).
244. Integration is better received by whites when the blacks in question are of the middle class
rather than the working class. See S. STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 167-221; see, eg., N. GLAZER,
AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 120-21 (paperback ed.
1978) (on failure of school integration when lower class blacks are integrated with middle class
whites); id. at 147-48 (on opposition in middle class white neighborhoods to introduction of low-
income housing for blacks). On the historic connection between class and neighborhood, see Kel.
[Vol. 64
CULTURAL IDENTITY
middle class neighborhoods and institutions. The identification of blacks as a
subordinate caste attaches to race itself and will last until the group's subordina-
tion ends. The stigma of caste thus differs fundamentally from the stigma at-
tached to individual poverty.
In this perspective it is evident that a cultural group's economic disadvan-
tage as a group contributes to the continued separation of the group's individual
members from the larger society and, inevitably, to continued intercultural con-
ffict. 245 Correspondingly, a subordinate cultural group's economic advancement
as a group promotes both the group's integration and the Nation's intercultural
harmony.
Given the lasting demoralizing effects of the racial caste system, integration
in this sense appears impossible to achieve within the lifetime of anyone now
living if we limit ourselves to the remedy of simply lowering formal racial barri-
ers to entry into the wider society's institutions:
An individualistic ethic is acceptable if society has never violated
this individualistic ethic in the past, but it is unacceptable if society has
not in fact lived up to its individualist ethic in the past. To shift from a
system of group discrimination to a system of individual performance
is to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination into the present and
the future.246
In other words, for a very long time, large numbers of blacks and of other
subordinated minorities2 4 7 will have no significant chances for individual ad-
vancement and no significant individual choices to make about belonging to the
larger society-unless we are prepared to employ group remedies now. To put
logg, Neighborhood Segregation by Race and Class: An American Tradition, in ETHNIcrry, LAW
AND THE SOCIAL GOOD 119 (W. Van Home ed. 1983).
Alexander Bickel once expressed concern that the Supreme Court's school desegregation deci-
sions, by failing to take account of these connections between race and class, would jeopardize the
public schools' performance of their historic nationalizing and assimilating missions. A. BICKEL,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 121-51 (1970). On middle class "white flight"
in Boston and other cities, see T. WHrrE, supra note 28, at 121-22, 132 n.*. But see Cunningham &
Husk, White Flight A Closer Look at the Assumptions, 7 READINGS ON EQUAL EDUCATION 371
(M. Barnett & C. Harrington eds. 1984), on the need to evaluate the influence of variables other than
desegregation of public schools. On the relation of class to white attitudes toward race, see D.
WELLMAN, PORTRAITS OF WHITE RACISM (1977).
For a class-centered analysis of discrimination against Chicanos, see M. BARRERA, RACE AND
CLASS IN THE SOUTHWEST 174-219 (1979). On race and class generally, see R. POLENBERG, ONE
NATION, DVSIBLE: CLASS, RACE, AND ETHNIcrrY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1938 (1980).
245. "If there is an iron law of ethnicity, it is that when ethnic groups are found in a hierarchy of
power, wealth, and status, then conflict is inevitable." S. STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 170. To put
the same point differently, it is the middle class black person who has a stake in the system and who
is most likely to find common ground with whites in loyalty to the Nation. In a famous passage,
W.E.B. DuBois depicted the question of a black person's identification with the Nation as an internal
conflict: "One ever feels his two-ness-an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unrec-
onciled strivings ... ." W.E.B. DuBoIs, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3 (1953). This cultural
dualism itself, however, represents an achievement of no little consequence; it is the middle class
black who has the opportunity to make the choices implicit in those "unreconciled strivings."
246. Thurow, supra note 167, at 35-36; see also Smelser & Lipset, Social Structure, Mobility, and
Development, in SOCIAL. STRUCTURE AND MOmLrrY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMEbrr, supra note 168,
at 1, 6-17 (comparing "structural" and "individual" mobility).
247. On the relevance of caste to other minority groups, see infra text accompanying notes 261-
62.
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the matter more succinctly, "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race. There is no other way." 248
One eloquent critic rejoins: "Rather, one gets beyond racism by getting
beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and credible commitment never to toler-
ate in one's own life--or in the life or practices of one's government-the differ-
ential treatment of other human beings by race."' 249 As a factual proposition,
this response focuses on one aspect of the educative force of legal principle.
250
To defend affirmative action as integration is to emphasize a different and
equally important aspect of law, namely the educative force of behavior in estab-
lishing norms. This latter view draws support from our experience with the
desegregation of public accommodations under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.251
Now, two decades after the adoption of the Act, the sight of black people in
hotels and restaurants in Southern cities is unremarkable-a fact that surely
owes more to the normative force of day-to-day behavior than it owes to any
continuing aura of the law's enactment.
The quoted criticism, however, expresses more than a factual disagreement
about the probable effectiveness of alternative ways to "get beyond racism"; it
also expresses a strong moral conviction that racial distinctions have no legiti-
mate place in our law. This position equates the status goal of equal citizen-
ship 252 with the achievement of equality before the law. In contrast, the view of
affirmative action as integration rests on the premise that the status of equal
citizenship requires more than formal equality-that the racial caste system can-
not be uprooted by trimming away those features of the system that have been
written into law.
253
If affirmative action programs were to settle in institutional concrete-for
example, by establishing racial quotas in permanent legislation-there might be
some reason to worry about a drift into cultural corporatism. Nothing in our
recent experience justifies any such anxiety. Justice Powell's "diversity" ap-
proach to affirmative action in higher education 254 does not freeze admissions in
racial or ethnic quotas; furthermore, the approach minimizes the occasions for
white resentment. 255 Appropriations bills, including the one approved by the
Supreme Court, setting aside a portion of certain public works funds for minor-
ity contractors, 256 have only temporary influence. When courts impose hiring
quotas in employment discrimination cases, generally they limit the quotas' du-
248. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.).
249. Van Alstyne, supra note 235, at 809.
250. Cf Graglia, Racially Discriminatory Admission to Public Institutions of Higher Education, 9
Sw. U.L. REv. 583, 590 (1977) (asserting that the law should compel equal educational standards
regardless of race, thus ultimately creating a system in which no racial differences exist).
251. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1982).
252. See supra text accompanying note 161.
253. See supra text accompanying note 166.
254. Justice Powell's view of the "constitutionally permissible" goal of attaining a diverse stu-
dent body is enunciated in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1978).
255. See Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R..
C.L. L. REv. 7, 13-15 (1979).
256. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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ration.2 57 With the historically justified exception of the Indian tribal govern-
ments, no racial or ethnic group wields governmental power granted by
legislation or judicial decree. 258 The chief results of affirmative action are not
corporatist but individualistic, freeing individuals from being locked into
subordinate status because of their group membership. As Michael Walzer has
remarked, these programs offer "opportunities to individuals, not a voice to
groups."' 259 The spectre of ethnic corporatism, like other ghosts, has the capac-
ity to frighten but lacks substance.
Affirmative action programs are often justified as compensation for past
harm, and the continuing harms produced by a system of caste bring such a
justification within the bounds of reasonable argument.26° The alternative per-
spective offered here-viewing affirmative action as a means to integrate Ameri-
can society-helps to explain why a number of affirmative action programs
extend beyond black beneficiaries to other disadvantaged racial and ethnic mi-
norities.2 61 In some cases, it would be hard to justify affirmative action as com-
pensation for societal discrimination in generations past. For example,
immigrants, immediately on arrival, normally are neither the direct victims of
past discrimination in the United States nor the descendants of such victims.
Even recent immigrants, however, will be plagued by the problem of caste once
they join communities that are presently subordinated.
262
No matter what justification is offered for affirmative action, it seems inevi-
257. On the importance of tailoring an affirmative action program to its remedial purpose-
including limits on the program's duration-see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979); Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894, 907-08, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1984).
258. The delegation of governmental power to a religious group, of course, would present serious
problems under the establishment clause. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (dele-
gation to church of power to permit or deny liquor sales in nearby taverns is unconstitutional).
259. Walzer, supra note 208, at 22.
260. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 324, 362-79 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.); see also B.
BrrrKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973) (legal analysis of the validity of claims for
compensation for former servitude); Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial
Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1979) (exploring the effects of racial remedies on minorities). For
an analysis of affirmative action in the employment context, combining a theory of remedy for past
discrimination with a sensitive appreciation of the importance of integrating the work force, see
Spiegelman, Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas after Stot" A Narrative on the Role of the Moralities of
the Web and the Ladder in Employment Discrimination Doctrine, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 339
(1985).
261. The statute upheld in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), was typical in offering its
benefits to "minority group members," defined to include citizens who were "Negroes, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts." See Public Works Employment Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-28, § 103(f)(2), 91 Stat. 116, 117 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (1982)).
262. The problem of defining membership in the groups thus disadvantaged remains a thorny
one. See Van Alstyne, supra note 235, at 804-08; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532, 534 n.5
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Mostly, the administrators of affirmative action programs resolve
these difficulties by "muddling through," and no one suggests that the process is tidy. In Lester
Thurow's words, "we have a dilemma. Individuals have to be judged on the basis of group data, yet
all systems of grouping will result in the unfair treatment of some individuals." Thurow, supra note
167, at 31. Integration assigns a high value to the elimination of racial and ethnic caste, a value great
enough to justify using racial and ethnic criteria even though the correlation between minority group
membership and economic or educational disadvantage is-fortunately-not perfect. As that corre-
lation decreases, the justification for continuing race-based affirmative action programs will similarly
decrease. I concede that it may be politically difficult to repeal such a program once it is in place.
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table that new claimant groups will emerge. At least some members of virtually
all cultural groups except British Americans can claim that their predecessors
experienced discrimination in this country. Furthermore, it should not surprise
anyone if members of today's subordinated minorities think of such programs as
"getting our share." The prediction that affirmative action will stimulate ethnic
politics 263 is sound; indeed, the prediction seems already borne out by the ethnic
revival of the 1970s.264 What does not seem justified, however, is the assump-
tion that a resurgence of ethnic politics will lead to a new fragmentation of
American society. The history of ethnic politics suggests quite the reverse.
265
Even if an ethnic group were disposed to characterize its political objective as a
share in "racial spoils," 266 that group must necessarily turn outward to the
wider society. As the leaders of today's cultural minorities turn from "solidarity
politics" to "broker politics," 267 no doubt they and their constituents, like the
Irish in the nineteenth century, will find that participation means integration.
In offering a view of affirmative action as integration, I do not want to
contribute to the illusion that such programs, by themselves, will integrate
American society. Ultimately integration will depend on factors no one can
foresee, most notably the ability of our economy to produce an abundance in
which all can share.2 68 Yet, although the new mobility of significant numbers of
members of racial and ethnic minorities may not be a sufficient condition for
integration, it appears to be a necessary condition if integration is to be accom-
plished before the Nation celebrates its tricentennial.
2. Voting and Cultural Politics
A proposition submitted to the California voters in 1984 called for the Gov-
ernor to inform Congress that the state wished to be free of its obligation under
federal law269 to provide ballots in languages other than English. If you set out
to construct a ballot measure that would be a symbol and nothing more, you
might come up with that proposition. The proposition won, with more than
263. See supra text accompanying note 236.
264. See Gleason, supra note 44, at 127-30. On white ethnic politics, see R. KRICKUS, PURSU-
ING THE AMERICAN DREAM: WHITE ETHNICS AND THE NEw POPULISM 139-97 (1976). On the
"new ethnic politics" among Chicanos, see J. MOORE & H. PACHON, MEXICAN AMERICANS 155-58
(2d ed. 1976); see also J. DUNNE, DELANO: THE STORY OF THE CALIFORNIA GRAPE STRIKE (1967)
(discussing how Cesar Chfivez organized California grape pickers). For historical background to the
modem political mobilization of Chicanos, see . SAMORA & P. SIMON, supra note 117, at 161-202.
It is plain that these political developments are closely connected to a heightened sense of ethnic
identity founded on self-respect. For a discussion of the need to develop this type of identity among
young Americans of Chinese ancestry, see S. STEINER, FUSANG: THE CHINESE WHO BUILT
AMERICA 218-36 (1979).
265. See supra text accompanying note 176.
266. Van Aistyne, supra note 235, at 809.
267. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
268. The civil rights era, from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, was a period of accelerated
economic growth. A fund of resources is always easier to share when it is expanding than when it is
contracting.
269. The 1975 Voting Rights Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-110, § 203, 89 Stat. 400, 402
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1982)).
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seventy percent of the vote.2 70 What was the substance behind the symbol? For
some voters, surely the ballot issue symbolized dominance itself: "foreigners"
were not to be allowed to "take over." Others no doubt thought that for a
citizen to participate fully in the life of the larger community, an ability to speak
English was essential. In other words, the attitudes of the California majority
probably reflected the same range of feelings that had fed the Americanization
movement around the turn of the century.
Difficult questions of fact and policy attend the issue of governmental sup-
port for languages other than English; but at least one thing is clear: any of the
majority voters in California who thought they were voting for assimilation were
mistaken. If the bilingual ballots have any effect at all, presumably that effect is
to facilitate voting by persons whose native languages are not English. And the
surest path to assimilation is participation in the larger society's activities and
institutions. Voting is not just an expression of political preferences; it is an
assertion of belonging to a political community.27 1
At last, official restrictions on voting by members of cultural minorities are
behind us: religious tests, long waiting periods for citizenship, racial discrimina-
tion, and English literacy tests have been repealed or otherwise rendered
invalid.272 Yet the danger of faction, identified by James Madison,273 remains.
One group may capture the legislature and use that power to perpetuate its own
dominance. The Supreme Court's initial reapportionment opinions 274 saw the
issue of legislative districting mainly as a problem of the systematic overrepre-
sentation of rural areas and of the political parties favored in those areas. Now,
two decades later, to speak of the urban-rural or urban-suburban rivalry is often
a genteel way of speaking about race and ethnicity.2 75 Many of the Supreme
Court's recent voting rights cases have arisen out of efforts by state legislatures
to define-and sometimes to dilute-the voting strength of racial and ethnic
groups.
2 7 6
For many years the Supreme Court had avoided the subject of reapportion-
ment, recognizing that the drawing of boundaries for legislative districts was
270. L.A. Times, Nov. 8, 1984, § I, at 19, col. 4.
271. This statement is true even where cultural politics are highly polarized. On the experience
in one such community-Crystal City, Texas--see J. SCHOCKLEY, CHICANO REVOLT IN A TEXAS
TowN (1974). On voting and community membership, see Karst, supra note 237, at 27-29.
272. English literacy has been required for naturalization since 1906. Earlier, some courts read
such a requirement into the general statutory language demanding attachment to the principles of
the Constitution. Liebowitz, The Official Character of Language in the United States: Literacy Re-
quirements for Immigration, Citizenship, and Entrance Into American Life, 15 AzLIN: IN'L J. OF
CHICANO STUD. 25, 34 (1985). However, since 1970 Congress has forbidden the states to condition
voting on passing a literacy test. This prohibition is a response to the use of literacy tests as a means
of racial discrimination.
273. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).
274. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S 186 (1962) (reapportionment presents a justicable controversy);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (and companion cases) (districting must follow principle of
one person, one vote).
275. On the political import of the changing racial and ethnic composition of the largest Ameri-
can cities, see T. WHrrE, supra note 28, at 350.
276. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-71 (1973) equates racial and ethnic groups in this
context.
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inescapably bound up with politics. 2 7 7 Until very recently, the Court has been
reluctant to confront the general problem of gerrymandering, presumably be-
cause the Justices have been unable to discern any principle that will separate
permissible political choices from impermissible ones.278 When the issue is ra-
cial or ethnic gerrymandering, however, the Court has long been prepared, at
least in some cases, to intervene.2 79 Evidently the reasons for this unwonted
willingness to enter the "political thicket" 2 80 lie in the Nation's unhappy history
of nativist restrictions on the franchise and in the belief that the minimum de-
mands of the Nation's commitments to equality and national unity today in-
clude fair legislative representation for the members of racial, religious, and
ethnic minorities.
Equality in the electoral process, in other words, is a central feature of
equal citizenship. Furthermore, the legislators who draw the boundaries of elec-
toral districts are keenly conscious of patterns of ethnic voting-of the behavior
of cultural groups as groups. Legislative districting thus presents the strongest
case for the courts to discard the premises underlying their refusal to find racial
discrimination in the absence of particularized proof of discriminatory mo-
tive.2 8 ' Any sensible view of the vote dilution problem would focus on the
highly visible effects of districting on racial and other cultural groups.
2 82
Some legislators and commentators continue to express concern that the
"effects" approach may amount to a principle of "ethnic entitlements" in legisla-
277. E.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
278. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), made clear the Court's determination not to
enter the field of political gerrymandering. In an action that may portend a change of heart on this
subject, the Court has granted review in a "pure" political gerrymandering case. This case, Davis v.
Bandemer,prob.juris. noted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1985) (No. 84-1244), will probably be
decided during the current Term. It is noteworthy that the Mexican-American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (MALDEF) has filed an amicus curiae brief in Davis, arguing against a test for the
fairness of apportionment that focuses on the number of votes cast for a political party as compared
with the number of legislative seats captured by that party. MALDEF shows beyond dispute that
such a test, if applied nationally, would minimize the legislative representation of Mexican-American
communities, which include younger-than-average populations and which, for reasons at least partly
tied to past discrimination, tend to have low voter turn-outs. Jonathan Steinberg and Daniel Lowen-
stein have shown the impossibility of devising a politically neutral standard for drawing district lines.
Steinberg & Lowenstein, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illu-
sory?, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1985).
279. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
280. Justice Frankfurter used this term in his plurality opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549, 556 (1946). See Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket A Perusal of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961 Sup.
Cr. REv. 194.
281. See supra text accompanying note 219.
282. In Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), the Court held fast to the requirement of proof of
intentional discrimination, but Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), in which the Court approved a
lower court's finding of intentional discrimination based largely on circumstantial evidence of the
racially disparate effects of districting legislation, blurred the borders between the tests of "inten-
tion" and "effects." In both these cases Justice Stevens registered his doubts that the Court was
capable of fashioning a principle that would permit judicial intervention in cases involving racial
gerrymanders but not in other situations. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 650-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mo-
bile, 446 U.S. at 88-92 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b (1982)), state that racially disparate "results" may be considered in determining racial dis-




tive districting.283 The recent jurisprudence of voting rights does not amount to
such a principle. It is the country's two centuries of experience with nativist
restrictions on participation in elections that suggests the appropriateness of an
"effects" test for determining constitutional284 and statutory285 violations in
cases of racial or ethnic gerrymandering or vote dilution. Such a test does not
imply a flat constitutional requirement of proportional representation for racial,
ethnic, or religious groups.28 6 It allows for judicial relief on the basis of effects
only if such a group also shows that its members have suffered past discrimina-
tion, contributing to the group's present weakness in influencing governmental
action.28 7 It is possible to conceive of a case in which such an inquiry would call
for subtle judgments,288 but no subtlety is required in considering the represen-
tation of blacks in the Mobile, Alabama city commission in the 1970s.
289
Even when the mechanisms of voting are not constructed in ways that mini-
283. The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat.
131, 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982)), included a proviso that the newly
established "results" factor should not be taken to establish a right to proportionate representation.
See also Glazer, supra note 231, at 136-41 (discussing redistricting in New York City).
284. Justice Marshall has argued that, whatever requirements of proof may be exacted under the
fourteenth amendment, a principle looking to racially disparate effects is appropriate under the fif-
teenth amendment. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 125-35 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
285. The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat.
131, 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982)), seem to have resolved this issue, but it
appears that much still depends on the weight that lower courts give to the racially disparate "re-
sults" of the districting laws.
286. Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75-80 (1980), so
characterized Justice Marshall's opinion in that case. Robert Barnes has offered an interesting anal-
ysis of the problem of reconciling the 1982 amendments' statement that racially disparate "results"
can be taken into account with the proviso that proportionate representation is not to be required.
Note, Voting Dilution, Discriminatory Results and Proportional Representation: What is the Appro-
priate Remedy for a Violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1203 (1985).
If residential neighborhoods were integrated perfectly, districting systems and at-large systems
would, assuming racial bloc voting, produce essentially the same results. Given the reality of racial
bloc voting, an at-large system means that a racial minority will elect no representatives, and a
system of districting means that they will elect some.
287. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REv. 75, 138-49 (1980).
288. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), was such a case. The Supreme Court
upheld an application of the Voting Rights Act in an apparent trade-off between blacks and Hasidic
Jews. One perspective on the case is that cultural politics had produced contrary results at the local
and national levels. Under the supremacy clause, the national standard-which was applied to favor
blacks-prevailed. Ultimately, however, one of the new districts elected a Jewish representative.
See Glazer, supra note 231, at 137.
289. On the Supreme Court's "historical stance" in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), see
Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 OHio ST. L.J. 383, 393-400 (1981) (criticizing the
Court's historical analysis of past governmental acts in determining present discrimination). On
remand, the district court in Bolden found the required evidence of racially discriminatory intent.
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1054-68, 1073-77 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
The at-large system has worked most effectively in minimizing black representation in small
towns and rural areas. Shipp, Across the Rural South, Segregation as Usual, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27,
1985, at Al, col. 3. The cities, however, are changing. In 1983, Greensboro, North Carolina, elected
two blacks to its city council as a result of a new districting system that was installed to head off a
threatened federal lawsuit. Schmidt, Jim Crow is Gone, But White Resistance Remains, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 4. The rigging of electoral systems to minimize the voting strength of racial
and ethnic minorities is by no means limited to the South. For a careful judge's sensitive and de-
tailed account of the way in which the New York state legislature restructured New York City
primary elections to diminish the chances of minority candidates, see Butts v. City of New York, 614
F. Supp. 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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mize the representation of racial or ethnic minorities, many of those groups are
at a disadvantage in raising money to conduct political campaigns. The rise of
the political action committee-an ironic result of post-Watergate "reform" leg-
islation 29 0 -has made the translation of power from the economic marketplace
to the political marketplace even easier than it was before, extending the arena in
which poor people have difficulty in competing with people who are better off.
Ethnic caucuses in legislatures, however, can and do engage in interest-group
bargaining, particularly in the area of welfare goals. The congressional "set-
aside" of a share of public works funds for minority businesses, upheld by the
Supreme Court,291 presumably resulted from such bargaining. Despite the con-
cerns expressed by Justice Stevens, 292 the notion of an "ethnic payoff" has been
a familiar part of American politics for many generations, 293 taking its place
alongside such hallowed practices as crop subsidies that benefit the districts of
influential members of Congress and the building of bridges and military bases
in the home districts of members of the appropriations committees.
The most serious harm of ethnic gerrymandering, of course, is that it results
in a legislative body that has no ethnic caucus. For cultural politics to work,
there must be legislators who represent cultural minorities. When legislative
districts are defined in ways that exclude the possibility of significant minority
representation, potential minority voters see that their votes are not worth cast-
ing. Yet electoral mobilization is vital, not just to the achievement of a cultural
group's legislative goals, 2 9 4 but to the group members' perceptions that they
belong to the community.
The ability of ethnic leadership to mobilize voters has derived from two
main sources. First, some leaders have created a voting clientele based on per-
sonal loyalties, built on a combination of material assistance and personal fa-
vors-the system of the old style urban machine. 295  Second, some issues-
chiefly domestic issues concerning group status and foreign affairs issues con-
cerning the ancestral homeland-bring out the voters by tapping strong feelings
of cultural identity.
296
290. As fate would have it, the reform has favored candidates who are running for re-election.
In the 1984 elections, political action committees gave 72% of their contributions to incumbents.
Irwin, PACs Donated Record Sum in '84, FEC Says, L.A. Times, May 19, 1985, § I, at 5, col. 3.
291. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); see supra note 256 and accompanying text.
292. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 541-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the
role of the congressional Black Caucus in the legislation that led to the Fullilove case).
293. See, ag., R. WIEBE, supra note 22, at 144-45.
294. An additional effect of cultural politics is the creation of executive agencies with particular
cultural constituencies. Barber, Some Consequences of Pluralization in Government, in THE FUTURE
OF THE UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT: TowARD THE YEAR 2000, at 242 (H. Perloff ed. 1972).
Beyond the immediate effects of a cultural group's electoral mobilization lies a general shift in
public attitudes toward the justice of the group's claims. It is not accidental that the civil rights era
began shortly after it became apparent that blacks had gained new political power in northern and
western cities.
295. See N. GLAZER & D. MOYNiHAN, supra note 134 (on ethnic politics in New York City);
M. JoNEs, supra note 8, at 229-46; R. WIEBE, supra note 22, at 139-46.
296. Issues of group status have provided the impetus for an impressive increase in the registra-
tion of black voters from 4.4 million in 1966 to more than 9 million in 1984. White, New Powers,
New Politics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 22.
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The existence of domination would seem at first glance to be an additional
inducement for members of cultural minorities to vote. Yet this is one area in
which a racial or ethnic group's dominated status appears to feed on itself. If
people are to be persuaded to vote, they must believe that they can change their
condition by influencing the government. 297 The process is thus circular: to
participate in the public life of the community, the members of a cultural minor-
ity must have the sense that they count for something, and it is precisely that
participation that is necessary to give them the sense that they belong. When a
legislative majority accomplishes gerrymandering to the disadvantage of a cul-
tural group, the history of American intergroup relations tells us that a serious
"status harm"'298 has been inflicted and that a constitutional right needs
vindication.
3. The Languages of Belonging
A recently proposed constitutional amendment would declare English the
official language of the United States.299 This proposal, like the California refer-
endum on bilingual ballots, is little more than a nativist symbol. It is not needed
for the conduct of the public's business, for that business is already conducted
largely in English.30° Nor does the proposal advance the cohesion of a multicul-
tural nation any more than did the Governor of Iowa's attempt seventy years
ago to prohibit telephone conversations in foreign languages.30' The proposed
amendment is an insult to the twenty million people in this country who speak a
mother tongue that is not English, and a gratuitous insult at that.
The adoption of English as a primary language is itself one measure of as-
similation into the larger American society. 30 2 There is still a lively debate over
the effects of language on an individual's definition of reality,30 3 but no one can
doubt that language is one of the "symbol spheres" 304 that define social
297. Recent incidents of low voter turnout among Latino groups may be explainable on this
basis. See Kantowicz, supra note 174, at 66. Conceivably, in the case of immigrants who are citi-
zens, low turnout is related to attitudes formed in the home country about the limits of what can be
expected from government. In some cases low voter turnout has yet to be given any satisfactory
explanation. Why, for example, do blacks in Mississippi and South Carolina now vote at signifi-
cantly higher rates than do blacks in New York and Massachusetts? See Glazer, supra note 231, at
138-44.
298. Fiss, supra note 139, at 157.
299. In 1981 a resolution proposing the amendment was first introduced by Senator S.I.
Hayakawa of California. Since his retirement, Senator Hayakawa has served as Honorary Chairman
of a group called U.S.-English, which is promoting a newly introduced amendment. See Houston,
English Pushed as Off cial U.S. Language, L.A. Times, June 13, 1984, § I, at 5, col. 1.
300. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has rejected a claim that the
Social Security system has a constitutional obligation to provide Spanish-language forms for the use
of Spanish-speaking applicants. Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied,
104 S. Ct. 1713 (1984).
301. See supra text accompanying note 56.
302. LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 202 (collection of essays exam-
ining the retention of native languages and the conversion to English in America); Thernstrom,
supra note 148, at 10.
303. For short summaries of the debate, see M. COLE & S. SCRIBNI:R, CULTURE AND
THOUGHT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTRODUCTDON 39-60 (1974); H. ISAACS, supra note 10, at 93-102.
304. H. GERTH & C. MILLS, CHARACTER AND SOCIAL STRuCTURE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 274-305 (1970). On language as one of the "foundations of knowledge in
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groups 30 5 and provide justification for social structures.306 A distinctive lan-
guage sets a cultural group off from others, with one consistent unhappy conse-
quence throughout American history: discrimination against members of the
cultural minority. Language differences provide both a way to rationalize subor-
dination and a ready means for accomplishing it.307
Part of the reason participation in a market economy is a strong assimilat-
ing force is that the market has its own "language of how much, how many, how
far.",30 8 One of the striking features of foreign language television is the assimi-
lating impact of commerce. Some of the programming is focused on those cul-
ture-specific symbols that nourish the "instinctive sympathies and ancestral
loyalties" 30 9 that hold a cultural minority together. The commercial messages,
however, are straight from Madison Avenue, appealing to the same values as
network advertising and even using the same vocabulary in literal translation.
310
Indeed, a considerable number of the commercial messages on foreign language
stations are in English.
There is no mystery in the desire of immigrant parents in America to have
their children learn English.3 11 The children's opportunities, not just to find
satisfying employment3 12 but to make effective choices about a wide range of
activities affecting their well-being, will be much improved if they are fluent in
the dominant language. The strongest retention of the mother tongue has al-
ways been associated with people of the most marginal economic and social sta-
tus.3 13 These incentives are powerful; in the past they have inexorably led to the
adoption of English and, for the most part, to the exclusive use of English by the
third or fourth generation.
3 14
everyday life," see P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 34-46
(1967).
305. H. IsAAcs, supra note 10, at 94. "The individuals of a group share patterns that enable
them to see the same thing and this holds them together." E. HALL, supra note 14, at 125. One of
those patterns, of course, is language.
Religion is another such pattern. The role of "ethnic parishes" in American history has been
assimilationist. See, e-g., M. JONES, supra note 8, at 317-19. At least 30% of American Catholics
are of Latino background; by the year 2000 the figure is expected to reach 40%; in Los Angeles
today it is 70%. Chandler, Catholic Church Absorbs a Growing Latino Flock, L.A. Times, May 20,
1985, § I, at 1, col. 1.
306. H. GERTH & C. MILLS, supra note 304, at 278-87.
307. The unhappy history of the use of literacy tests in America provides ample evidence. See
M. JONES, supra note 8, at 259-62; Liebowitz, supra note 272; Liebowitz, English Literacy: Legal
Sanction for Discrimination, 45 NoTRE DAME LAW. 7 (1969).
308. R. WInBE, supra note 22, at 41.
309. ETHNIC LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA, supra note 150, at 14.
310. On the matter of vocabulary, I can speak confidently only of commercial messages in Span-
ish. But the values appealed to by similar messages in Korean or Japanese is evident even to one
who does not speak those languages.
311. See, eg., Pefialosa, Chicano Bilingualism and the World System, in THEORY IN BILINGUAL
EDUCATION 3, 8-11 (R. Padilla ed. 1980); Weimer, Factors Affecting Native Language Maintenance,
in THEORY IN BILINGUAL EDUCATION, supra, at 35, 36-37.
312. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR MANPOWER RESEARCH, MONOGRAPH No. 31, IMMIGRANTS AND
THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET 42 (1974).
313. Fishman, Language Maintenance in a Supra-Ethnic Age: Summary and Conclusions, in
LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNTrED STATES, supra note 202, at 392, 396-97.
314. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR MANPOWER RESEARCH, supra note 312, at 41. On the relatively
rapid shift of Hispanic Americans to English, see Grenier, Shifts to English as Usual Language by
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Some characteristics of the Spanish-speaking populations in the United
States suggest the possibility of a departure from this historic pattern. Many
families retain ties in Mexico, Central America, or Puerto Rico, and move back
and forth between their present and former communities. This "revolving door"
phenomenon, 315 along with the high probability of a continued flow of immi-
grants over the southern border,316 means that large Spanish-speaking commu-
nities will continue to exist in the United States for the indefinite future.3 17 This
fact, however, is consistent with various kinds of assimilation of large numbers
of individuals into the larger economy and society. Probably the process of as-
similation will be slowed somewhat in these communities. But the recent experi-
ence of economic advance from one generation to another among the Latino
populations3 18 and the large proportion of marriages between Latino and non-
Latino spouses319 indicate that for a great many individuals and families, assimi-
Americans of Spanish Mother Tongue, in THE MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 5, at
346.
315. See Cafferty, The Language Question: The Dilemma of Bilingual Education for Hispanics in
America, in ETHNIC RELATIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 231, at 113-15.
316. Demographers who make projections for the future are always careful not to assume any
particular levels of influx. They do, however, include very large numbers of immigrants in their
models. See, eg., Corwin, supra note 5; Kraly, Immigration Debate and Demographic Policy, in THE
UNAVOIDABLE ISSUE, supra note 5, at 123. The conventional "push-pull" theory of Mexican immi-
gration is trenchantly criticized in Ldpez, supra note 117. Whatever the causes of this immigration,
it is clear that population growth in other countries has always been a necessary condition for large-
scale immigration to the United States. Hofstetter, Economic Underdevelopment and the Population
Explosion: Implications for U.S. Immigration Policy, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY, supra note 5, at
55. The population of Mexico in 1980 was estimated at 70,000,000. WORLD BANK, WORLD DE-
VELOPMENT REPORT 111 (1980), and is estimated to increase to 116,000,000 by the year 2000-an
eight-fold increase during the twentieth century. Id. at 143.
317. "Although estimates of the target population [for bilingual education programs] range from
934,000 to 3.6 million, there is general agreement that this population will continue to expand....
The number of Hispanic children may, by some projections, double by the year 2000." H.R. REP.
No. 748, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4036, 4040. The
same report adds: "In 1981, 30 percent of Hispanic 18 and 19-year-olds were not high school gradu-
ates ... ." Id. On "the dropout problem" and its relation to bilingual education, see Ortego, The
Education of Mexican Americans, in THE CHICANOS: MEXICAN AMERICAN VOICES 157, 165-69 (E.
Ludwig & J. Santibafiez eds. 1971).
Comparative studies of language shift and language retention reveal that members of
subordinated groups are most resistant to language shift when the subordinate group is spatially
isolated and indigenous rather than migrant. See R. SCHERMERHORN, COMPARATIVE ETHNIC RE-
LATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THEORY AND RESEARCH 122-58 (1970); Lieberson, Dalto & John-
ston, The Course of Mother Tongue Diversity in Nations, 81 AM. J. SoC. 34, 53-59 (1975).
318. Thernstrom, supra note 148, at 24. It is by no means clear that Latinos have advanced
economically in the years since 1980. "2.3 million Latino children lived in poverty in 1984, up from
2.2 million the year before." May, 38.7% of Latino Children in U.S. Lived in Poverty in '84, Con-
gressionalStudy Finds, L.A. Times, Sept. 15, 1985, pt. I., at 4, col. 1. Thernstrom's comments were
addressed to the long-term question of intergenerational advance. On the rapid growth of Latino
enterprise, see Sahagin, Latino Entrepreneurs Move Into Mainstream, L.A. Times, July 1, 1984, § V,
at 1, col. 2. On doubts among the "Chicano generation" about the likely continuation of this pattern
of intergenerational advance, see Alvarez, The Psycho-Historical and Socioeconomic Development of
the Chicano Community in the United States, in THE MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra note
5, at 33, 49.
319. Thernstrom, supra note 148, at 23. Among married persons who identified themselves as
"Hispanic" in the 1980 census, 71% had married other Hispanics. Collins, supra note 204. Assum-
ing that the 71% were married to each other, this figure means that about 45% of the marriages
involving Hispanics were to non-Hispanics. (Among 1000 married Hispanics, the 71% would ac-
count for 355 marriages-710 people-and the 29% for 290 marriages.) For similar figures see R.
GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, LA FAMILIA: CHICANO FAMILIES IN THE URBAN SOUTHwFST, 1848
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lation is following its usual course, even as the communities retain their strong
Latino identification.
The expectation that large Spanish-speaking communities will persist for
many years is one factor contributing to a call for national support for bilingual
education of children in those communities' public schools. 320 Bilingual educa-
tion can take a number of forms and in those varying forms can serve a number
of purposes. In the 1960s such programs were proposed to facilitate the learning
of English and to avoid disadvantaging children whose English was deficient in
their studies of other subjects. More recently, bilingual education has been seen
by a number of its advocates as a means to maintain the children's native lan-
guages and cultures. 32 1 The issue is important for people with a variety of polit-
ical agendas, from separatism at one pole to absorption at the other. Even the
professional literature evaluating bilingual education bears the marks of this po-
larization. The evaluations to date are inconclusive.
322
The issue of bilingual education has nonetheless served to unite the leader-
ship of the Nation's Latino communities, even though those communities vary
in a number of important respects, including race and national origin.3 2 3 The
issue's emotional appeal is grounded in concerns about status that are directly
TO PRESENT 120-22 (1984). One study suggests a significant increase in the rate of intermarriage of
Mexican Americans since 1970. Cazares, Murguia & Frisbie, Mexican American Intermarriage In a
Nonmetropolitan Context, in THE MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 5, at 392.
320. "One million of the 4 million students in California's public schools are Hispanic, and one-
third of those students speak limited English, at best." McConahay, Bilingualism: Is It a Mixed
Blessing?, S.F. Sunday Examiner & Chron., Jan. 8, 1984, Magazine, at 10.
321. For a short summary of the various types of bilingual education, see Gonzblez, Coming of
Age in Bilingual/Bicultural Education: A Historical Perspective, 19 INEQUALITY IN EDUC. 5 (1975).
On the disagreements among experts concerning the objectives and methods of bilingual education,
see the series of articles by William Trombley in the Los Angeles Times: Can Bilingual Education
Do Its Job?, Sept. 4, 1980, § I, at I, col. 1; Bilingual Education: Even Experts Are Confused, Sept. 5,
1980, § I, at 1, col. 5; Instruction Methods Vary in the Bilingual Classroom, Sept. 6, 1980, § I, at 1,
col. 5. Congress in 1984 made its view clear: "The purpose of a bilingual program is to help chil-
dren enter an all-English class as soon as possible." H.R. REP. No. 748, supra note 317, at 5, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4039. Although bilingual programs primarily serve children
from Spanish-speaking homes, in 1983 they also served children who spoke more than 80 native
languages. Id. at 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4040.
On the difficulties of language maintenance in a society characterized by social mobility, see
Glazer, The Process and Problems ofLanguage-Maintenance" An Integrative Review, in LANGUAGE
LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 202, at 358. For a defense of language maintenance,
see Fishman, Planned Reinforcement of Language Maintenance in the United States Suggestions for
the Conservation of a Neglected National Resource, in LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 202, at 369.
322. The history of bilingual education is outlined and the literature critically surveyed in
Rotberg, Some Legal and Research Considerations in Establishing Federal Policy in Bilingual Educa.
lion, 52 HARv. EDUC. REv. 149 (1982). A sharply critical analysis is found in N. EPSTEIN, LAN-
GUAGE, ETHNICITY, AND THE SCHOOLS: POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR BILINGUAL-BICULTURAL
EDUCATION (1977). For a thoughtful response, see Otheguy, Thinking About Bilingual Education:
A Critical Appraisal, 52 HARV. EDUC. REv. 301 (1982). Raymond Padilla has edited a series of
volumes under the general title of Ethnoperspectives in Bilingual Education. They are: Volume I:
BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); Volume II: THEORY
IN BILINGUAL EDUCATION (1980); Volume III: BILINGUAL EDUCATION TECHNOLOGY (1981).
Each of the volumes contains a broad range of essays.
323. This political development appears to be part of a modern phenomenon comparable to the
"first assimilations" that united Lutherans and Catholics into a community called "Germans" and
Germans and East Europeans into a community called "Jews."
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traceable to the Nation's history of discrimination against people of Hispanic
background. Like the demands for "Black Power," the demand for Spanish lan-
guage maintenance in the schools is an assertion of the worth of a people and a
culture; it, too, should be seen as a demand not for separation but for
inclusion.
324
Cultural politics has already produced its own results in the bilingual edu-
cation area. Since 1968, Congress has conditioned the grant of school funds on
the adoption of bilingual programs for children of "limited English profi-
ciency." 325 Some state legislatures have ordered school districts to make bilin-
gual education available, subject to parental consent.326 Local school boards
have considerable practical control over the content of these programs.327 Thus,
it is natural to find heavy emphasis on maintenance of the Spanish language and
Latino culture in a city like Miami, and in other school districts with very large
proportions of Latino students.
328
Against this background, some have proposed to remove the issue from
cultural politics, through recognition of a constitutional right to government
support for bilingual education, or even the maintenance of foreign languages
among cultural minorities. 329 Unquestionably our existing constitutional doc-
324. UCLA houses a journal, now in its sixteenth year, called AzTLAN: INTERNATIONAL JOUR-
NAL OF CHICANO STUDIES RESEARCH. Most of the journal's contents are in English, but at the
front of each issue, just under the copyright notice, are these words: "Printed in El Pueblo de
Nuestra Sefiora la Reina de Los Angeles de Porcifincula. U.S.A." Both parts of that statement are
significant. The United States is not just a collection of cultures, but a multicultural nation.
325. The provision is currently embodied in Title VII of the Educational Amendments Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-511, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 98 Stat. 2370 (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 3221-3262
(West Supp. 1985)). The quoted phrase is from 20 U.S.C.A. § 3222 (a)(1).
326. California's program is embodied in CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 52160-52179 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1985). The parental consent provisions appear in id. §§ 52161, 52173. The parallel parental
consent provision in the federal law is in the 1984 Educational Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 98-
511, § 721(d)(1)(D), 98 Stat. 2366, 2376-77 (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. § 3231(d)(1)(D) (West Supp.
1985)).
327. Federal government enforcement of the administrative guidelines issued in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (upholding governmental guide-
lines requiring education that addressed the needs of children with English language deficiency), was
lax until late in the Carter Administration. See Pifer, Bilingual Education and the Hispanic Chal-
lenge, in 7 READINGS ON EQUAL EDUCATION 12 (M. Barnett & C. Harrington eds. 1984). Federal
law contemplates wide local variation in these programs, setting out seven different types of bilingual
education that are eligible for federal support. See H.R. REP. No. 748, supra note 317, at 6-8, 1984
U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4039-43.
328. On Miami, see Henry, Against a Confusion of Tongues, TImE, June 13, 1983, at 30.
Whatever may result in the short term from cultural maintenance programs, the fact that so many
Cubans in Miami are middle-class suggests the strong likelihood that their children will be assimi-
lated rapidly. See supra text accompanying note 203.
Some critics have been disturbed that there are professional and other careers associated with
bilingual education. See, e.g., N. EPSTEIN, supra note 322, at 38. But the history of ethnic politics in
America is replete with examples of careers in politics and elsewhere that have been built on one or
another feature of ethnic solidarity. See, eg., M. WALZER, supra note 149, at 148. Even strong
supporters of bilingual education concede that much of the instruction in these programs has been
inadequate. They argue, however, that many of the teachers specially recruited for the programs are
given inadequate training for their tasks. See, eg., N. EPSTEIN, supra note 322, at 71, 75 (the
response of Jos6 Cfrdenas).
329. See, e.g., Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier The Right to Bilingual Education, 9
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 52 (1974); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A BETTER CHANCE TO
LEARN: BILINGUAL-CULTURAL EDUCATION 142-70 (Clearinghouse Publication No. 51, 1975)
(constitutional right to equal access to education, which may require judicial remedies including one
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trine supports a wide measure of individual choice concerning behavior bearing
on assimilation and the maintenance of cultural identity. When we are speaking
of the education of children, necessarily the effective choice must rest with par-
ents. Meyer v. Nebraska330 and its companion cases331 protected the rights of
individual parents to send their children to private religious schools that offered
instruction in German.332 Yet neither those decisions nor any others by the
Supreme Court suggest that the public schools have a constitutional obligation
to provide instruction in students' native languages.333 Recognition of such a
claim would require a major expansion of equal protection doctrine.
Undoubtedly the issue of bilingual education touches the sense of belong-
ing, and undoubtedly that sense is vital to every person's identity and self-es-
teem. However, in this multicultural society the paths to belonging are as
numerous as the "varieties of ethnic experience. ' 334 It is for parents and local
communities to make their choices about the paths they will follow, including
how much cultural maintenance they want for their children. Cultural politics
can translate those choices into community action, as it has done in Congress, in
the state legislatures, and in hundreds of local communities. 335 In the present
state of understanding about the effects of bilingual education on learning, how-
ever, it would be unwise to constitutionalize the outcome of these issues.
336
or another form of bilingual education). Reymundo Gamboa appears to support the recognition of a
constitutional right to cultural maintenance in his essay Cultures, Communities, Courts and Educa-
tional Change, in THEORY IN BILINGUAL EDUCATION, supra note 322, at 234.
330. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
331. The three companion cases were reported under the name of Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404
(1923).
332. The opinions also expressed concern for the due process rights of teachers to pursue their
callings.
333. In United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.
1972), and in Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), aft'd, 499 F.2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1974), the courts included orders for the institution of bilingual education programs
as part of the remedies in school desegregation cases. A consent decree in Aspira of New York, Inc.
v. Board of Educ., No. 72 Civ. 4002 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), included some provisions calling for cultural
maintenance. See Thernstrom, E Pluribus Plura-Congress and Bilingual Education, 60 Pun. IN-
TREsr 3, 20-21 (1980). In the Supreme Court's one venture into the field, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974), it upheld the validity of administrative regulations under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 602, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1982)),
requiring a school board to take affirmative steps to remedy language deficiencies that had the effect
of excluding "national origin minority group children from effective participation" in the board's
educational program.
For an argument for a "right of cultural pluralism," derived from the equal protection clause,
see Note, Cultural Pluralism, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rlv. 133, 143-46 (1978).
334. See supra note 20.
335. To affect school affairs, of course, parents must vote and the electoral system must not be
rigged against them. The town of Whittier, a suburb of Los Angeles with a significant Chicano
population, has continued to elect an all-Anglo school board in at-large voting. A challenge to this
electoral system based on state law has thus far failed. See Carrillo v. Whittier Union High School
Dist., No. 67858, (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist. Civ. 1984). In 1985 the California Supreme Court ordered
the opinion of the Court of Appeals "depublished." Conversation with John E. Huerta, of Mexican-
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (June 6, 1985). Suits challenging at-large election
systems are being considered in about 25 California communities. See, Brennan, Texas Voting
Rights Group Sues Pomona, L.A. Times, May 22, 1985, § I, at 22, col. 4.
336. See, eg., L. ZEPPERT & B. CRuz, BILINGUAL EDUCATION: AN APPRAISAL OF EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH (Berkeley Unified School Dist. 1977); Rotberg, supra note 322, at 165. For a cautious
statement outlining the potential benefits of bilingual education offered under ideal conditions, see
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Whatever course our cultural politics and constitutional law may take concern-
ing bilingual education, our long national experience with assimilation and cul-
tural pluralism suggests that the forms in which the various Latino cultures
survive will depend, in the long run, on the choices of millions of individual
members of those cultures, not on any nationally enforced political norm.
4. The Religious Outsider
The religion clauses of the first amendment 337 recognize the primacy of
individual choice concerning religious identity. Only the free exercise clause
speaks explicitly to the individual's religious liberty. One purpose of the estab-
lishment clause, however, was to assure that religious affiliation would be volun-
tary. That clause's institutional concerns-for separating church and state and
for keeping the national government from trenching on the domain of the
states33 8-ultimately are concerns for the prevention of tyranny. Thus, at the
substantive core of both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause lies
the individual's religious liberty. In the context of this Essay, that liberty in-
cludes the freedom to develop, maintain, or modify a religious identity.
339
Congress has never threatened to establish a national religion. Beyond the
explicit prohibition of the first amendment lies another insurmountable obstacle
to a national religion: the Nation has never approached the religious consensus
that such an establishment would require. On the eve of independence, Congre-
gationalists predominated in New England and Anglicans in Virginia, but in all
the other colonies these two sects were in the minority. In most of the colonies
no majority religion existed. "Accordingly, religious liberty became a practical
necessity no matter what the letter of the law proclaimed.' 34° Local orthodoxy,
however, was the rule rather than the exception. Within colonial towns and
villages, the standard was homogeneity. Dissenters generally chose to create
new communities of their own.3 4 1 In one sense "the consent of the governed"
342
meant that local communities were permitted to impose their own conformities,
Troike, Research Evidence for the Effectiveness of Bilingual Education, in 7 READINGS ON EQUAL
EDUCATION, supra note 327, at 183. If it were demonstrated that a particular form of bilingual
education would make the difference between effectively excluding the children of a linguistic minor-
ity from a public educational program and providing those children effective access to the program,
that fact would be a powerful argument for a constitutional right to that form of bilingual education.
In the parlous state of research on the value of the many different forms of bilingual education, the
courts have no basis for drawing such a factual conclusion.
A serious concern raised by any program that labels some school children as "different" is the
danger of stigmatizing those children. Martha Minow sensitively analyzes the problem in her arti-
cle, Minow, Learning to Live With the Dilemma of Dffierence." Bilingual and Special Education, 48
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1985, at 157.
337. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, .... " U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
338. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Com-
ment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.L 770, 772-79.
339. See Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses Constitutional Construction and Conceptions
of the Self, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1468, 1472-75 (1984).
340. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 37.
341. R. WIEBE, supra note 22, at 18, 49, 169.
342. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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including religious conformities, by both formal and informal means. 343
Today's constitutional doctrine rests on quite a different premise. Our sep-
arate peoples have become a nation, and religious liberty is not to be conditioned
on the individual's forfeiture of the status of equal citizenship. The Constitution
guarantees "the equality of believers and non-believers, saints and worldlings,
the saved and the damned: all are equally citizens; ... .1"4 Justice O'Connor
recently addressed one aspect of this wider principle when she wrote, "The Es-
tablishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. '3 45 The
Constitution forbids various kinds of religious discrimination 346 and protects the
status of religious outsiders as equal citizens by forbidding governmental spon-
sorship of religion.
3 47
In the perspective of concerns about equal citizenship and religious domina-
tion, the Supreme Court's decisions on schoolhouse religion 348 are understood
easily. The problem of officially sponsored school prayer--even watered-down
"nondenominational" prayer349 -is not just that it lends some perfunctory gov-
ernment support to Christianity, to Judaic- Christian monotheism, or to religion
in general. The most serious harm of this form of government support is that it
tells schoolchildren who do not share the dominant religious faiths represented
by the prayer that they are outsiders, that they do not belong as full members of
the community.350 For our generation's religious politics, 'school prayer has be-
343. See D. POTrER, Social Cohesion and the Crisis of Law, in HIsToRY AND AMERICAN SocI-
ETY 390, 409-10 (D. Fehrenbacher ed. 1973); see also R. WIEBE, supra note 22, at 35-36 (successful
administration of the colonies required adaptation to local conditions).
344. M. WALZER, supra note 149, at 245-46.
345. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1366 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
346. E.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (rule amounting to a denominational
preference violates the first amendment); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (religious test
for public office is unconstitutional). Article VI of the United States Constitution prohibits the use
of any religious test for appointment to federal office. The first amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech also is used to protect individuals from discrimination based on religious expression. E.g.,
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (state university that allows use of facilities by student
groups excluded a student religious group).
347. Eg., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,42 (1980) (per curiam) (posting ofTen Commandments
in classrooms violates establishment clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (official school
prayer violates establishment clause). "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (dictum).
The "civil religion" christened by Robert Bellah in 1967, Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in
AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 21 (R. Richey & D. Jones eds. 1974), is so watered down as to include
vague notions of "national self-transcendence" that have little connection to the God of our Fathers,
See Marty, Two Kinds of Two Kinds of Civil Religion, in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION, supra, at 139,
144.
348. Eg., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (bible reading); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (official state prayer recited in public schools); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released time religious instruction in schoolhouse).
349. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422, 430 (1962). Vern Countryman's unpublished mock
opinion, "signed" by Justice Douglas, included such a prayer: "To Whom it may concern: We
appreciate it. Amen."
350. "[lit is not only positive values that sacred symbols dramatize, but negative ones as well.
They point not only toward the existence of good but also of evil, and toward the conflict between
them." C. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 130. The religious outsider is thus dramatized as a moral
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come the same kind of symbol of political domination that Prohibition was dur-
ing the century of intercultural strife that ended in 1933.351 The school board's
message to the religious outsider is clear: "This is our town."
Two decades ago Ernest Brown criticized the Supreme Court for failing to
appreciate the difficulty of the question of standing to sue in the school prayer
and Bible reading cases. 352 He argued that the standing of a child or parent
should turn on a showing, to the satisfaction of a jury,353 that the child had been
coerced to join in religious exercises or to be present while they were going on.
The Court, on the other hand, concluded that coercion was irrelevant. 354 In the
prayer case the Court did not discuss standing at all; in the Bible reading case
the Court said only that the plaintiffs, schoolchildren and their parents, were
"directly affected" by the laws and practices challenged. 355
The Court was right in concluding that the children and parents had stand-
ing, and it was right in refusing to leave the constitutional claims of religious
outsiders to local juries. The institution of trial by jury has long served the ideal
of local orthodoxy; from an early time in America, jurors were seen as "depend-
able neighbors who would uphold the community canons, ' 356 and nothing in
our recent experience suggests that things have changed. As for the question of
standing to sue, much depends on the way the harm is characterized. The Jus-
tices who decided the prayer and Bible reading cases obviously understood that,
coercion or no coercion, children were being told by public officials that they did
not really belong to the community. That is a particularly painful harm, 3 57 one
that deserves explicit constitutional recognition. 358 The remedy for that harm
should not be left to ethnic politics for two reasons. First, the religious out-
outsider. "[S]chool prayer violates a fundamental assumption of American life. . .: that one ought
to be able to retain one's humanity without being made to feel a pariah in ones own country."
Rosenblatt, Whose Country Is It, Anyway?, TIME, March 19, 1984, at 94.
351. See supra text accompanying note 59.
352. Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 1.
353. These were suits for injunctive relief, which normally would not call for jury trial. Perhaps
Professor Brown had in mind the impaneling of an advisory jury.
354. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 430-31 (1962).
355. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963).
356. R. WIEBE, supra note 22, at 152. Compare Judge Learned Hand's 1920 letter to
Zecharaiah Chafee, expressing concern about the Supreme Court's free speech "rule" of "tendency
plus a purpose to produce the evil," because of its reliance on jury factfinding. "'I think it is pre-
cisely at those times when alone the freedom of speech becomes important as an institution, that the
protection of a jury on such an issue is illusory."' Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of First
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 719, 766 (1975) (quoting
Learned Hand's letter).
357. See supra text accompanying note 145.
358. Professor Brown, rejecting this harm as unworthy of constitutional protection, quotes Jus-
tice Jackson's expressions of doubt in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring):
The complaint is that when others join in and [the dissenting child] does not, it sets him
apart as a dissenter, which is humiliating. Even admitting this to be true, it may be
doubted whether the Constitution which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can be
construed also to protect one from the embarrassment that always attends nonconformity,
whether in religion, politics, behavior or dress.
Justice Jackson misses two crucial points. It is the government that is imposing the status harm in
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sider's right to equal citizenship is not a matter for negotiation. Second, local
ethnic and religious majorities can be expected, especially when they feel
threatened, to exercise their political dominance by creating symbolic exclusions
designed to reduce cultural outsiders to a subordinate status.
Unhappily, the Supreme Court, in giving its recent constitutional benedic-
tion to the City of Pawtucket's official Christmas display of a Nativity scene,
showed little concern for this kind of symbolic exclusion of religious outsid-
ers.35 9 Indeed, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion positively reveled in re-
citing incidents from our national history in which religious groups have
succeeded in getting governmental endorsement and politicians have reached
out for divine coattails. 36° As for Pawtucket's official sponsorship of a portrayal
of the divinity of Christ, the Court asserted that "the religious nature of the
creche" did not detract from the display's secular purpose, which was merely to
"[take] note of a significant historical religious event long celebrated in the West-
ern World.1361 The Court found insufficient evidence that the display of the
creche was an "effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a
particular religious message."'3 62 The Chief Justice's repetition of this extraordi-
nary assertion of secular content in the city's celebration of the divine Nativity
recalls the style of argument of the Bellman in The Hunting of the Snark:
"What I tell you three times is true."
363
Americans who are not Christian no doubt will agree that the message of
the Nativity scene was not subtle. The City of Pawtucket said to them: You
outsiders do not belong. In today's America, the addressees of such messages
number in the millions: Jews, Buddhists, Moslems, Hindus, observers of Native
American religions-the list goes on and on, extending to hundreds of religions
that are not Christian. 364 The Supreme Court's unwillingness to understand this
question, and there is a considerable difference between nonconformity of dress and nonparticipation
in an officially sponsored religious exercise.
Standing in some cases challenging the government's conduct is based on the plaintiff's status as
a taxpayer. Eg., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). The most important interest at stake in
a case like Lynch, however, is not some taxpayer's concern about the spending of trivial amounts of
money, but the religious dissenter's concern for the status of equal citizenship.
359. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1365 (1984).
360. William Van Alstyne's devastating analysis of the Lynch opinion, supra note 338, should be
required reading for the Justices who formed the majority in Lynch.
361. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1365 (1984). Religious outsiders can understand more
easily why government closes schools and public offices on Christmas, a day when a huge majority of
the population would be unlikely to carry on business as usual. To equate that practice with Paw-
tucket's sponsorship of the creche is to ignore altogether the differences in the way the two kinds of
governmental action impinge on the religious outsiders' sense of belonging.
362. Id. Justice David Brewer, in a 1904 lecture series, took a more forthright stance, calling the
United States "a Christian nation." D. BREwER, THE UNITED STATES A CIIRISTIAN NATION
(1905). For evidence that Brewer was accurately summarizing a long history of official support for
Christianity, see Hartogensis, Denial of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities and Non.Believers in the
United States, 39 YALE L.J. 659, 660-66 (1930).
363. L. CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED SNARK 38 (M. Gardner ed. 1962). In Burelle v. City of
Nashua, 599 F. Supp. 792, 795-97 (D.N.H. 1984), Chief Judge Devine focused on narrow factual
differences to distinguish Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
364. For a listing and brief description of such religions, which do number in the hundreds, see 2
J. MELTON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS 23-482 (1978). Eight out of ten Amer-
icans say they are Christians, according to one recent Gallup poll. Gallup, supra note 241, at 168.
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particular symbolism of domination is no less perverse than was an earlier
Court's refusal to understand that the racial segregation of railroad cars symbol-
ized the subordination of black people.
365
It is no trivial matter for the Supreme Court to countenance governmental
conduct that tells some Americans that their differences from the dominant reli-
gion exclude them from full membership in the community. Often those reli-
gious differences are associated with other cultural differences; most Buddhists
in America, for example, are of Japanese ancestry.366 Given the recent increase
in immigration to this country from non-Christian countries in Asia and the
Middle East, it would not be surprising if government officials were pressed into
further public sponsorship of the symbols of Christianity, precisely to assert the
dominance of today's augmented family of "old stock" Americans. There is
ample historical precedent in the nativist movements that greeted the arrival of
earlier immigrants deemed to be unassimilable. 367 Today we recall with no little
sadness how the Supreme Court, by upholding the constitutionality of segre-
gated railroad cars, gave impetus to the laws and private behavior that became
the pervasive, ugly system of Jim Crow.368 Let us hope that the Court's recent
blessing of an official governmental symbol of the divinity of Christ will not
contribute to a new vicious circle of domination and defensive separatism. Cul-
tural politics has its place in the American civic culture; cultural domination has
no legitimate place at all.
V. AMERICAN IDENTITY AND THE AMERICAN CIVic CuLTURE
When our constitutional law promotes the freedom to choose cultural iden-
tity, it nourishes the sense of belonging in two different ways. It protects the
choice to turn inward to the cultural group, and it offers members of cultural
minorities the choice to participate fully in the institutions of the wider society.
The principle of equal citizenship allows an individual to maintain a strong con-
nection to a particular cultural group and still belong to America. Given the
impulses toward distrust and domination that result from the process of identity
The remaining 20% of the population numbers about 44 million. Even more conservative estimates
conclude that the number of non-Christian Americans is very large. Jews comprise about two to
three percent of the population; members of non-Judeo-Christian faiths amount to a larger number,
and from seven to nine percent say they are not adherents of any religion. See Cohen & Fain, From
Integration to Survival American Jewish Anxieties in Transition, 480 ANNALs OF THE AM. ACAD.
OF POL. & SOC. Sci. 75, 80 (1985); Roof & McKinney, DenominationalAmerica and the New Reli-
gious Pluralism, 480 ANNALS OF THE AM. AcAD. OF POL. & SoC. Sci. 24, 25-28 (1984).
365. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), the Court said:
[M]e consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assump-
tion that the enforced segregation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
For two brief, poignant accounts of the reactions of religious outsiders to the promotion of religion
in public schools, see Arnow, The Year We Hid Our Religion, LIBERTY, May/June 1985, at 3;
Barlow, We Were the Different Ones, LIBERTY, May/June 1985, at 4.
366. See 2 J. MELTON, supra note 364, at 400-02.
367. The label "unassimilable" has been applied to the Irish, Italians, and Germans-to speak
only of a few European groups. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
368. See C. WOODWARD, supra note 33, at 67-109.
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formation,369 it may seem remarkable that our constitutional doctrine should
have come to be so protective of intercultural tolerance. Yet the survival of the
American Nation has never been seriously threatened by our cultural diversity.
When the United States did break apart in civil war, the rupture did not follow
the seams of ethnic or religious division. It was true then and is still true that
American nationhood rests on a base that is not just contractual but is also
cultural.
The assumption that there is such a thing as "the American character" has
appeared in literature at least since Independence. 370 The earliest writers on the
subject omitted mention of the slave and the American Indian, thus providing
still another illustration of the intimate relationship between domination and
separatism: Indians and slaves were implicitly set apart as not belonging to
American society.371 For those who did belong, however, there was truth in the
idea that they shared a common culture. There is even more truth in that idea
today. For all our diversity, undoubtedly our strong sense of national iden-
tity372 rests on a common American culture, widely shared among our people.
Assimilation, of course, has played an important part in the formation of a
national culture. In the years since the Second World War, the process has been
accelerated by an increase in affluence that has dramatically expanded the
American middle class and by the development of a national communications
system that spreads the mainstream culture to every corner of the country. Yet
assimilation cannot completely explain the existence of a national culture. First,
contrary to the assumptions of the proponents of the Americanization move-
ment,373 assimilation does not imply a thorough conformity with the cultural
mainstream. Rather, assimilation is consistent with a great many "varieties of
ethnic experience."'374 What the Framers of the Constitution called the problem
of faction has always had its cultural dimensions.375 Second, the mainstream
culture itself is constantly being changed by the contributions of newly assimi-
lated groups: language and literature, music and art, dress and foods, and lei-
sure activities. The mixture resulting from all this diversity and ferment is
anything but a recipe for cultural stability. It would be unimaginably difficult to
found a nation of continental dimension on a cultural base that is both radically
369. See supra text accompanying note 10.
370. Eg., H. DE CREVECOEUR, supra note 41; A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
(H. Reeve trans., P. Bradley ed. 1945). The notion of an "American character" is meaningless if it is
taken to refer to the character of a nation. That would, indeed, be "a variant of the fallacy of
composition." Morris, Interpretive and Noninterpretive Constitutional Theory, 94 ETHics 501, 514
(1984). Most writers, when they refer to an American character, have in mind some notion of
attitudes and behavior typically found in our culture.
371. Tocqueville, who wrote in the 1830s, discussed with prescience both these aspects of race
relations. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 370, vol. I, ch. XVIII.
372. See generally P. DEvINE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE UNITED STATES 79-95 (1972)
(explaining the concept of national identity and tracing the development of the sense of national
identity in the United States).
373. See supra text accompanying note 49.
374. See supra note 20.
375. See THE FEDERALIsT No. 51 (J. Madison).
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heterogeneous and continually in flux, More is required to account for the com-
mon culture that sustains our nationhood.
We have tended to see ourselves as practical, op-eft to change, future-ori-
ented, optimistic, righteous innocents in a world full of guile. These characteris-
tics, real or imagined, do reflect features of the American culture, but they are
hardly the makings of a social bond. Nor can loyalty or the sense of belonging
be founded on a Constitution that is no more than a contract.3 76 Lacking com-
mon ancestral origins, religion, ethnic traditions-in short, lacking many of the
usual forms of cultural glue-Americans have been required to found a Nation
on something else.
What is "the Nation" that commands our loyalty? For a long time, the
answer eluded clear definition. Perhaps for this very reason, nineteenth century
America indulged in patriotic rhetoric of an intensity unmatched in our history
either before or since.3 77 Woodrow Wilson, who was anything but a model of
tolerance toward members of racial and ethnic groups that were not his own,378
implicitly recognized how difficult it was to define the Nation. Speaking in 1915
to some newly naturalized citizens, Wilson said:
You have just taken an oath of allegiance to the United States. Of
allegiance to whom? Of allegiance to no one unless it be to God ....
You have taken an oath of allegiance to a great ideal, to a great body of
principles, to a great hope of the human race.3 79
New citizens, like officers of government who swear to defend the Constitution,
are not merely making a contract. By their rituals they are accepting and rein-
forcing a set of norms that give meaning to conduct.3 80 They are embracing the
American civic culture--a mixture of behavior and belief that infuses our law
and our institutions, transcending race, religion, and ethnicity, allowing individ-
ual citizens to preserve their separate cultural identities and still identify them-
selves as Americans.
The essential meaning of American identity is adherence to the ideology of
the American civic culture and behavior in accordance with that culture's
norms.38 1 When Wilson so defined the Nation, he merely repeated a view that
had prevailed in the early days of the Republic: "To be or to become an Ameri-
can, a person did not have to be of any particular national, linguistic, religious,
or ethnic background. All he had to do was to commit himself to the political
ideology centered on the abstract ideals of liberty, equality, and
republicanism. ' ' 3
82
376. Karst, supra note 206, explores these issues.
377. See J. HxsHAM, note 8, at 68-105.
378. W.E.B. DuBois put it mildly when he said, "Ot the whole, we do not believe that Woodrow
Wilson admires Negroes." W.E.B. DuBois, THE CRisis WrriNcs 190 (D. Walden ed. 1972). On
Wilson's attitudes toward immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, see . HIGHAM, supra
note 8, at 199; M. JONES, supra note 8, at 239. Wilson did, however, veto a congressional bill
requiring a literacy test for immigrants. W. PRESTON, supra note 82, at 80-81.
379. Quoted in Harrington, supra note 107, at 678.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
381. See S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN PoLmIcs: THE PROMIsE OF DISHARMONY 13-30 (1981).
382. Gleason, supra note 44, at 62.
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The sources of our sense of nationhood are older than the Nation itself. In
the colonies it was widely believed that America had special origins and a special
destiny-even a divine mission.38 3 The colonists borrowed this belief from the
Puritan ideal of an errand into the wilderness. 3 84 Protestant traditions of "insti-
tutional decentralization and ideological uniformity" 38 5 also were established
well before independence. But the era of the Revolution left its own nationalist
legacy. Republicanism not only embedded in the civic culture the central idea of
equal citizenship-that "one should consider himself as good a man as an-
other"386-but also served as a unifying ideology in its own right.387 New insti-
tutions were established, nudging the states toward union. Although the
Constitutional Convention was called to remedy defects in the Confederation,
many of the Constitution's Framers aimed to do more: they sought a secure
base on which to found a nation.
388
In the early years of the republic, however, strong national loyalty was not
to be taken for granted. The notion of an American identity, although it had
begun to appear in print,3 89 was strained by the "triumphant particularism" that
characterized both belief and action in a "segmented society."'390 What contrib-
uted most to an American identity in the nineteenth century was the emergence
of a national ideology, a "large, loose faith"39 1 roughly comprehending the val-
ues of today's American civic culture: individualism, egalitarianism, national-
ism, and tolerance of diversity.
392
With more than a little moral arrogance, we have assumed a national mis-
sion to be a "city on a hill," an example for the rest of the world to see and
emulate.393 The idea that America is something special came to ftll flower in
383. R. GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 22-25 (1940); Higham,
Hanging Together: Divergent Unities in American History, 61 J. AM. HiSr. 5, 13-15 (1974).
384. Bercovitch, New England's Errand Reappraised, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN IN-
TELLECTUAL HISTORY 85 (J. Higham & P. Conkin eds. 1979).
385. Higham, supra note 383, at 11.
386. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 73 (1972).
387. Higham, supra note 383, at 15-18.
388. G. WOOD, supra note 386, at 519-64.
389. See H. DE CREVECOEUR, supra note 41. On the notion of Americans as a "new people,"
see G. WooD, supra note 386, at 46-48.
390. R. WIEBE, supra note 22, at 36. This particularism not only dispersed political power, but
also separated culturally disparate communities from each other. Id. at 30-36, 49-54, 65-70, 90-94;
J. IIIGHAM, supra note 48, at 181-86. This "mutual avoidance" variation on the social contract, id.
at 185-86, naturally inhibited ethnic intermarriage and other kinds of interaction that promote as-
similation. The effects of the dispersal of population on ethnic solidarity, however, were ambiguous.
Each community tended toward cultural homogeneity, yet dispersal meant, for example, that
"Germans" in different localities followed different patterns of community development and did not
form attachments to national ethnic groups. Id. at 184-85. Localism, in other words, did not imply
ethnic pluralism.
391. Higham, supra note 383, at 16.
392. Professor Higham's list of the elements of nineteenth century ideology includes the ideas of
the mission of America, the doctrine of individual liberty, the dispersal of power, and the doctrine of
equal rights (including opposition to artificial inequalities of status). Id. Thomas Bender's list is
similar, but takes note of two additional notions that no longer hold sway as national orthodoxies:
Protestantism and white supremacy. T. BENDER, supra note 196, at 88.
393. The phrase, "city on a hill," was used by John Winthrop in a sermon preached on board the
ship Arabella while it was bound from the Isle of Wight to Massachusetts Bay in 1630. On notions
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the mid-nineteenth century. 394 When we look closely at what is supposed to be
special, it turns out to be an ideology, one of "those explicit systems of general
beliefs that give large bodies of people a common identity and purpose, a com-
mon program of action, and a standard for self-criticism. ' 395 To be special,
Americans must try to live by the ideology that gives them their identity as
Americans. Belief in the ideological aspect of the American civic culture, then,
must be complemented by behavior in order to establish one's American cultural
identity. Here as in any process of acculturation it is the ritualization of correct
behavior that supplies the symbolic meanings underlying the sense of belonging.
"Society's forms are culture's substance."
396
A. Ideology and Identity
The connections between culture and identity397 pose an obvious problem
in a society of many cultures, each one shaping a separate identity around its
own normative claims. A minimum requirement of nationhood is a set of uni-
versal norms. "Apparently, a decent multiethnic society must rest on a unifying
ideology, faith, or myth. '398 The American civic culture, as I use the term here,
embraces not only citizen allegiances and participation but also a widely shared
"unifying ideology," a creed that is both manifested in constitutional doctrine
and shaped by it.399 Like other creeds, this one is untidy and sometimes self-
contradictory. It resists any effort to reduce it to systematic intellectual order.
It lends itself as readily to hypocrisy as to genuine observance.4 ° Yet if any
single feature of our society is central to the definition of an American identity,
it is this ideological component of the civic culture. "It has been our fate as a
nation not to have ideologies but to be one."'4 1
The ideological component of the American civic culture performs its uni-
of American superiority in the nineteenth century, see T. BENDER, supra note 196, at 88. On the
idea of American exceptionalism, see Harrington, supra note 107, at 678.
394. See Higham, supra note 383, at 12-18.
395. Id. at 10.
396. C. GEERTZ, supra note 14, at 28. The American civic culture is centered on the conception
of the United States as a polity, but "political culture" seems too narrow a term. More than 20 years
ago, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba used the term "civic culture" to describe a particular orien-
tation of citizens to public affairs: loyal participation in the national polity, concurrent with the
maintenance of "parochial" allegiances and a healthy dose of self-interest. G. ALMOND & S. VERBA,
THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATrrruDEs AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS (1963). As the
text makes clear, I use the same term to describe an amalgam of ideology and behavior centered on
the values of individualism, egalitarianism, nationalism, and tolerance of diversity.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 10-15.
398. J. HIGHAM, supra note 48, at 232. On the interrelationship of ideology, group solidarity,
and individual identity, see Apter, Introduction: Ideology and Discontent, in IDEOLOGY AND DIs-
CONTENT 15, 18-21 (D. Apter ed. 1964).
399. On the "American Creed," see S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 381, at 13-30; G. MYRDAL,
supra note 112, at xlvi-xlvii. Both Myrdal and Huntington make clear throughout their books how
frequently Americans fail to live up to the ideals of their creed. On the relation of behavior to
ideology, see infra text accompanying note 423.
400. No doubt it is these very ambiguities that permit the creed to be held so widely. See Mur-
phey, The Place of Beliefs in Modern Culture, in NEw DIRECTIoNs IN AMERICAN INTELLECfrUAL
HISTORY, supra note 384, at 151, 163.
401. H. KOHN, AMERICAN NATIONALISM: AN INTERPRETIVE ESSAY 13 (1957) (quoting Rich-
ard Hofstadter); see S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 381, at 23-30; Gleason, supra note 44, at 58-68.
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fying function in the way that myth and religion unify, providing the focus for
individual self-identification in a system of belief that is founded more on feeling
than on logic.4° 2 This culturally specific American ideology has found wide-
spread agreement, and even emotional attachment, in part because of the diffuse
quality of its principal values. It simultaneously proclaims our commitment
both to individualism and to egalitarianism, both to the virtues of diversity and
to the unity of the Nation.
Whatever argument one may have with those historians who emphasize
consensus and continuities in American history,4°3 no one denies that a strong
current of individualism has been running in this country ever since colonial
times. The theme of individualism has been traced to a great many sources: the
natural-rights liberalism of John Locke4° 4 and the European Enlightenment, 4°5
Protestant traditions of the free individual conscience and of congregationalism
in church governance, 4° 6 the claims of republicanism, 40 7 and an orientation of
economic affairs toward capitalism that was well under way by the time of Inde-
pendence.40° The Revolution's slogans about liberty, which culminated in the
assertion of rights to self-government and independence from the British crown,
had their beginnings in the colonists' claims to the rights of Englishmen.
4 °9
After Independence, it was a short step to the formal adoption, in the con-
stitutions of the new states, of limits on government aimed at preserving a con-
siderable range of individual freedoms. 4 10 By the time the Constitution was
adopted, the "rights" mentality had ripened into a conception of liberty that
went beyond the people's right to govern themselves. "The liberty that was now
emphasized was personal or private, the protection of individual rights against
all governmental encroachments .... -4 11 By mid-nineteenth century the "lib-
erty" theme in the American civic culture had come to embrace what Ralph
Gabriel later called the doctrine of "the free individual."' 412 The individual's
right to "self-development and self-regulation" became central to American ide-
402. See E. CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON MAN 81-82 (1944).
403. See D. BoORsTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE (1958); D. BOORSTIN,
THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPEIENCE (1973); D. BOoRSTIN, TnE AMERICANS: THE
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE (1965); R. GABRIEL, supra note 383; L. HART, THE LIBERAL TRADITION
IN AMERICA (1955); E. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-1789 (1956). For a sum-
mary of newer historical scholarship emphasizing variation and particularistic analysis, see J.
HIGHAM, HISTORY: PROFESSIONAL SCHOLARSHIP IN AMERICA 233-62 (1983).
404. L. HARTZ, supra note 403; E. MORGAN, supra note 403, at 73-75.
405. H. MAY, THE ENUGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976).
406. These traditions are outlined in Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 252-54
(1983). "The United States is the only country in the world in which a majority of the population
has belonged to dissenting Protestant sects." S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 381, at 15.
407. G. WOOD, supra note 386, at 46-90. In 1839 Michel Chevalier wrote that "protestantism,
republicanism, and individuality are all one." M. CHEVALIER, SOCIETY, MANNERS, AND POLITICS
IN THE UNITED STATES 368 (T. Bradford trans. 1839).
408. See, ag., D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THm COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 105-10 (1958) (on
"planter capitalism" in Virginia).
409. This was the claim of the Continental Congress' 1774 declaration. See E. MORGAN, supra
note 403, at 64-65.
410. Id. at 88-94.
411. G. WOOD, supra note 386, at 609.
412. R. GABRIEL, supra note 383.
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ology. 4 13 The enduring power of the theme of individualism in America can be
seen in its constant repetition in today's political rhetoric, from party conven-
tions to newspaper editorials.
American notions of liberty early became associated with the principle of
limited government. Not only was governmental power to be dispersed, but the
individual also had legal rights against government, rights that could be vindi-
cated in court. This association of constitutionalism with individualism is
heightened in our own time; Americans who are not legal professionals mainly
associate the Constitution with the protection of the rights of individuals. Nati-
vist domination itself, as practiced by the government, is now seen as inconsis-
tent with the fundamentals of oqr constitutional order
Like individualism "[t]he avowal of 'equality,' and often its practice as
well, has been a persistent thernm through most of American history. ' 4 14 The
roots of both our avowal and our sometime practice of egalitarianism run
deep.4 15 Both Calvinist doctrines and the organization of New ]England's colo-
nial churches reflected a belief in the equality of individuals in the sight of God.
The idea of universally applicable laws also took hold in the colonies, inhibiting
the establishment of legal privileges based on personal status. In the revolution-
ary era, freedom meant freedom for everyQne. Republican notions of self-gov-
ernment implied widespread participation in the election of officials.
416
Constitutionalism had its own egalitarian strain: not only the people but also
their governors must obey the law. Individualism implied equality of opportu-
nity in open markets, careers open to talents. By the era of Andrew Jackson,
these kinds of egalitarianism were well established in the ideological part of the
American civic culture. So they remain today, reinforced by the extraordinary
outpouring of literature, legislation, and judicial opinions that has accompanied
the civil rights movement and the resurgence of feminism.
Tolerance was not an invention of the Warren Court; it has always been a
necessary feature of the American experiment, a value that makes the American
Nation possible. Religious tolerance was already a political necessity by the
time the Constitution was adopted. 4 17 Indeed, the dispersal of power that had
characterized both religion and government in the colonies was, for the Framers
of the Constitution, not just an institutional habit but an essential defense
against tyranny.4 18 Diversity itself was an important tenet of the national ideol-
413. Ward, Jacksonian Democratic Thought "A Natural Charter of Privilege," in THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF AN AMERIcAN CuLTURE 58, 73 (S. Coben & L. Ratner 2d ed. 1983). In this concep-
tion, "the solitary, self-reliant individual stands at the center of the social order." Id. at 77.
414. R. WILLIAMS, AmERicAN SocIET: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 472 (1954).
415. This paragraph is a capsule version of a fuller discussion in Karst, supra note 206, at 183-
99.
416. These notions did not prevent limitation of the franchise to white male owners of property.
417. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison); E. MORGAN, supra note 403, at 128-43; G.
WOOD, supra note 386, at 127-61, 524-32, 547-53.
418. Higham, supra note 383, at 16. The protection of local autonomy was also seen as a defense
of one sort of community. See T. BENDER, supra note 196, at 83-84.
Even Horace Kallen, who coined the term "cultural pluralism" to denote an ideology that was
explicitly anti-assimilationist, recognized that in his "democracy of nationalities" the various cul-
tural groups would have to cooperate through the "common institutions" of the Nation. The "polit-
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ogy that burgeoned in the nineteenth century. "Variety became fundamental to
the dominant American ideal of unity: E Pluribus Unum."'
4 9
Although the diverse peoples of a "segmented society" believed in avoiding
conflict by minimizing interaction with each other, today's ideology of tolerance
draws its main nourishment from the other values of the civic culture: individu-
alism and egalitarianism. In fact, belief in those values seems an indispensable
antithesis to the urge to domination that so often grows out of the process that
forms cultural identity.420 "[S]ocieties have a need to find ways of checking
their own tendencies. In these polarities there may be something of a clue to
social systems." 42 1 To take seriously the ideals of individualism and egalitarian-
ism is to reject domination in favor of the principle of tolerance. It is to believe
that every person, whatever his or her ethnicity, race, or religion, is entitled to
respected participation in the community's public life. Indeed, cultural diversity
is widely idealized as a positive feature of that public life, as everyone who has
heard the corporal call the squad roll in a 1940s war movie knows: "Anderson,
Chen, Giordanno, Goldstein, L6pez, .
Tolerance serves more than the need to avoid conflict between cultural
groups; it is an essential ingredient of the American civic culture, serving our
need to identify with the national community in order to identify ourselves as
Americans. The cultural base for American identity depends on the sharing of
values and of some vision of what we are as a nation. The only vision of
America capable of being shared by all of us is a vision in which all of us belong.
The ideological component of our civic culture is thus a major part of the
cultural cement that holds American society together. Ideology alone, however,
is not enough to make any value a durable part of the civic culture. A necessary
ingredient of that durability is the behavior of large numbers of people, from one
generation to the next, in accordance with the culture's norms. Leonard Levy
ical and economic life of the commonwealth," he said, was "a single unit" that would provide the
foundation for each cultural group's separate realization of its destiny. These quotations of Kallen
are taken from Gleason, supra note 44, at 97. Kallen's major work, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY,
was published in 1924. He had set out the main ideas in his article, Democracy versus the Melting
Pot, NATION, Feb. 18, 1915, at 190. See Higham, supra note 48, at 205-10, 215. Kallen never
addressed the obvious difficulties implicit in his notion that ethnic groups could participate fully in
an integrated American polity and yet resist assimilation. See Gleason, supra note 44, at 106.
A hard-edged, corporatist version of cultural pluralism, devolving important political functions
to religious or ethnic groups, is beyond the range of the possible in the United States today. For
ethnic corporatism to work, we should have to define the boundaries of each ethnic group, identify-
ing its members and the characteristics that entitle them to membership. Because of assimilation,
ethnic status does not inevitably pass from one generation to the next. The overwhelming majority
of Americans are the product of ethnic interbreeding. Collins, supra note 204. Whatever conclusion
one may draw in the debate over the "primordial" or "optional" character of ethnicity, see supra
note 20, for some individuals ethnic identity plainly is a matter open for decision: "Individuals move
freely across the vaguely and informally drawn line between ethnic or religious identification and
non-identification; the line is in no way policed; the movements are not even recorded." M.
WALZER, supra note 149, at 150. For the state even to attempt to police the line, of course, would
violate the American Constitution.
419. Higham, supra note 383, at 16.
420. See supra text accompanying note 10.
421. Hofstadter, Commentary: Have There Been Discernible Shifts in American Values During
the Past Generation?, in THE AMERICAN STYLE: ESSAYS IN VALUE AND PERFORMANCE 353, 357
(E. Morrison ed. 1958).
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has recently shown that the freedom of the press emerged in America during the
revolutionary generation, primarily through the day-to-day exercise by newspa-
per editors of the freedom they claimed, not through the adoption of the first
amendment.422 So it is with any important societal value or any constitutional
right: use it or lose it.
B. Behavior and Belonging
Culture is not merely the assignment of meaning to behavior;423 it is also
behavior itself, behavior that follows cultural norms and reinforces them as well.
Most of us make little effort to examine the interconnection between our norma-
tive beliefs and our behavior; generally we allow those connections to lie below
the level of conscious articulation. Indeed, at least for the present, there seems
to be an irreducible element of mystery in the precise mechanisms that lead from
awareness to behavior.424 No wonder the mechanisms of cultural assimilation
are difficult to isolate and to describe.425
Despite these difficulties of analysis at the level of microcosm, it does seem
clear that a society can maintain its "unifying ideology" 426 only when large
numbers of individuals act in accordance with the ideal. With ideology as with
myth, "ritual is prior to dogma."427 Shared behavior not only establishes and
reinforces the culture's norms; it also establishes the individual's cultural iden-
tity. An American demonstrates that he or she belongs to America primarily by
acting out the civic culture's ideals. In so doing, the individual contributes to
the shared emotion that is essential to the sense of community.428 The society's
central myths may seem to be in tension with each other or sometimes even
contradictory; yet "[tihe real substratum of myth is not a substratum of thought
but of feeling.. .. [Its] coherence depends much more upon unity of feeling
than upon logical rules." 429
All the same, that unity will collapse unless the society's system of beliefs is
largely validated in most people's minds by their own experience.430 A belief
system finds its utility not just in satisfying individual needs for security and the
sense of identity and moral worth but also in providing the basis on which ac-
tions may be planned and executed. When a belief system no longer explains
experience or serves to guide behavior, it gives way to another system that
422. L. LEVY, supra note 82.
423. See supra text accompanying note 14.
424. See Skinner, Why is a Reinforcer Reinforcing?, in MOTIVATION 201 (D. Bindra & J. Stewart
2d ed. 1971).
425. See supra text accompanying note 194.
426. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
427. E. CASSIRER, supra note 402, at 79. Durkheim makes a similar point in E. DURKHEIM,
THE ELEMENTARY FoRMs OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 419 (1912).
428. On the relation of shared values and feelings to community, see Karst, supra note 206, at
183-86, and the writings there cited.
429. E. CASSIRER, supra note 402, at 81.
430. See Murphey, supra note 400, at 153-54.
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will.43 1 If the ideals of the American civic culture are to hold a multicultural
nation together, they must find reinforcement in American behavior.
When the Framers of the Constitution sought to make a nation, they knew
that the centralization of governmental power was only a beginning. Na-
tionhood would demand the widespread sharing of a national identity. Yet the
Framers explicitly rejected two institutional means that had been used to rally
the needed emotional support for nationhood in the countries of Europe: a mon-
archy432 and an established church.433 Low levels of immigration from the be-
ginning of the Revolution to the end of the War of 1812 permitted the definitive
Consolidation of English as the national language. 434 And early, if halting, suc-
cesses of the national government helped persuade most Americans that the Na-
tion served their interests.4 35 The Revolution itself had produced nationalizing
and unifying effects. It provided the liberal and egalitarian ideology of republi-
canism and also put those values into practice by establishing a new order of
status equality both for individuals and for cultural (mainly religious) groups.
4 36
An individual's identification with the new Nation was closely tied to a sense
that the Nation was making good on its professed individualistic and egalitarian
ideals.
437
From that time to this time, a strong congruence between belief and behav-
ior has always characterized the thread of individualism in our civic culture, a
congruence shaped by the demands of market capitalism and the opportunities
of a continent rich in resources.438 The same degree of congruence, however, is
not evident between our profession of egalitarian ideals and our willingness to
live up to those ideals. The main examples of the Nation's failure to practice
what it preaches about equality have always been found in the subordination of
minorities defined by race, religion, or ethnicity. From the earliest times, some
people were included as full participants in the society's public life while others
were not.
431. Id. at 154-55. On ideology as a "symbolic template" for political behavior, see C. GEERTZ,
Ideology as a Cultural System, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT, supra note 398, at 47, 60-65.
432. George Washington did, in fact, serve as an early symbol of nationhood. P. DEVINE, supra
note 372, at 112-13, 127-28; R. GABRIEL, supra note 383, at 91-94. But the President's political role
makes this sort of symbolism diffcult Id. at 93.
433. Religious fragmentation made a nationally established church impossible. See supra text
accompanying note 340.
434. M. JONES, supra note 8, at 64-65, 75-76.
435. The organization of the government itself was no little achievement. And there was wide
support for Washington's policy of neutrality in the early years of the Napoleonic wars. The War of
1812 was not a success story, but it did demonstrate the need for national unity as against outside
foes. See generally S. LPSET, THE FIiST NEW NATION (1963) (equality and achievement, although
not always compatible with one another, have molded the development of America).
436. Id. at 74-79.
437. Id. at 61-98.
438. On the drive for individual achievement and "the American character," see id. at 101-39.
On individualism as a primary value in American society, see R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLI-
VAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIrE (1985); 1. DIGGINS, Tm LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN PoLrICS: VIRTUE, SELF-
INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1984). Both the rhetoric and the behavior of
American individualism often evidence a suspicious attitude toward government, which is consistent
with loyalty to the N~tjqn.
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Americans came early to accept the inevitabIe pfesenc of outsiders,
aliens somewhere in their land. Citizenship and membership, a rela-
tively simple equation in France, formed the components of an exceed-
ingly complex problem in America. Although every citizen could
claim a basic set of legal rights, some of these citizens would almost
certainly remain outsiders. Actual membership was determined by ad-
ditional tests of religion, perhaps, or race or language or behavior, tests
that varied considerably among segments and over time. Each genera-
tion passed to the next an open qtuesioi of who really b longed to
American society.
43 9
Among those who did belong, however, the very eXistence of outsider
groups promoted both egalitarian ideals and eolility in concrete social rela.-
tions.440 John Blum has highlighted the way in which this '"burden of American
equality" 44 1 has been carried in different places and at differen: times by Indi-
ans, blacks, and successive groups of immigrants. Thus the ideal of equality has
managed to gain strength even as a genuine equality of status has been denied to
a series of cultural outsiders. As various cultural groups have moved toward full
membership, the day-to-day treatment of the groups' members has moved to-
ward congruence with that ideal. The most important issue concerning equality
in America has always been one of belonging: should Catholics, or freed slaves.,
or immigrants from Poland or Mexico be treated as respected, responsible par-
ticipants in American society? The egalitarian strand in oi rci,vi: culture centers
on the idea of equal citizenship.
These attitudes and practices add up to an equality well suited to a polity in
which the value of individualism is an important premise. The equality em-
braced in the American civic culture has historically been individualistic in two
senses. First, although the denial of equal citizenship has historically been ac-
complished by excluding groups of people from full participation in the society's
public life, the claim to equality generally has been seen as the claim of an indi-
vidual, not of a group. Second, American egalitarianism generally has not
looked to communal values, nor to an equality of condition, but to an equality of
individual opportunity. The egalitarianism of the American civic culture, in
other words, has been focused on the elimination of aste, not plass.442
It was therefore to be expected that the Supreme Court's revival of the
principle of equal citizenship should follow this individualistic pattern. In the
years since the Second World War, American ideals have come to embrace a
439. R. WIEsE, supra note 22, at 95.
440. See J. BLUM, THE BURDEN OF AMERICAN EQUALITY 3-4 (1978); V7. JORDAN, WHrE
OVER BLACK 134 (1968); J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALrrY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 25 (1978);
R. WILLIAMS, supra note 414, at 413-14.
441. J. BLUM, supra note 440.
442. See generally S. VERBA & G. ORRAN, EQUALITY IN AMERICA: THE VIEW FROM THE Tov"
253-66 (1985) (on leadership views of economic equality). In Jennifer Hochschild's study of atti-
tudes toward distributive justice, the "[r]espondents usually start from a principle of equality, and
use mainly egalitarian norms, when they address the socializing and political domains; they usually
start from a principle of differentiation, and use mainly differentiating norms, when they address the
economic domain." J. HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR? AMICAN BELIEFS AEQUT DISTIBUTIVE
JUSTICE 82 (1981).
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pronounced widening of the circle of full citizenship. It is not much of an exag-
geration to say that today, in theory, every citizen belongs, as a full member of
the society.443 This development is not just a matter of rhetorical style. Hypoc-
risy may be the tribute that vice pays to virtue, but virtue has a way of collecting
its accounts. Pieties, repeated often enough, come to be believed and ultimately
affect behavior. One major success of the civil rights movement was that it con-
tributed to the development of the American civic culture, providing both a
theoretical foundation and a behavioral model for other egalitarian movements.
In today's prevailing ideology, we have settled the question, "Equality for
whom?," by answering, "For everyone."
Yet no one can live on ideology alone. The threat of a permanent under-
class associated with race is serious enough to make us refine the question:
"Who belongs to America?" In these circumstances the distinction between
class and caste loses much of its utility. The historic association between assimi-
lation and economic advancement suggests the wisdom of public policies aimed
at breaking the hold of a racially based system of class that has the look of
permanence. I do not argue here that the Constitution compels such policies, 444
but merely that, given the high correlation between racial class and caste, noth-
ing in the individualism or egalitarianism of our civic culture stands in the way
of the policies' adoption.
Individualism and egalitarianism bear on cultural assimilation in many of
the same ways. When a system of racial or religious or ethnic domination is
ended, some of the pressures that induce members of the dominated group to opt
for separatist solutions is relieved. At the same time, the importance of an indi-
vidual's connection with a group is reduced in the consciousness of members of
that group and of others. When Catholics are treated equally with Protestants,
the status of "being a Catholic" loses much of its previous social and political
importance, religious intermarriage rises in frequency, and a Catholic can be
elected President. Yet the civic culture's norm of equal treatment, irrespective
of an individual's group membership, also protects a cultural group against gov-
ernmental sanctions that might threaten its existence. Furthermore, the civic
culture expects equal treatment of the groups themselves.
Inevitably, however, group loyalties are translated into intergroup conflict.
The Framers recognized that problems were associated with the Nation's cul-
tural diversity, 445 and today's expression, "intergroup relations," reminds us of
our own divisions based on race, ethnicity, and religion. No one should expect
443. Even aliens "belong" in some ways. Our constitutional law reflects the dominant ideology
when it recognizes that, for some purposes, aliens are entitled to equal treatment along with citizens.
The most dramatic example of this recognition in recent years is Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(states cannot deny public school instruction to the children of undocumented aliens). Despite this
decision, undocumented aliens are far from being accepted as full members of the community, either
in law or in the mind of the general public. See L6pez, supra note 316.
444. I have argued elsewhere that some kinds of poverty are sufficiently dehumanizing and de-
moralizing to require governmental action to restore the equal citizenship of their victims. Karst,
supra note 237, at 59-64, supra note 168 and accompanying text. For commentary linking racism
and social class with the ideology of equality of opportunity, see Lawrence, "Justice" or "Just Us".
Racism and the Role of Ideology (Book Review), 35 STAN. L. REv. 831 (1983).
445. See THE FEDERALiST No. 51, at 357-59 (3. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
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those divisions or their attendant conflicts to disappear. Cultural politics may
sometimes trouble our hearts, but it is here to stay. One result, in a society that
is complex, multicultural, and increasingly national in scope, is that the Nation
has come to be seen as the one institution capable of coordinating the society's
fragmented interactions and of resolving intergroup differences.44 6 In perform-
ing these functions, the Nation itself is reinforced in the minds of its citizens as a
source of basic group identity, an object of basic loyalty.447 When we behave in
ways that reinforce the civic culture's ideals of individualism and egalitarianism,
we strengthen the restraints on our impulses to cultural domination. In so do-
ing, we promote not only tolerance for diversity but also the sense of belonging
to America-and so complete the circle back to nationalism.
In our society, one of the most prominent bridges between ideology and
behavior is the law, particularly constitutional law. It is fair to say that the
Constitution today is our pre-eminent symbol of nationhood 4 8 and that the
doctrine of judicial review is a major practical support for both the attitudinal
and the behavioral elements of the American civic culture. It is true that dis-
putes over the meaning of the Constitution have frequently been the foci for
bitter division among Americans. 449 Yet the very passion of these disputes sug-
gests that the contending parties have understood that they were fighting over a
symbol that mattered. When a constitutional struggle did split the Nation, the
important conflict over interpretation went to issues such as the power of the
Congress over the extension of slavery. In other words, disagreement centered
on the structure of government, not on the underlying values of the civic culture.
Indeed, both sides appealed to the ideals of freedom and equality. The Confed-
eracy registered its appreciation of the Constitution's value as a symbol by cast-
ing its own constitution in words closely resembling those of the Constitution of
the United States. From one perspective the entire episode can be seen as a
demonstration of the way conflict can play a unifying function by making clear
to the contesting parties that they agree on the value of the prize.
450
Constitutional litigation itself performs a similar unifying function, for it is
a process in which ideology is reinforced by the behavior of litigants and of legal
professionals, including judges. Litigants express their belonging to the national
community by appealing to the civic culture's basic norms. When judges en-
force the Constitution's protections of cultural minorities against various forms
of domination, that judicial behavior not only helps to preserve the integrity of
446. Madison remarked that the proposed Constitution contained an important safeguard
against local tyrannies. See id. One faction might control a majority in a single state, but, "[in the
extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects
which it embraces," id. at 359, coalitions would have to rest on principles of the general good, not on
the good of a powerful faction. The tyranny of local majorities might be resisted by concentrating
power in the national government, the composition of which would be determined with the partici-
pation of all the Nation's sects and factions. The application of civil rights legislation to end the
sway of Jim Crow in the southern states is a modern illustration of such a use of national power.
447. See H. IsAAcs, supra note 10, at 171-204.
448. See P. DEvINE, supra note 372, at 116-19, 141-43; R. GABRIEL, supra note 383, at 397-
405; Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L. 1290, 1294-1305, 1315-1319 (1937).
449. See, eg., Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SuP. Cr. REv. 123.
450. See L. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CoNFLIcT 121-28 (1956).
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cultural groups but also reinforces the individualism and egalitarianism that are
central to the American group identity. When the ideology of the civic culture
is embodied in positive law, it is not just the enactment of the law that serves to
unify the society but the enforcement of the law in actual cases.451 Law is ideol-
ogy, all right, but the application of law is the ritual behavior that keeps the
ideology alive. When our constitutional law infuses the spirit of tolerance into
the decision of cases, those rituals provide regular, day-to-day renewal of the
idea that we are one nation.
Beyond the unification of society, the civic culture-has its effects on the lives
of individuals. For example, of all the norms of American culture, the norms of
the civic culture find the quickest acceptance by immigrants and the widest dif-
fusion among cultural minorities. The reason is that those norms are centered
on the public life of the community, where cultural interaction is a necessity for
survival. The adoption of the beliefs and behavioral norms of the civic culture
plainly is assimilationist in tendency, and for the most p at tis form of assimila-
tion has been avidly sought and easily achieved.452
By protecting a wide freedom of individual belief and behavior associated
with cultural identity, the Constitution matches the individualistic expectations
generated by the civic culture. It reinforces those expectations as well, with the
result that the process of assimilation is advanced. Whatever else was accom-
plished by the civil rights movement, it seems clear that Americans of the cul-
tural mainstream are more receptive today to claims of equal citizenship by
persons of different religions, races, and ethnic backgrounds than they were
before the Second World War.45 3 This change in attitude is reflected in behav-
iors, from voting454 to intermarriage.4s5 If official tolerance of cultural minori-
ties is no longer a controversial policy, one explanation may be that the policy
no longer seems to threaten expectations abott the minorities' ultimate
assimilation.
Still, no one can be at once wholly embedded in both a minority culture and
the culture of the larger society. For most of us, American identity comes easily,
even automatically. For many members of cultural minorities, however, identifi-
cation with America is a choice that entail$ osts. 45 6 Their willingness to iden-
451. See generally Bredemeier, Law as an Integrative Mechanism, in LAW AND SOCIOLOOY 73
(W. Evan ed. 1962) (on the legal system's contributions to societal integrgtion through the resolution
of conflicts).
452. See Buenker, supra note 44, at 318-29 (9n assimilaton of the Irish, blacls, and ethnic mi-
norities into the American culture).
453. See Pettigrew, supra note 25, at 26-27.
454. At this writing, the Governors of California and New York are of Armenian and Italian
descent, respectively. Catholic candidates for the Presidency are taken seriously. Blacks have been
elected as mayors of a number of major cities, often with the necessary support of white voters.
455. See supra note 204.
456. In this context, as Irving Howe has remarked, "All changes bring losses . " Howe,
Toward An Open Culture, NEw REPUBLIC, March 5, 1984, at 25, 27. For a theoretical discussion,
see A. WALLACE, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY 199-206 (2d ed. 1970). See also S. STEINER, LA
RAZA: THE MEXICAN AMERiCANS 230-44 (1970) (presenting a range of views on the question of
Chicano identity, including views from the streets of the barrio concerning those who leave). The
point is made with poignancy in several recent autobiographies. See, ag., E. GALARzA, BARRIO
Boy (1971) (acculturation of Mexican immigrant to California); E. RiVERA, FAMILY INSTALL-
[VCol. 64
CULTURAL IDENTITY
tify themselves as Americans will vary in proportion to their perception that the
ideals of the civic culture have been made a reality in their own lives. One major
influence on their sense of belonging will be the development of our constitu-
tional law.
Justice Black once chided Justice Frankfurter for limiting his search for
guidance in constitutional interpretation to the traditions of the "English-speak-
ing peoples,"' 457 but in fact American constitutional law, like the rest of the
American civic culture, is predominantly an outgrowth of British-American tra-
ditions of liberalism.458 Although our constitutional law began as the artifact of
a particular culture, it is also capable of embracing the attitudes and behaviors of
other cultures. This openness to accommodation is the product of our civic cul-
ture's values of individual liberty and equality. Immigrants to America gener-
ally are receptive to the civic culture; however, some of the expectations of that
culture-its egalitarian norms in particular-may be troubling to some newcom-
ers. For example, there is a sizeable population of immigrants from Vietnam in
southern California. American norms concerning equality between the sexes are
putting a strain on some marriages,459 and other egalitarian norms are compli-
cating life for some Vietnamese workers and their employers46 0-just as similar
norms have troubled many of their native-born American contemporaries.
This recent experience illustrates a larger principle: there are norms of the
American civic culture to which the Nation can legitimately demand conform-
ance in the interest of protecting the principle of equal citizenship, the right to
belong. In particular, it is proper for us to insist on observance of the civic
culture's norms of social equality, even when those norms require the abandon-
ment of another culture's norms of dominance and subordination. A major
problem for our constitutional doctrine over the next generation will be to sort
out these justified exactions of cultural conformity from the cases in which re-
quiring people to conform is, as the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions said of
the conformity demanded by the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, a threat to
MENTs: MEMORIES OF GROWING UP HISPANIC (1982) (Puerto Rican in New York); R. RODRI-
GUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD RODRIGUEZ (1982) (California-born
Chicano moving away from his family).
The personal stories connected with acculturation make fine reading. See, eg., AMERICAN Mo-
SAIC (J. Morrison & C. Zabusky eds. 1980) (collection of stories of the immigrant experience in the
words of those who lived it); CHILDREN OF THE UPROOTED (D. Handlin ed. 1966).
457. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
458. See L. HARTZ, supra note 403; S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 381, at 20. James Q. Wilson,
reviewing more than two dozen analyses of the political culture of Americans, noted general agree-
ment about five widely shared values: liberty, individualism, equal opportunity, the rule of law, and
civic duty. J. WILSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 79 (1980). S. HUNTINGTON, supra note 381, at
15, lists the following values as central to the American creed: "constitutionalism, individualism,
liberalism, democracy, and egalitarianism."
459. Day & Holley, Vietnamese Create Their Own Saigon, L.A. Times, Sept. 30, 1984, § I, at 3,
col. 1. Furthermore, when Vietnamese children in school learn "to ask why mad to express opin-
ions," at home they may be less apt to follow the cultural norm of the homeland or to "do what they
are told." Id.
460. 'Taking orders or direction from someone who held a lesser job in Vietnam can be a serious
obstacle for some workers.... Even worse are problems with some women supervisors.
'Vietnamese men [do not] respond well to female direction,' said [one company official]." Id.
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"the general principles of free government. '4 61 In other words, nationalism, in
the sense of acceptance of the civic culture, does not require the complete aban-
donment of distinctive cultural identities.
One unexpected product of the civil rights movement was the white "ethnic
revival" of the early 1970s.462 Some cultural groups actively sought to prevent
assimilation. Janet Dolgin describes the Jewish Defense League as "a project to
enact ethnicity," 463 and goes on to show how the JDL consistently demon-
strated its acceptance of the ideological forms of American politics.4 64 The re-
cent ethnic revival signaled neither a return to traditional ethnic communities
nor the foundation of new communities of refuge. Rather, buttons that say "Kiss
me, I'm Irish" and T-shirts advertising "Green Power" appear to represent a
transformation of ethnic identity, an effort by assimilated Americans to distin-
guish themselves with an overlay of expressive ethnic solidarity or "symbolic
ethnicity." 465 "Being Irish in Boston today. . . bears no resemblance to being
Irish in Boston in 1851.11466
That ethnicity has become a matter of choice for scores of millions of
Americans is a triumph for the ideology of tolerance and an illustration of the
staying power of the values of individualism and egalitarianism. The broad
range of "varieties of ethnic experience" 467 available to a great many people in
this country is founded solidly on the civic culture that infuses our constitutional
law.
461. 1. CAREY, supra note 78, at 38-39 (quoting Madison's speech before the Virginia Assembly,
Dec. 21, 1798); see supra note 87 and accompanying text. Our constitutional law has made some
accommodations to the values and perceptions of groups outside the cultural "mainstream." The
Amish, for example, see separation from the world in a redemptive community as a Biblical com-
mand. J. HOSTETLER, supra note 12, at 77-79. They avoid, to the extent feasible, participation in
the larger society's system of law and government (although they do vote in elections), and they seek
to withdraw their children from consolidated public high schools. Id. at 251-69. The Supreme
Court, confronted with claims of religious liberty arising out of Amish separatism, has struck a
rough balance, accepting the claim against a compulsory school law, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972), but denying the claim in the context of Social Security taxation, United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982). These decisions are appropriate to the civic culture's value of tolerance. The tax
poses no serious threat to the taxpayer's cultural identity; compulsory attendance at high school is
another matter, assuming the children agree with their parents' religious views. Similarly, decisions
on jury discrimination focus on the goal of drawing jurors from a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity, with particular reference to such juror characteristics as race and ethnicity. Eg., Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). Such characteristics are relevant not only because of the danger of
racial or ethnic prejudice but also because of the differences in "perspective[s] on human events"
associated with race or ethnicity. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972) (plurality opinion of
Marshall, J.).
462. See, eg., P. KRiCKus, PURSUING THE AMERICAN DREAM: WHITE ETHNICS AND THE
NEW POPULISM (1976); M. NovAK, THE RISE OF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS (1971). But see S.
STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH: RACE, ETHNIcrTY, AND CLASS IN AMERICA 50-51, 73-74 (1982)
(advancing thesis that the ethnic revival was not a genuine "revitalization" of ethnicity, but an illus-
tration of the general decline of ethnic communities).
463. J. DOLGIN, supra note 107, at 15.
464. J. DOLGIN, supra note 107.
465. See Gans, Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America, in ON
THE MAKING OF AMERICANS 193 (H. Gans ed. 1979).
466. Thernstrom, supra note 148, at 20.
467. See supra note 20.
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CULTURAL IDENTITY
American history is the history of many peoples and of one people. That
there is an American people has always been a subject for discussion in this
country; surely no other people in human history has felt a greater compulsion
to keep on verifying its own existence, year after year. When we look into the
mirror, however, what we see is nothing tangible, but an abstraction: a civic
culture that provides us with our identity as a people and a nation. Indeed, it is
our need for national self-definition that has given the American civic culture
such a prominent role in the life of our society. Because American identity is the
civic culture, it enters into every individual American's life as an important part
of the sense of self.
The civic culture thus plays an important stabilizing role, both for the soci-
ety and for each one of us; yet it is not static. In the modem era its growth has
been nourished by one of the very processes it has made possible: the integration
into American society of cultural groups previously treated as marginal. Thus,
one admirable feature of today's American civic culture, in comparison with
yesterday's, is its relative openness. On the whole, Americans now profess the
belief that people of any and all cultures deserve to belong as members of the
national community so long as they embrace the civic culture itself. In promot-
ing tolerance and the sense of belonging, the American civic culture and Ameri-
can constitutional law have come a long way in the seven decades since the
heyday of the Americanization movement. Generally, those changes have made
our country more civilized and more humane.
Even so, the work of maintaining a society characterized by tolerance and
"the spirit of moderation" 468 never ends. In a nation of many cultures, we shall
never be able to put the impulse to nativist domination wholly behind us; the
case of the Nativity scene is a sobering reminder. Yet every such incident is an
occasion for resolving to live up to the ideals we profess. Because the Nation's
identity and the identity of each one of us as an American are to be found in the
American civic culture, all of us have a stake in the tolerance and the freedom of
cultural choice that make it possible for many peoples to be a nation.
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